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I.

INTRODUCTION

Technology has transformed the consumer marketplace. 1 It has
radically changed the way consumers enter into contracts for goods and

*
Mark E. Budnitz is the Bobby Lee Cook Professor of Law Emeritus,
Georgia State University College of Law. He received his B.A. from Dartmouth College and
his J.D. from Harvard Law School. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his graduate
research assistant Tianqi Xu; Pam Brannon, Coordinator of Faculty Library Services; and
Karen Butler, Administrative Specialist. He thanks Editor-in-Chief Bryan Siddique and the
other organizers for the opportunity to participate in the Nova Law Review Symposium
Progression 2018. He would also like to thank Lead Articles Editor Veronika Balbuzanova
and the other editors for their editorial expertise.
1.
Orrin Broberg, Eight Ways Technology Is Changing Business, MODUS:
MODUS BLOG (Dec. 5, 2013, 1:35 AM), http://www.gomodus.com/blog/eight-waystechnology-changing-business.
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services. 2 Part II of this Article provides the broader context in which online
contracting occurs, describing the general electronic environment that
technology has made possible, including its costs as well as its benefits. 3
The law has failed to keep up with this transformation and Part III points out
these gaps in the law. 4 The major focus of this Article is on issues raised by
the new ways in which consumers and businesses enter into online
contracts. 5 Part IV begins this inquiry by providing a brief history of the
various media people have used to embody contract terms and to document
the parties’ intention to enter into a contract.6 Part V reviews applicable
legislation. 7 It also analyzes the emerging case law in which courts struggle
to determine whether consumers have entered into a contract when they use a
mouse to click on a button labeled “I agree” or have the opportunity to click
on a hyperlink that leads to an agreement but does not require any explicit
indication of their consent. 8 Part V describes the new environment in which
consumers order goods by touching or tapping on small mobile device
screens or by talking to virtual personal assistants. 9 Unique legal issues
relating to the formation of contracts arise when agreements are made using
these devices. 10 Part VI discusses various approaches policymakers could
adopt to develop the law on contracting in cyberspace in an ever-changing
consumer e-commerce marketplace. 11
II.

TECHNOLOGY HAS FOREVER CHANGED THE LIVES OF CONSUMERS
FOR GOOD AND BAD

The focus of this article is on the formation of online consumer
contracts by consumers when they touch or tap mobile devices and talk to
virtual assistants. 12 But in developing legal rules for formation of contracts,
courts and policymakers should consider the wider context in which online
contracting occurs. 13 Online contracting using mobile devices and virtual
2.
See id.
3.
See discussion infra Part II.
4.
See discussion infra Parts II–III.
5.
See discussion infra Part III.
6.
See discussion infra Part IV.
7.
See discussion infra Part V.
8.
See discussion infra Part V.
9.
See discussion infra Part V.
10.
See discussion infra Part V.
11.
See discussion infra Part VI.
12.
See discussion infra Parts II–IV.
13.
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS
STUDY 63–64 (7th ed. 1981); Mark E. Budnitz, Consumers Surfing for Sales in Cyberspace:
What Constitutes Acceptance and What Legal Terms and Conditions Bind the Consumer?, 16
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 741, 743–45 (2000).
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assistants takes place in a world in which technology in general, and
electronic devices in particular, are increasingly pervasive.14 As the
following examples illustrate, these developments have brought significant
benefits to the consumer who is able to have access to them. 15 They also
have introduced costs and risks, have had unintended negative consequences,
and have increased the disparity between the haves and the have-nots. 16 For
the most part, the law has not responded in a timely or adequate manner, if at
all, as described in Part III. 17
Technology has been a boon for the disabled. 18 For example, an app
enables a blind person to use a smartphone or glasses with a camera to
livestream video to a helper, who then assists the blind person to get to the
desired destination. 19 But connected health services may collect huge
amounts of very personal information. 20
Services, such as Florida’s SunPass, enable people to drive right
through toll booths and receive a monthly bill instead of having to carry cash
and face the delay of long lines at the toll booths. 21 A botched system
It is society and not the courts which gives rise to, which shapes in the first instance
. . . emerging institution[s]; which kicks the courts into action. It is only from
observation of society that the courts can pick their notions of what needs the new
institution serves, what needs it baffles.

LLEWELLYN, supra, at 63.
14.
See Broberg, supra note 1.
15.
See Christopher G. Bradley, FinTech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 61, 71 (2018). The poor and elderly have limited access to the benefits of technology.
Id. at 72. Rural areas and minority communities lack adequate access to broadband,
presenting “a major constraint on economic opportunity and mobility.” K. Sabeel Rahman,
The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility
Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1653 (2018). Financial institutions have not designed
websites and apps tailored to meet the needs of the elderly. See Joshua C.P. Reams,
Comment, Twenty-First Century Advertising and the Plight of the Elderly Consumer, 52
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 325, 333 (2016).
16.
Bradley, supra note 15, at 71–72; Monica Anderson, Digital Divide
Persists Even as Lower-Income Americans Make Gains in Tech Adoption, PEW RES. CTR.
(Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/22/digital-divide-persistseven-as-lower-income-americans-make-gains-in-tech-adoption/.
17.
See discussion infra Part III.
18.
“Technology, a Boon to Disabled”, DECCAN HERALD (Jan. 16, 2010,
11:08 PM), http://www.deccanherald.com/content/47216/technology-boon-disabled.html.
19.
Joshua Brockman, Tech Makes Life Easier for Disabled Travelers, Until
They Board, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2018, at B5.
20.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED
WORLD
i–ii,
vii
(2015),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-reportnovember-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
21.
FLA. TURNPIKE ENTERPRISE, FLORIDA’S TURNPIKE: ALL-ELECTRONIC, NOCASH
TOLLING
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS
1
(Sept.
2015),
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upgrade, however, resulted in drivers receiving erroneous bills for hundreds
of dollars. 22
Google dominates internet search with an almost ninety percent
market share, and Facebook is the main social network. 23 If they do not
deliver the services users want, they would not be so tremendously popular,
but they also collect, store, and use huge amounts of information about
users. 24 As a result, “[t]hey can affect not only our wallets but our privacy,
autonomy, democracy, and well-being.” 25
Carriers, such as AT&T and T-Mobile, have brought consumers the
many revolutionary features of cell phones that have benefitted users in
many ways—providing convenient communication with others, email, text
messages, navigation tools, and cameras. 26 Consumers can increase the
phone’s level of service by consenting to share their location to the carrier. 27
But it turns out that carriers actually depend on third parties to maintain
location information, and some third parties ascertain user locations without
obtaining their consent. 28

http://www.floridasturnpike.com/documents/aet/AllElectronic%20Tolling%20FAQs%20Sept%202015__print.pdf.
22.
Sheri Kotzum, Botched Upgrade Leaves SunPass Users Facing Huge
FLA.
DAILY
NEWS
(Aug.
13,
2018,
11:51
AM),
Fees,
NW.
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20180811/botched-upgrade-leaves-sunpass-users-facinghuge-fees.
23.
Greg Ip, Capital Account: Bail-Bond Ad Bans Spark Web Debate, WALL
ST. J., July 5, 2018, at A2.
24.
Maurice E. Stucke, Here Are All the Reasons It’s a Bad Idea to Let a Few
Tech Companies Monopolize Our Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 27, 2018),
http://hbr.org/2018/03/here-are-all-the-reasons-its-a-bad-idea-to-let-a-few-tech-companiesmonopolize-our-data.
25.
Id.
26.
See Drew FitzGerald, Third Parties Know Exactly Where You Are, WALL
ST. J., July 16, 2018, at B4; 8 Advantages and Disadvantages of Cell Phones,
FUTUREOFWORKING,
http://www.futureofworking.com/8-advantages-and-disadvantages-ofcell-phones (last visited May 1, 2019).
27.
Zack Whittaker, Verizon, Sprint, AT&T and T-Mobile Stop Sharing RealTime Cell Phone Location Data, ZDNET (June 19, 2018, 11:49 AM),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/senator-rebukes-carriers-sharing-real-time-location-data/; Fred
Zahradnik, Tracking and Other Cell Phone GPS Services, LIFEWIRE (Oct. 30, 2018),
http://www.lifewire.com/gps-tracking-and-services-on-phone-1683467.
28.
Whittaker, supra note 27. “Mapping a cell phone’s location over the
course of [one hundred twenty-seven] days provides an all-encompassing record of the
holder’s whereabouts. As with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate
window into a person’s life . . . .” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
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Airlines use technology to provide passengers with many
conveniences. 29 Passengers can relax by watching television programs,
movies, or the news on the screen provided on the back of the seat in front of
them. 30 Or they can connect to the airline’s Wi-Fi and use their laptop to
catch up on work. 31 Alaska Airlines gives its flight attendants an app on
their mobile devices that they can use to report passengers who create
problems, such as sexual harassment, to the company. 32 Flight attendants on
United Airlines have an app that provides them with information about each
frequent flyer passenger. 33
“[T]he Internet of Things (“IoT”) [is] an interconnected environment
where all manner of objects have a digital presence and the ability to
communicate with other objects and people.” 34 IoT has the potential to
provide substantial benefits to users. 35 There are many obvious risks,
however, including security breaches and privacy invasions. 36
An
unanticipated risk has emerged as well.37 IoT is being used as an instrument
of domestic abuse in which the abuser uses IoT “as a means for harassment,
monitoring, revenge, and control.” 38

29.
Marisa Garcia, 6 Innovative In-Flight Technologies Keeping Passengers
Distracted, SKIFT (May 13, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.skift.com/2015/05/13/six-hand-medown-ife-solutions-which-are-pretty-good-news-for-passengers/.
30.
Id.
31.
See id.
32.
Scott McCartney, The Middle Seat: What the Airline Knows About the
Guy in Seat 12A, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2018, at A11.
33.
Id. Flight attendants on United Airlines flights have an app that can show
them detailed information on each passengers’ last five flights. Id.
34.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at 1. “[T]he [IoT] involves a
transformation of everyday physical objects into smart objects able to react to and
communicate with the world around them in an efficient and frictionless way.” Jessie Cheng,
Toward the Internet of Value: The Internet of Things and the Future of Payment Systems, in
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS: LAW AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 287, 287 (1st ed. 2017).
35.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at 2. “Connected health devices
will allow consumers with serious health conditions to work with their physicians to manage
their diseases.” Id. “Connected cars will notify first responders in the event of an accident.”
Id. IoT in the home can provide homeowners with information allowing them to use energy
more efficiently and alerting them to water in their basement. Id. at 8–9.
36.
Id. at 10–11.
37.
See Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of
TIMES:
TECH.
(June
23,
2018),
Domestic
Abuse,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/smart-home-devices-domestic-abuse.html.
38.
Id. Abusers use home IoT to “watch and listen . . . scare or show power.
Even after a partner had left the home, the devices often stayed and continued to be used to
intimidate and confuse.” Id.
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Video games have provided children with many hours of
entertainment. 39 In addition, “[t]hey can help students improve in math and
history, plus nurture team-building skills and creativity.” 40 But experts fear
they may also have serious negative effects on behavior. 41 Young children
have difficulty telling the difference between what is real and what is
fantasy. 42 This creates behavioral problems when they interact with a virtual
personal assistant such as Alexa or Siri. 43
Having described some of the features of the current technological
revolution and the problems they cause, Part III briefly reviews lawmakers’
failure to take action to provide safeguards or remedies for injury that may
occur. 44
III.

LAWMAKERS HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO THE TECHNOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION

The technological developments described in Part II have had a
profound impact on consumers. 45 While they have provided consumers with
many benefits, they also have inflicted many costs.46 To an overwhelming
extent, legislatures and government agencies have been silent. 47

39.
See Keith Stuart, What Every Parent Needs to Know About Video Games:
A
Crash
Course,
GUARDIAN
(June
2,
2014,
7:16
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/02/parents-guide-video-games-playstationxbox-wii-apps-children.
40.
Sarah E. Needleman, Game Developers Are Making It Hard for Players to
Stop — Availability on Multiple Devices Add to Allure, Long Hours, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21,
2018, at B4.
41.
See id. The World Health Organization has added a new disease
classification—gaming disorder. Id.
42.
Sue Shellenbarger, Alexa! Tell My Child to Behave! — Children as
Young as 1 Are Using Voice-Activated Technology, but Some Parents Worry They’re Picking
Up Rude Habits, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2018, at A9.
43.
See id. “Many [young children] see smart speakers as magical, imbue
them with human traits and boss them around like a Marine drill sergeant, according to several
new studies in the past year.” Id. Because adults have difficulty restricting the amount of
time they spend on various apps, Apple and Google are developing tools that allow users to
limit the time they spend each day on various apps. Joanna Stern, Willpower Eased iPhone
Addiction, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2018, at B4.
44.
See discussion infra Part III.
45.
See discussion supra Part II.
46.
See Daniel Callahan, Health Care Costs and Medical Technology, in
FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING
BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 79, 79–80 (Mary Crowley ed.,
2008).
47.
See id. at 81.
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The most important areas in which lawmakers have not acted are
data security and consumer privacy. 48 The technological developments
described in Part II have greatly increased the risk that data about personal
consumer information will be collected, often secretly stored, sold to others,
or stolen. 49 As a result, there has been a substantial loss of consumer
privacy. 50 The United States, however, has no comprehensive law ensuring
consumer privacy. 51 Instead, it has laws covering narrowly-defined
situations with limited scope and inadequate consumer remedies.52
There are exceptions, however. 53 A few states have enacted statutes
or regulations that begin to deal with consumer privacy. 54 The European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, effective in May 2018, may
impact consumers in the United States because some multi-national
companies are adopting it as their standard operating practice in every

48.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at vii–viii.
49.
Cheng, supra note 34, at 294; McCartney, supra note 32; John D.
McKinnon, Lawmakers to Quiz Tech Giants on Privacy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2018, at A6;
see also discussion supra Part II.
50.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at 10–11.
51.
See David Lott, The GDPR’s Impact on U.S. Consumers, FED. RES. BANK
ATLANTA (June 4, 2018), http://takeonpayments.frbatlanta.org/2018/06/the-gdprs-impact-onus-consumers.html. “There have been numerous efforts in the United States to pass uniform
privacy legislation, with little or no change.” Id.
52.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012) (coverage limited to children under
thirteen and no private right of action); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809, 6821–6827 (2012) (limited
privacy disclosures to customers of the financial institutions that are covered by the Act; no
private right of action); 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 7706 (2012) (no private right of
action); 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012) (protections limited to automat[ed] telephone dialing
systems). Each of these statutes has its own limitations in terms of type of institutions or
situations covered as well as no or restricted consumer remedies. Eleanor Lumsden, Securing
Mobile Technology & Financial Transactions in the United States, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 139,
172 (2012). Part II explains that cell phone carriers use third parties to obtain location data
without users’ consent. FitzGerald, supra note 26; see also discussion supra Part II. Some
experts believe that does not violate any law. FitzGerald, supra note 26.
53.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2019); Ben Kochman,
3 Things You Need to Know About NY’s Latest Cyber Regs, LAW360 (Aug. 30, 2018, 6:23
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/1077789/3-things-you-need-to-know-about-ny-s-latestcyber-regs.
54.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199. California Assembly Bill
No. 375 deals with the collection, storage, and sale of personal information of California
residents. Assemb. B. 375, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). It becomes effective on
Jan. 1, 2020. Id. § 1798.100. New York’s Department of Financial Services issued
regulations that became effective in September 2018 requiring the destruction of old data,
safeguarding sensitive information on company devices or servers, and having the ability to
digitally trace the source of a data breach. Press Release, Dep’t of Fin. Servs., DFS
Superintendent Vullo Reminds Regulated Entities of Approaching Cybersecurity Regulation
Compliance Effective Date (Aug. 8, 2018) (on file with author); Kochman, supra note 53.
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country where they do business—regardless of whether the regulation
applies to consumers in those countries. 55
In addition, there are no laws explicitly dealing with problems
consumers might face related to the electronic age in which they now live. 56
Examples include the IoT; 57 facial and voice recognition; 58 surveillance by
drones; 59 electronic monitoring by stores in order to collect, store, and sell
customer information, 60 or charge customer accounts for purchases; 61 and
injury to persons and property caused by drones 62 and self-driving vehicles. 63
As discussed in Part II, many technology developments have
resulted in products that provide consumers with significant benefits. 64 But
55.
See Tony Romm et al., Europe, Not the U.S., Is Now the Most Powerful
Regulator
of
Silicon
Valley,
WASH.
POST
(May
25,
2018),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/europe-not-the-us-is-now-the-mostpowerful-regulator-of-silicon-valley/2018/05/25/f7dfb600-604f-11e8-8c938cf33c21da8d_story.html.
56.
See Daniel Malan, The Law Can’t Keep Up with New Tech. Here’s How
ECON.
F.
(June
21,
2018),
to
Close
the
Gap,
WORLD
http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/law-too-slow-for-new-tech-how-keep-up/.
57.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at vii. As described in Part II, IoT is
being used as an instrument of domestic abuse. Bowles, supra note 37. Victims sometimes
request courts to issue restraining orders prohibiting the abuser from having contact with the
victim. Id. Often, they do not realize they need to ask the judge to specifically prohibit using
IoT to abuse the victim. Id. If the restraining order merely forbids contact, it may not cover
the abuser remotely manipulating devices connected to IoT. Id.
58.
Natasha Singer, Tech to Spot Faces Gets It Wrong, Say Lawmakers, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2018, at B4; Oleksandr Pastukhov & Els Kindt, Voice Recognition: Risks to
Our
Privacy,
FORBES
(Oct.
6,
2016,
5:16
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/10/06/voice-recognition-every-single-day-everyword-you-say/#2a2f570e786d.
59.
Gail Schontzler, MSU Moves to Restrict Drones on Campus, BOZEMAN
DAILY
CHRON.
(Sept.
6,
2018),
http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/montana_state_university/msu-moves-torestrict-drones-on-campus/article_18443f34-51b4-5731-bb4d-b1ad15e353c2.html.
60.
JOSEPH TUROW, THE AISLES HAVE EYES: HOW RETAILERS TRACK YOUR
SHOPPING, STRIP YOUR PRIVACY, AND DEFINE YOUR POWER 3–5 (2017).
61.
Dominik Bosnjak, Amazon’s Mission of Making Cashiers Redundant
HEADLINES
(Sept.
10,
2018,
7:23
AM),
Continues,
ANDROID
http://www.androidheadlines.com/2018/09/amazons-mission-of-making-cashiers-redundantcontinues.html.
62.
Schontzler, supra note 59.
63.
Bridget Clerkin, Are Today’s Laws Adequate for Self-Driving Cars?,
DMV.ORG: ARTICLES (May 8, 2018), http://www.dmv.org/articles/can-current-laws-handleself-driving-vehicles; see also Keith Laing, Few Carmakers Submit Self-driving Car Safety
NEWS
(Sept.
10,
2018,
1:51
PM)
Reports,
DETROIT
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/mobility/2018/09/10/few-carmakers-submitself-driving-safety-assessments/1076691002/.
64.
See discussion infra Part II.
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only those who can afford those products realize those benefits. 65 For those
who do not have the financial means, the impact of the digital divide will
only increase. 66 It is not only the poor who are deprived of this technological
revolution. 67 Regardless of how much money a person has, access also
depends on the availability of high-speed internet, cell phone towers, etc.68
Many rural areas lack that access. 69 Legislation to improve affordability and
access may be the only way to provide services that are increasingly
regarded as essential. 70 Examples of government programs from the past
include rural electrification 71 and universal access to telephone service. 72
Social scientists have only begun to assess the psychological impact
of this world of pervasive technology. 73 But some studies suggest many
have become dependent on it and, as a result, may have become socially
isolated. 74 In the future, they may decide legal measures are necessary, at
least with regard to young people. 75 An example of legislation to protect
children is the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.76 It prohibits
65.
See Anderson, supra note 16.
66.
See id. The models introduced in September 2018 cost an average of
$949—fifteen percent more than a year earlier. Tripp Mickle, Apple’s Phones Get Bigger,
Pricier — Latest Models Cost $949 on Average, 15% More than iPhones Launched a Year
Ago, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2018, at B1.
67.
Anderson, supra note 16; see also Mark Niesse, Power Co-ops Become
Rural Internet Saviors: Utilities Step in to Close Digital Gap in Georgia’s Remote
Communities, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 10, 2018, at A1.
68.
See Niesse, supra note 67.
69.
Id.
70.
See id.
71.
Jim Galloway, Rescuing Rural Georgia: A Search for Economic,
Political Rationality, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 9, 2018, at B1 (quoting Professor Joe
Crespino saying there is a straight-up direct analogy between the rural electrification program
under former President Roosevelt and Congress and the need for government support for rural
broadband); see also Niesse, supra note 67.
72.
See Edward Wyatt, Appeals Court Rules for F.C.C. on Broadband Fund,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2014, at B2. A Federal Communications Commission plan has partially
ameliorated the problem of internet access. Id. It has converted the universal telephone
program to one that would provide a subsidy for high-speed internet service in designated
areas of need. Id. It has withstood a legal challenge in a case before the Tenth Circuit. See In
re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015, 1159 (10th Cir. 2014).
73.
See Kaveri Subrahmanyam et al., The Impact of Computer Use on
Children’s and Adolescents’ Development, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 7, 18–19
(2001).
74.
Id. at 19.
75.
See Joanne Orlando, Banning Kids from Using Technology Is CounterProductive, CONVERSATION: SCI. & TECH. (Feb. 10, 2015, 6:44 PM),
http://www.theconversation.com/banning-kids-from-using-technology-is-counter-productive37173.
76.
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012); 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2018).
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companies from collecting personal information online from children
without parental consent. 77
Parts II and III have described the larger technological context in
which online contracting occurs. 78 Part IV begins the examination of the
formation of contracts in cyberspace by first briefly contrasting how parties
entered into contracts over roughly the last two millennia.79
IV.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONTRACT MEDIA AND SIGNATURES

In the ancient Middle East, most people were illiterate 80 and paper in
the form of papyrus was expensive, 81 fragile, not pliable, and subject to
deterioration from moisture or cracking if conditions were too dry. 82 People
engaging in business who wanted a tangible manifestation of their
transaction used seals. 83 A seal could function as a signature. 84 For
example, persons would carve their own unique image on a stone and make
an impression of it onto clay. 85 The center of the object containing the image
“was hollowed out and a cord passed through so that it could be worn around
the neck. This highly personal object performed the function of a signature
in modern society.” 86 Today, passwords that consumers use online also
serve as a way to uniquely identify themselves. 87
77.
15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii); 16 C.F.R. § 312.3.
78.
Budnitz, supra note 13, at 743, 745; see also discussion supra Parts II–III.
79.
See discussion infra Part IV.
80.
Dan Falk, More People Were Literate in Ancient Judah than We Knew,
MENTAL FLOSS (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.mentalfloss.com/article/78416/more-peoplewere-literate-ancient-judah-we-knew. Christopher Rollston, an expert in Semitic languages
and literature at George Washington University, opined that “[l]iteracy in ancient Israel and
Judah was probably [fifteen] or [twenty] percent of the population, at most.” Id.
81.
WILLIAM V. HARRIS, ANCIENT LITERACY 194–95 (1991).
82.
Papyrus, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papyrus (last updated
Mar. 31, 2019, 4:35 PM). In Egypt, in the years before and after the first century A.D.,
parchment was also available, but its use was limited because it was made from animal skins.
See id.
83.
Joshua J. Mark, Cylinder Seals in Ancient Mesopotamia — Their History
HIST.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Dec.
2,
2015),
and
Significance,
ANCIENT
http://www.ancient.eu/article/846/cylinder-seals-in-ancient-mesopotamia---their-hist/.
84.
Id.
85.
See id.
86.
THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY: THE UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF CONSERVATIVE
JUDAISM, ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 236 & n.18, (David L. Leiber et al. eds. &
trans., Jewish Publ’n. Soc’y 1999) (2001). The Biblical story of Judah and Tamar illustrate
the use of the seal as a pledge. Id. Judah promises to pay Tamar one goat when he returns to
his home. Id. To ensure that he will satisfy this obligation, he gives Tamar his seal. Id.
87.
See
More
than
Words,
ATLANTIC,
http://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/ibm-2018/beyond-passwords/1859/ (last visited May 1,
2019).
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With increased literacy and the wide availability of inexpensive
paper, written agreements became widespread and the parties to a transaction
could indicate their consent by affixing their signature to a piece of paper. 88
Although a forger can produce a perfect signature, as a general matter, each
signature is different from every other, so it serves as a unique identifier. 89
Handwriting experts often testify in court as to the authenticity of a
signature. 90 As described in Part V.F, clicking with a mouse on a button
labeled “I agree” often has replaced the written signature when parties
contract online. 91
The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) illustrates modern
American law with regard to the medium on which contracts are written and
what constitutes a signature. 92 UCC Article 2 applies to the sale of goods. 93
It has been amended to conform to the federal law validating electronic
records—the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
(“E-Sign”). 94 It replaces the former UCC definitions of writing and written
with a new term—a record. 95 A record “means information that is inscribed
[in] a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and
is retrievable in perceivable form.” 96
The UCC defines signed as including “any symbol executed or
adopted [by a party] with present intention to adopt or accept a writing.” 97
88.
See Hope Restle, The History of Successful Business Agreements in One
Handy
Chart,
BUS.
INSIDER
(June
17,
2015,
12:51
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-the-handshake-2015-6;
Paper,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paper (last updated Mar. 28, 2019, 3:57 AM). Paper was
invented in China in the early second century, A.D. Paper, supra.
89.
See Jacques Mathyer, The Expert Examination of Signatures, 52 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 122, 122, 124–25 (1961).
90.
See Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, No. 107677-RD, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS
259, at *1, *16–18 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2018) (describing in detail qualification of expert
forensic document examiner and the three-step process of his examination of wife’s
handwriting).
91.
Jeff C. Dodd & James A. Hernandez, Contracting in Cyberspace,
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J., Summer 1998, at 1, 3–4. In a clickwrap agreement, “clicking
an ‘I Agree’ button . . . is the digital equivalent of a signature at the bottom of a printed form.”
RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS, § 2, at 33 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2017).
92.
U.C.C. § 1-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
93.
Id. § 2-102.
94.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No.
106-229, § 101, 114 Stat. 464, 464–65 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7001
(2012)).
95.
Id. § 101(c).
96.
15 U.S.C. § 7006(9) (2012); U.C.C. § 1-201(31).
97.
U.C.C. § 1-201(37). The consumer’s signature, or its electronic
equivalent, may not always be required. Zacher v. Comcast Cable Commc’n LLC, No. 17 CV
7256, 2018 WL 3046955, at *3–*4 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2018). In Zacher v. Comcast Cable
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As explained in an Official Comment, “[t]he symbol may be printed,
stamped or written; it may be by initials or by thumbprint . . . . The question
always is whether the symbol was executed or adopted by the party with
present intention to adopt or accept the writing.” 98 Under this definition, a
username or password typed onto a website apparently could qualify as a
signature. 99 But neither legislation nor case law has determined whether a
click with a mouse would satisfy this provision. 100
Additional guidance is provided from definitions in two statutes
specifically tailored to apply to electronic transactions: E-Sign and the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”) that forty-seven states and
the District of Columbia have enacted. 101 For example, E-Sign requires that
in consumer transactions electronic records be perceivable in tangible
form. 102 UETA requires, in addition, that the electronic record be capable of
retention and the sender cannot inhibit the recipient’s ability to print or store
the record. 103 Sellers can satisfy this requirement by posting the agreement
in a format in which consumers can produce a paper copy through their
printers. 104 It is apparent from this requirement that policymakers recognized

Communications LLC, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires an
arbitration agreement to be in writing but does not require such agreements to be signed. Id.
98.
U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 37.
99.
Dodd & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 18; see also U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 37.
100.
See U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 37; Dodd & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 18.
101.
UETA — Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, RIGHTSIGNATURE,
http://www.rightsignature.com/legality/ueta-act (last visited May 1, 2019); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 7001; UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999). E-Sign is codified in
15 U.S.C. § 7001. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a). Electronic signature is defined in 15 U.S.C. §
7006(5). Id. § 7006(5). Record is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 7006(9). Id. § 7006(9). E-Sign and
UETA apply to UCC Article 2, the article governing transactions in goods. Id.; UNIF. ELEC.
TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3(b)(2), cmt. 4. See U.C.C. § 1-108 on the relationship between the
UCC and E-Sign. U.C.C. § 1-108. “[UETA] is not a general contracting statute, and
questions of substantive contract law are governed by the applicable body of contract law,
such as the common law of contracts or Article 2 of the [UCC]” Juliet M. Moringiello &
William L. Reynolds, Electronic Contracting Cases 2008 – 2009, 65 BUS. LAW. 317, 322
(2009). Nevertheless, “for practical purposes the UETA and ESIGN may be viewed as
adjuncts of the UCC.” Donald C. Lampe, The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and
Federal ESIGN Law: An Overview, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 255, 256 (2001).
102.
15 U.S.C. § 7006(9); U.C.C. § 1-201(31). E-Sign also includes provisions
requiring a business to obtain the consumer’s consent to provide information through
electronic records. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1).
103.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 8(a).
104.
See id. § 8(a), (c). The Official Comment to this section explains that the
recipient “must have the ability to get back to the information in some way at a later date.” Id.
§ 8, cmt. 3. “The policies underlying laws requiring the provision of information in writing
warrant [requiring] the sender to make the information available in a manner which will
permit subsequent reference.” Id.
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the risk of consumers having to rely only on records in electronic form and
the continuing reliability of paper documents. 105
In addition, UETA defines electronic signature to mean “an
electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with
a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the
record.” 106 Intent is particularly problematic when consumers engage in
online transactions and payments because anyone can type any consumer’s
name into an online form. 107 The Personal Identification Number (“PIN”) or
password is one way for consumers to authenticate who they are. 108
Biometrics such as facial recognition and scanning a person’s fingerprint or
iris are other methods being developed. 109
UCC Article 2 applies to transactions in goods. 110 It is not clear
from the text of the UCC whether software qualifies as a good. 111 Lacking
the inclusion of software in the definition of goods, courts have not
universally held that software qualifies as a good. 112 It is clear, however, that
105.
See id. § 8(a).
106.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(8). E-Sign’s definition of electronic
signature is almost identical. 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5).
107.
See Matthew A. Cordell, An Introduction to the Law of Electronic
Signatures and Electronic Records in North Carolina (Part 2), TECH., PRIVACY & DATA SEC.
L. BLOG (May 24, 2014, 6:39 PM), http://www.privacylawnc.blogspot.com/2014/05.
108.
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES: A REVIEW OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN
GLOBAL
AND
NATIONAL
COMMERCE
ACT
6
(2003),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/esignfinal.pdf. UCC Article 9 replaces the
terms sign and signed with the term authenticate. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(7) (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). It did this “to . . . authenticat[e] . . . all records, not just writings.”
Id. § 9-102, cmt 9b; see also UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT §
102(a)(6) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMMR’S UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002). The Uniform Computer
Information Transaction Act was enacted in Maryland and Virginia. What Is the Uniform
Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA)?, DANIEL W. UHLFELDER P.A.,
http://www.dwulaw.com/news/what-is-the-uniform-computer-information-Transaction-ActUCITA.shtml (last visited May 1, 2019); see also UNIF. COMP. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT §
102.
109.
See Bryan Yurcan, Corporate Customers Want Retail’s Bells and
BANKER
(July
3,
2018,
11:43
AM),
Whistles,
Too,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/corporate-customers-want-retail-banking-techs-bellsand-whistles-too (reporting that a Merrill Lynch mobile app includes fingerprint and facial
recognition biometric authentication).
110.
U.C.C. § 2-102.
111.
See U.C.C. § 2-105(1). UCC section 2-105(1) defines goods generally as
“all things . . . which are movable.” Id.
112.
Stacy-Ann Elvy, Hybrid Transactions and the INTERNET of Things:
Goods, Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 126–27 (2017). In Advent System
Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., the court found a computer program was a good because it could be put
in the form of a floppy disc or other medium that was tangible and movable. 925 F.2d 670,
674–75 (3d Cir. 1991). But some courts refuse to apply the UCC. See Elvy, supra, at 126–
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the sale of personal services do not qualify as goods. 113 E-Sign and UETA
include definitions that would apply to these transactions. 114 State contract
law applies to contracts for services. 115 In important respects, the UCC
differs significantly from the common law of contracts.116
As described above, in ancient times, a party to a transaction could
be authenticated by a seal that served as a unique personal identifier, rather
than a signature. 117 In cyberspace transactions, a party is authenticated by a
unique electronic personal identifier, such as a password, instead of a
signature. 118 It is not clear, however, that electronic identifiers are
reliable. 119 For example, facial recognition is unreliable because it may
incorrectly identify black women. 120 As a result, some modern methods may
even be less reliable than the ancient seal.121
Throughout history, some agreements have been oral rather than
written. 122
These agreements often are referred to as gentlemen’s
agreements. 123 Typically, the parties signify their intention to be bound to
27. For example, some courts determine that the transaction is a license of software, not a
sale, and several UCC Article 2 provisions apply only to sales. Id. at 126.
113.
Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129,
130 (1985).
114.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7006 (2012); UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2 (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 1999).
115.
Common Law and Uniform Commercial Contracts, LUMEN,
http://courses.lumenlearning.com/workwithinthelaw/chapter/formation-and-types-ofcontracts/ (last visited May 1, 2019); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking
Glass: What Courts and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age,
38 DUQ. L. REV. 255, 262–63 (2000).
116.
Horovitz, supra note 113, at 140. The rights and remedies of sellers and
buyers vary significantly “in the areas of implied warranties, consequential damages,
disclaimers, and limitations on liability and taxes,” as well as regarding procedural issues. Id.
117.
Mark, supra note 83.
118.
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 108, at 6.
119.
See Cordell, supra note 107.
120.
Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Lawmakers Worry Amazon’s
Facial Recognition Tech Could Reinforce Racial Profiling, WASH. POST: POWER POST (May
29,
2018),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cyber-security202/2018/05/29/the-cybersecurity-202-lawmakers-worry-amazon-s-facial-recognition-techcould-reinforce-racial-profiling/5b0c10741b326b492dd07eb8.
121.
See Michael Liebi, Future Trends and Standards in Authentication,
UNITED SECURITY PROVIDERS: WEB SECURITY (Dec. 6, 2016, 9:24 AM), http://www.unitedsecurity-providers.com/blog/future-trends-and-standards-in-authentication/; Mark, supra note
83.
122.
See Gentleman’s Agreement – Definition and Meaning, MKT. BUS. NEWS,
http://www.marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/gentlemans-agreement/ (last visited
May 1, 2019).
123.
Id. A discussion of the sexist nature of this term, implying that only men
enter into business transactions, is beyond the scope of this Article.*
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their agreement by shaking hands and courts enforce this method of
contracting. 124 This symbolic act involving two persons, often strangers,
touching each other’s flesh is in stark contrast to consumers accepting a
seller’s terms by touching and tapping computer screens where a consumer’s
consent is acknowledged, if at all, by the seller’s electronic agent. 125 The
issue is whether touching and tapping should be treated differently when
analyzing the legal validity of online contract formation than other methods
of showing agreement. 126
Cyberspace transactions substitute the tangible piece of paper with
an electronic record. 127 The agreement may be easily accessible, as in a popup box that automatically appears, known as a clickwrap contract. 128 The
consumer may engage in conduct comparable to signing a piece of paper by
clicking on a box accompanied by words such as “I agree” or “accept.” 129
Alternatively, it may be relatively inaccessible, as in a browsewrap contract
where the website does not require the consumer to do anything affirmative
or explicit. 130 If the consumer denies entering into a binding transaction, the
seller may contend that engaging in the transaction by selecting what goods
to buy and supplying debit or credit card information clearly indicates intent
to adopt or accept the seller’s agreement. 131
If the consumer enters into a contract online, two other features are
involved that are unique to such contracting: Electronic hardware used by
the consumer, such as a desktop computer or a smartphone, and a software
program. 132 In addition, the seller must maintain a site accessible on the
124.
See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Comment, The Language of Offer and
Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 189, 206 (1986). “A
party can accept an offer by . . . shaking hands with the other party . . . .” Id.
125.
See id. at 206, 216; Dodd & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 10.
126.
See Budnitz, supra note 13, at 750–51.
127.
Dodd & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 3.
128.
See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, at 33 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2017). “In electronic and web-based transactions, assent is often
[manifested] by clicking an ‘I agree’ button. This . . . is the digital equivalent of a signature at
the bottom of a printed form.” Id. Usually the transaction involves payment as well as
purchasing. Id. at 18. If the consumer instructs the seller to bill the consumer’s credit card
account, the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z apply. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); 12
C.F.R. § 1026.1 (2018). If the consumer instructs the seller to obtain funds from a debit card
account, the EFTA and Regulation E apply. 15 U.S.C. § 1693; 12 C.F.R. § 1005.1.
129.
See Dodd & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 3–4.
130.
RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, at 35 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2017). In a browsewrap contract, there is no “I agree” button to click on. Id.
“The website includes a link to another page with the standard terms, and consumers, by
proceeding with the purchase or simply by continuing to use the website, are deemed to have
adopted the standard terms as part of the contract.” Id.
131.
See id. at 18–19.
132.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c).

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

31

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 1

250

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

internet. 133 The agreement is typically on one of the site’s pages. 134 It is
entirely within the power of the seller to remove the agreement that was on
the site when the consumer indicated his or her agreement and replace it with
a different agreement. 135 Unless consumers save a copy of the contract at the
time they indicate their agreement, it may be impossible—short of discovery
in a lawsuit or arbitration—for them to disprove the terms the seller may
claim were posted on the site at the time of the transaction.136
V.

THE LAW HAS NOT CAUGHT UP WITH TECHNOLOGY

There are serious gaps in the law that apply to sellers and buyers
entering into a contractual relationship in the new consumer e-commerce
environment that technological developments have produced. 137 Federal and
state legislation leave enormous gaps. 138 Federal agencies have provided
scant guidance. 139 State statutes, such as those modeled after the UCC and
UETA, were not designed to deal with the issues raised by the new ways
parties enter into contracts.140 Case law is divided and does not consider the

133.
A.J. Zottola & Robert Parr, Guidelines for Creating Enforceable
Contracts Online — “The New Way Is the Same as the Old Way,” ASS’N CORP. COUNS. (Dec.
20, 2012), http://m.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/gfceco.cfm.
134.
See id.
135.
See Deborah R. Eltgroth, Note, Best Evidence and the Wayback Machine:
Toward a Workable Authentication Standard for Archived Internet Evidence, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 181, 184–85 (2009).
136.
See id. at 185. Many consumer agreements include mandatory arbitration
clauses requiring consumers to use arbitration services. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237,
1240 (2001). These services typically permit the arbitrator to restrict discovery. Id. at 1249–
50. A litigant may be able to retrieve a web page from the past through the Wayback
Machine.
Using the Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE: WAYBACK MACHINE,
http://help.archive.org/hc/en-us/articles/360004651732-Using-The-Wayback-Machine
(last
visited May 1, 2019). But not all sites are available either because the Wayback Machine’s
automated crawlers are not aware of the site when they engaged in their crawl to access sites,
because they were password protected or otherwise inaccessible or because the site owner
requested that their sites not be included. Id.; Holly Andersen, Note, A Website Owner’s
Practical Guide to the Wayback Machine, 11 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 251, 266
(2013). Furthermore, a litigant may encounter evidentiary obstacles to introducing screen
shots of past website pages into evidence. See Eltgroth, supra note 135, at 191.
137.
See Adine Mitrani et al., e-Commerce, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH
(Aug. 2018), http://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/11/jurisdiction/23/e-commerce-unitedstates/.
138.
See id.
139.
See id.
140.
See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999);
U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); Charles W. Mooney,
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ever-changing ways in which technology enables consumers and sellers to
enter into these relationships. 141
A.

E-Sign

E-Sign does not deal directly with the manner in which parties enter
into an agreement when consumers engage in transactions in an electronic
environment. 142 Rather, its chief function is to provide that:
(1)
[A] signature, contract, or other record relating to [a
transaction in or affecting interstate commerce] may not be denied
legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in an
electronic form; and
(2)
[A] contract relating to such transaction may not be
denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an
electronic signature or electronic record was used in its
formation. 143

E-Sign does, however, provide consumers limited safeguards that are
related to electronic contracting. 144 If a “rule of law requires information
relating to a transaction . . . to be . . . in writing,” the seller may not provide
the information in an electronic record unless the consumer has affirmatively
consented. 145 Moreover, an agreement can be in the form of an electronic
record, but it must be retrievable in perceivable form. 146
B.

EFTA

Like E-Sign, the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (“EFTA”) does not
directly regulate the manner in which consumers and financial institutions

Jr., Surveys, Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Same
Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41 BUS. L. 1343, 1346 (1986).
141.
See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018).
142.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No.
106-229, § 101, 114 Stat. 464, 464 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2012));
Mike Watson, Comment, E-Commerce and E-Law; Is Everything E-Okay? Analysis of the
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 803, 813–
14 (2001).
143.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, § 101, 114
Stat. at 464.
144.
See id.; Watson, supra note 142, at 821.
145.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, § 101, 114
Stat. at 465; Watson, supra note 142, at 815.
146.
15 U.S.C. § 7006(9) (2012); see also Watson, supra note 142, at 815.
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enter into an agreement in an electronic environment. 147 Instead, it requires
that financial institutions provide certain protections to consumers who pay
via electronic fund transfers. 148 The protections cover transfers made using
computers, including smartphones. 149 Those protections include an error
resolution procedure, if the consumer claims an error occurred.150
The EFTA requires a financial institution to provide consumers a
periodic statement with information about each electronic transfer, fees,
balances, and other information. 151 A question that arises is whether the
EFTA or its accompanying regulations should be amended to clarify what
constitutes an adequate statement when the financial institution sends the
statement knowing the consumer will be receiving it only on a mobile device
with its small screen. 152 Arguably, it may be far more difficult for consumers
to identify errors, especially those that are not in substantial amounts, if they
are disclosed on such a small screen.153
C.

FTC Act

In determining whether a seller has complied with the requirements
for the formation of a contract that appears on the screen of a mobile device,
courts often pay particular attention to the design of the website or app. 154
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has issued a guidance that
indirectly provides information that may assist sellers who want to design
agreements that appear on mobile devices that will pass muster with courts
and consumers attempting to determine how the agreement should be
147.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1693; Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, § 101, 114 Stat. at 464; Jessie Cheng et al., Does It Matter How I Pay?,
A.B.A.:
BUS.
L.
TODAY
(June
29,
2017),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publication/blt/2017/05/08_Cheng/.
148.
15 U.S.C. § 1693a(7); Cheng et. al., supra note 147. The term is defined
in 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(7) to include debiting a consumer’s account at the point-of-sale. 15
U.S.C. § 1693a(7).
149.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(7). 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(7) defines an electronic
fund transfer to include transfers initiated by telephone. Id.
150.
Id. § 1693f(a). The EFTA also provides the protection of limited liability
to consumers when there is an unauthorized transfer. Id. § 1693g(a).
151.
Id. § 1693h.
152.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1693h; 12 C.F.R. § 1005.1 (2018).
153.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1693f; 12 C.F.R. § 1005.1(b); FED. TRADE COMM’N, .COM
DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES IN DIGITAL ADVERTISING 18 (2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-staff-revises-onlineadvertising-disclosure-guidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf.
154.
Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018);
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble,
Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014).
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disclosed on a small screen such as those on a smartphone and how the
screen should be designed to gain the consumer’s acceptance. 155
The specific subject matter of the guidance is how sellers should
make disclosures in digital advertising that complies with the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTC Act”). 156 The FTC Act prohibits unfair and
deceptive acts and practices. 157 The FTC guidance explains that this requires
“[c]lear and [c]onspicuous [d]isclosures in [o]nline [a]dvertisements.” 158
The guidance addresses disclosure issues that arise because of the small size
of the screen on mobile devices, and how that requires considerations that are
different from disclosures on the screen of a desktop computer. 159 For
example, because of the size of the screen on the mobile device, a consumer
would have to engage in “significant vertical and horizontal scrolling” to see
disclosures. 160 The guidance includes specific suggestions for how to design
the mobile device’s website pages to avoid discouraging consumers from
scrolling to view disclosures. 161 Disclosures on smartphones are more likely
to comply with the law “on websites that are optimized for mobile devices or
created using responsive design, which automatically detects the kind of
device the consumer is using to access the site and arranges the content on
the site so it makes sense for that device.” 162
Privacy and security are constant concerns for those participating in
e-commerce. 163
The FTC has brought major enforcement actions,
contending that it has the authority under the FTC Act to ensure that sellers
safeguard the privacy of consumers shopping online.164 An Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decision, however, may impose major obstacles on the
FTC’s ability to do so in future cases. 165
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 153, at 1.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 153, at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at A-22.
Bob Angus, 6 Steps to an Effective Ecommerce Privacy Policy,
ECOMMERCE:
MGMT.
&
FIN.
(Nov.
21,
2014),
PRACTICAL
http://www.practicalecommerce.com/6-steps-to-an-effective-ecommerce-privacy-policy.
164.
See LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018).
165.
Id. at 1237. The specific holding in the case is that the FTC’s consent
order was void because its requirements for LabMD’s security program were not sufficiently
specific to be enforceable. Id. But the court raised more fundamental issues as well. See id.
[The consent order] does not enjoin a specific act or practice. Instead, it mandates a
complete overhaul of LabMD’s data-security program and says precious little about
how this is to be accomplished. Moreover, it effectually charges the district court
with managing the overhaul. This is a scheme Congress could not have envisioned.
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UCC

In addition to the definitions discussed above, the UCC includes
other definitions and provisions that come into play in determining whether
the parties have consented to the terms of the agreement and are bound by
those terms. 166 The UCC distinguishes between the parties’ agreement and
the parties’ contract. 167 An agreement is “the bargain of the parties in fact,
as [set forth] in their language or inferred from other circumstances,
including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.” 168
Thus, the agreement may be more than the document that appears on a
company’s website. 169 Importantly, for purposes of determining the legal
effect of consumers agreeing by a click, tap, touch, or voice, it is appropriate
for courts to look at all the circumstances. 170 Although this definition is
useful in that it instructs courts on how to analyze what constitutes the
parties’ agreement, it does nothing to clarify how courts should determine
the parties’ agreement under the ever-changing consumer e-commerce
environment. 171 In contrast to the agreement, the parties’ contract is “the
total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement.” 172
Another UCC provision that bears upon the formation of online
contracts addresses offer and acceptance.173 That section provides that
“[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances . . . an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances.” 174 Therefore, if the online seller is making an offer, it does
not matter whether the consumer accepts by signing a piece of paper,
Id. The case raises many questions as to how the FTC can fashion consent orders that meet
the court’s standard. Paige M. Boshell, The LabMD Case and the Evolving Concept of
Reasonable
Security,
A.B.A.:
BUS.
L.
TODAY
(July
16,
2018),
http://www.businesslawtoday.org/2018/07/labmd-case-evolving-concept-reasonable-security/.
166.
See U.C.C. § 1-201(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
167.
Id. § 1-201(b)(3).
168.
Id. “[C]ourse of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade” are
defined in UCC section 1-303. Id. §§ 1-201(b)(3); 1-303(a)–(c).
169.
See id. § 1-201(b)(3).
170.
See U.C.C. § 1-303.
171.
See id.
172.
Id. § 1-201(b)(12). Both in the definition of agreement and the definition
of contract, the UCC notes that the two terms are not the same; instead, they must be
distinguished from one another. Id. § 1-201(b)(3), (12). The term contract, however,
“sometimes [is] used as a synonym for [the terms] agreement and bargain.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1, cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). The Restatement follows the
UCC approach. Id. In this Article, contract is used as a synonym for agreement. See id.
173.
U.C.C. § 2-206 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
174.
Id.
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clicking on a mouse, or touching or tapping on a screen. 175 In fact, the
Official Comment anticipates a changing contracting environment. 176
To form a bilateral contract, one party must make an offer and the
other party must accept. 177 On many websites, in order to complete the
transaction, the consumer must click on or tap a button labelled “I agree.” 178
On the surface, this would seem to mean the seller is making the offer and
the consumer is the party accepting. 179 But this assumes the seller can
dictate that it is the party making the offer. 180 In ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 181 a
prominent case involving a business seller and a business buyer entering into
a contract online, the court agreed with this assumption, declaring that the
seller is the master of the offer. 182 In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 183 a case
involving a business seller and consumer buyer, the court refused to follow
ProCD’s conclusion that the seller is the master of the offer and found the
consumer made the offer. 184
175.
See id.
176.
Id. “This section is intended to remain flexible and its applicability to be
enlarged as new media of communication develop or as the more time-saving present-day
media come into general use.” Id.
177.
Rosin v. First Bank of Oak Park, 466 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984). According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, there must be a “[m]anifestation
of mutual assent [in which] each party either makes a promise or begins or renders
performance.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). “The
manifestation of mutual assent . . . ordinarily takes the form of an offer or proposal by one
party followed by an acceptance by the other party or parties.” Id. § 22. Section 24 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines offer. Id. § 24. Under UCC section 2-204, “[a]
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
[offer and acceptance], conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract,”
the interaction of electronic agents, and the interaction of an electronic agent and an
individual. U.C.C. § 2-204. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines acceptance in
section 50, acceptance by performance in section 54, and acceptance by telephone in section
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 50, 54, 64.
178.
Ed Bayley, The Clicks That Bind: Ways Users Agree to Online Terms of
Service, EFF (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.eff.org/wp/clicks-that-bind-ways-users-agreeonline-terms-servce.
179.
Id.
180.
See id.
181.
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
182.
Id. at 1452. The court does not explain its blanket statement that the
seller, whom the court calls the vendor, is the master of the offer, or cite any cases to support
this position. See id. A comment to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: “The
offeror is the master of his offer.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 52, cmt. a. But
this does not address the question of whether, in a specific transaction, it is the seller or the
buyer who is the offeror. See id.
183.
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
184.
Id. at 1340. The court noted that the court in ProCD provided “no
explanation for its conclusion that ‘the vendor is the master of the offer.’” Id.; ProCD, Inc.,
86 F.3d at 1452.
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Furthermore, cases have held that “the mere use of the word accept
does not automatically make a communication an acceptance of an offer.” 185
The seller responsible for a website that does not make clear what the
consumer is accepting may be committing a deceptive act or practice that
violates the FTC Act. 186 Some sellers specifically provide that the seller is
neither making an offer nor accepting an offer from the consumer. 187 These
websites stipulate that no contract has been formed until the seller engages in
subsequent conduct. 188 Best Buy’s notice states: “At any time after receipt
of your order, we may accept, decline or place . . . limits on your order . . .
.” 189 The notice seems to be assuming the consumer is the party making the
offer. 190
Even assuming the online seller is the party making the offer, no law
requires online sellers to provide an “I accept” button on their website to
bind the consumer. 191 Some sellers have used other terms, such as “submit
order” and “place order.” 192 The case law has not clarified whether these
185.
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 54 (2018) (citing United States v. Braunstein, 75 F.
Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)).
186.
FTC v. Direct Benefits Grp., LLC, No. 6:11-cv-1186-Orl-28TBS, 2013
WL 3771322, at *15 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2013).
187.
See Terms and Conditions, BEST BUY, http://www.bestbuy.com/site/helptopics/terms-and-conditions/pcmcat204400050067.c?id=pcmcat204400050067 (last updated
May 1, 2019). “Our order confirmation to you does not signify our acceptance of your order,
nor does it constitute confirmation of our offer to sell. At any time after receipt of your order,
we may accept, decline, or place quantity or other limits on your order for any reason.” Id.
The first sentence declares that the seller is neither making an offer nor accepting the seller’s
offer. Id. The second sentence indicates it is the consumer who makes an offer by ordering
goods, and the seller has the power to accept the consumer’s terms, modify them by limiting
the order, or reject the offer altogether. Id. One website provided that after the consumer
submitted an order, the seller would send an email confirmation within twenty-four hours.
Budnitz, supra note 13, at 748. The site’s terms provided: “The receipt of an e-mail . . .
confirmation does not constitute the acceptance of an order or a confirmation of an offer to
sell.” Id. It is unclear who is making the offer and who is accepting. Id. at 748–49. Perhaps
the seller is making an invitation to the consumer to make an offer and the seller accepts the
offer by shipping the goods. See id. at 749. Ambiguous offer and acceptance situations are
not confined to online transactions. See Kenneth K. Ching, Beauty and Ugliness in Offer and
Acceptance, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 469, 479 (2015). “[I]n some exchanges it will be unclear who
technically gave the offer and who gave the acceptance, and to force the facts into the slots of
offer and acceptance may be artificial and even unjust.” Id.
188.
Budnitz, supra note 13, at 748–49.
189.
Terms and Conditions, supra note 187.
190.
See id.
191.
See Budnitz, supra note 13, at 751–52.
192.
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 236–37 (2d Cir. 2016);
Budnitz, supra note 13, at 744 n.19. Where a website provided a “Place your order” button
instead of an “I agree” button and did not present additional terms directly adjacent to the
“Place your order” button to indicate the user should continue clicking, user had not accepted
additional terms. Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236. The FAA requires an arbitration agreement to be
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terms have the same legal effect as an “I accept” button. 193 In addition, the
legal effect of an agreement providing the consumer and/or the seller the
option of cancelling within a designated period of time is unclear. 194
Transactions involving virtual personal assistants such as Siri, Alexa,
and Echo present several issues in contract formation. 195 There may be more
than one agreement. 196 For example, a consumer can order coffee from
Starbucks via a virtual personal assistant. 197 But first the consumer must
establish an account—the first agreement. 198 Consumers supply Starbucks
with their credit card number and other personal information when
establishing that account. 199 Next, the consumer tells the virtual assistant to
purchase coffee on a particular day. 200 For example, the consumer can say,
“Alexa, tell Starbucks to place an order.” 201 Arguably, placing an order is an
offer to enter into a second agreement. 202 Consequently, no contract is
formed unless Starbucks accepts the offer. 203 Presumably, Starbucks accepts
the offer by having the order ready when the customer arrives to pick it up. 204
in writing but does not require such agreements to be signed. Zacher v. Comcast Cable
Commc’n LLC, No. CV 7256, 2018 WL 3046955, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2018); see also 9
U.S.C. § 3 (2012).
193.
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236. “[C]licking ‘Place your order’ does not
specifically manifest assent to the additional terms, for the purchaser is not specifically asked
whether she agrees or to say ‘I agree.’” Id.
194.
See Ching, supra note 187, at 479.
195.
See Elvy, supra note 112, at 81–83
196.
See Taylor Martin, Make Alexa Order Your Iced Grande Caramel
Macchiato, CNET (Feb. 6, 2017, 12:35 PM), http://www.cnet.com/how-to/amazon-echo-howto-order-starbucks-with-alexa/.
197.
Id.
198.
Sarah Perez, Starbucks Unveils a Virtual Assistant That Takes Your Order
(Jan.
30,
2017)
Via
Messaging
or
Voice,
TECHCRUNCH
http://www.techcrunch.com/2017/01/30/starbucks-unveils-a-virtual-assistant-that-takes-yourorder-via-messaging-or-voice. Customers also must link their Starbucks and Alexa accounts.
Id. “Before, you could tell Alexa to start brewing your coffee. Now you can tell it to place
your favorite Starbucks order.” Martin, supra note 196.
199.
Martin, supra note 196. “If you have an Echo, you’ve already provided
Amazon with your credit-card number, address, birthday and the names of all your children.”
Matthew Hennessey, Siri, Why Do I Feel Like I’m Being Watched?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11,
2018, at A13.
200.
Martin, supra note 196.
201.
Id.
202.
See Ching, supra note 187, at 475–76. The effect of placing an order is
not clear in the case law. See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 235–36 (2d Cir.
2016).
203.
See Ching, supra note 187, at 476–77; Martin, supra note 196.
204.
Martin, supra note 196. This is an example of acceptance by conduct.
U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). The Restatement of
Contracts has a comparable provision, called acceptance by performance. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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But perhaps Starbucks is offering to sell coffee, and the consumer accepts the
offer by placing an order by talking to Alexa. 205 As Kenneth Ching says, in
some transactions it is unclear who is making the offer and who is accepting
it. 206
Assuming Starbucks is the party making an offer to sell coffee, and
the consumer accepts the offer by placing an order by talking to Alexa, what
are the legal consequences if Starbucks seeks to impose additional terms to
the transaction when the customer goes to Starbucks to pick up the order? 207
UCC section 2-207 provides that in a transaction between a merchant and a
non-merchant, such as a consumer, when one party accepts the other’s offer,
but that acceptance “states terms additional to . . . those offered or agreed
upon . . . [t]he additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition
to the contract.” 208 Therefore, in the Starbucks scenario described above, the
additional terms are merely proposals that are not binding on consumers
unless accepted by them. 209
A controversial series of cases may apply in the following
scenario. 210 The consumer establishes an account with Laptops Unlimited,
providing information such as a cell phone number and a credit card
number. 211 The consumer receives a text message from Laptops Unlimited,
informing the consumer it is holding a sale on the Bell Laptop Model X55. 212
The message contains a few other details such as the price, tax, and estimated
delivery time. 213 The consumer tells Alexa to purchase that computer from
Laptops Unlimited. 214 When the computer is delivered to the consumer, the
box it comes in contains an agreement with additional terms, such as an

205.
See Ching, supra note 187, at 476–77; Martin, supra note 197.
206.
Ching, supra note 187, at 477, 480.
207.
See id. at 476–78; Martin, supra note 196.
208.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1)–(2).
209.
See id.; Ching, supra note 187, at 486; Martin, supra note 196.
210.
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). The scenario is similar to the
service Best Buy offers. Bianca Jones, Best Buy: Voice-Only Deals Now Available on Alexa,
MARKETSCREENER (July 9, 2018, 9:19 AM), http://www.marketscreener.com/BEST-BUYCOMPANY-11778/news/Best-Buy-Voice-Only-Deals-now-available-on-Alexa-26896696/.
Consumers establish a Best Buy account. Id. They then link to Alexa. Id. Among other
features, consumers are eligible for Voice-Only Deals that are not available on Bestbuy.com or
in stores. Id.
211.
See id.
212.
See Jones, supra note 210.
213.
See id.
214.
See id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss3/1

40

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 3

2019]

TOUCHING, TAPPING, AND TALKING

259

arbitration clause and a disclaimer of implied warranties. 215 The agreement
provides that the consumer has fifteen days to return the computer. 216
Several cases involved the above set of facts, except buyers ordered
the product online or over the phone. 217 Additional terms were delivered
with the product and the consumer had a specified number of days to return
the product. 218 The courts held that no contract is formed until the buyer
accepts the goods by not returning them within that time. 219 In Hill v.
Gateway 2000, 220 the consumer ordered a computer by phone and the
additional terms came in the carton with the computer. 221 That case followed
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, where the buyer being sued purchased the
software in person but then posted the information online, thereby breaching
the software use agreement. 222 The ProCD court noted that software can be
ordered over the internet and arrives by wire. 223 Courts deciding cases where
the consumer orders a product by talking to a virtual assistant instead of
talking to a person over a phone may find this line of cases applicable. 224
Other courts and legal scholars contend ProCD and its progeny were
wrongly decided because the courts incorrectly applied the UCC. 225 The
critics contend buyers are not bound by the additional terms unless they
agree to the additional terms. 226

215.
See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450, 1453.
216.
See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
217.
See id.; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450.
218.
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
219.
Id. “A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to
treat as acceptance.” ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452. Here, the buyer accepted by using the
software “after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure.” Id.
220.
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
221.
Id. at 1148.
222.
86 F.3d at 1450.
223.
Id. at 1451.
224.
See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148–50; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451–52.
225.
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000);
Roger C. Bern, Terms Later Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for
Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 642–43 (2004);
Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 753 (2002); John E. Murray
Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation Theory, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 35, 46
(2012). Bern contends that in the ProCD case Judge Easterbrook “deftly discarded clear
statutory language and foundational common law principles and created in their place,
virtually out of whole cloth, a new doctrine of contract formation.” Bern, supra. Bern states
that despite Easterbrook’s citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to support his
position, that restatement offers no support. See id. at 654.
226.
Id. at 654–55.
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But even assuming the cases applied the UCC properly, they leave
many crucial questions unanswered. 227 For example, in Hill, the seller gave
the consumer thirty days to read the contract terms that came in the box and
return the computer. 228 In another case involving the same seller, the
consumer had only five days to return the computer. 229 While it is
reasonable to assume courts would require sellers to provide consumers a
reasonable period of time in order to avoid a finding of unconscionability,
the cases provide no guidance on how much time is reasonable. 230
Another issue is who must pay the cost of returning the goods? 231
The Hill court found the question interesting but refused to provide any
guidance. 232 Those costs could be considerable if the goods are fragile and
must be carefully packed. 233 Consumers may have to purchase a new carton
and packing materials if the originals were damaged when the product was
227.
See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452–53; Klocek, 104
F. Supp. 2d at 1337–41.
228.
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
229.
Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
230.
Id. at 1341; Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. The Reporters’ Notes to the Draft
Restatement of Consumer Contracts states that the consumer must be granted sufficient time
to exercise the right to terminate. RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, at 27 (AM.
LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2017). Cf. Lima v. Gateway, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1182,
1186 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (determining that a fifteen-day window and fifteen percent restocking
fee made the affirmative duty to reject so oppressive as to contribute to procedural
unconscionability). UCC section 2-302 provides that a court may refuse to enforce an
unconscionable contract or any clause it finds unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). The unconscionability doctrine has not provided adequate
relief for consumers. Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle:
Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 319 (2010).
In addition, UCC Article 2 applies only to the sale of goods, not the sale of services. U.C.C. §
2-102. Some courts find software transactions involve a license, not a sale. Elvy, supra note
112 at 126–27; see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., No. 5:10-25, 2016 WL
3435196, at *10 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2016). Consequently, Article 2 does not apply. U.C.C. §
2-102. UCC section 2-105(1) defines goods as “all things . . . which are movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale.” U.C.C. § 2-105(1). Courts have struggled over the
question of whether software is included within the meaning of goods. SAS Inst., Inc., 2016
WL 3435196, at *10.
231.
See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
232.
Id. The court said it need not deal with that issue because the consumers
knew the carton in which the computer was sent would contain important contract terms but
didn’t bother to find out what the terms were. Id. A Comment to the Restatement of
Consumer Contracts states: “[T]he consumer’s opportunity to terminate the transaction after
receiving the terms must not place unreasonable cost, personal burden, or risk of loss on the
consumer.” RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft
2017). The reporters’ notes state that the cost of terminating the transaction “must not be so
large that it deters the exercise of the right.” Id.
233.
See Behind the Box: How to Safely Ship Fragile Items, PACKLANE (Oct.
18, 2017), http://www.packlane.com/blog/how-to-safely-ship-fragile-items.
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unpacked or if consumers threw them away, not realizing they would later
decide to return the merchandise. 234 If the item is expensive, consumers may
feel they need to purchase shipping insurance. 235
Yet another question is whether consumers may use the goods before
returning them. 236 In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 237 the court opined that
consumers may use the product and not lose the right to return it as long as it
was done within the time the seller gave the consumer to return the goods. 238
The ProCD court talked about the contractual return period giving
buyers time to review the terms of the agreement and decide whether to
accept its provisions. 239 But consumers also can take advantage of that time
to decide whether to return the product because they discover they can get a
better price elsewhere or they do not like the way the product performs, even
if they have no objection to the terms of the contract. 240 That is a logical
conclusion since under the ProCD analysis, no contract is formed until the
return period has passed. 241 This can be a significant benefit for
consumers. 242 In the case of a product such as a computer, consumers may
not be able to reasonably decide whether to return the product unless they
use it or compare the price with those of other sellers. 243
The ProCD court says the buyer must be given the opportunity to
read the contract terms and decide whether to return the goods. 244 In cases
234.
See id.; Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148, 1150.
235.
See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
236.
See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998).
237.
676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
238.
Id. at 573. In ProCD, Inc., the court noted that the buyer “tried out the
software, learned of the license, and did not reject the goods.” ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996).
239.
ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453 (stating that the UCC permits the parties to
structure their relations so the buyer has the opportunity to decide whether to accept the
seller’s terms after a detailed review). In upholding the agreement, the court noted
approvingly that the buyer had the “opportunity to read the license at leisure.” Id. at 1452.
240.
See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The consumers
in Hill complained about the computer’s components and performance. Hill, 105 F.3d at
1148. The UCC grants buyers the right to reject or revoke acceptance. U.C.C. § 2-601 (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). But both rights have substantial barriers the buyer
must overcome. Id. § 2-602. The buyer can reject only if the goods or the tender of delivery
fail in any respect to conform to the contract.” Id. § 2-601. Furthermore, rejection “must be
within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender.” Id. § 2-602. In order to revoke
acceptance, the goods must not conform to the contract and that nonconformity must be one
that substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer. Id. § 2-608.
241.
See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452.
242.
See id.
243.
See id.
244.
Id. at 1452–53.
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like Hill, the additional terms are in the box delivered with the good. 245
What if instead of a contract in the box, the box merely contained a notice
instructing the consumer to read the contract on the seller’s website? 246
Would that provide the consumer with the opportunity to read the contract
and decide whether to return the product, as the courts require? 247 If a
contract provides that the consumer must return the goods within thirty days,
does that mean the seller must receive the goods within thirty days, or has the
consumer complied with the requirement as long as the return package is
postmarked by the thirtieth day? 248
In Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 249 the court analyzed a website on
Amazon that provided the consumer with the opportunity to click on a button
labelled “Place your order.” 250 The court pointed out that “the purchaser is
not specifically asked whether she agrees or to say ‘I agree.’” 251 According
to the court, “[n]othing about the ‘Place your order’ button alone suggests
that additional terms apply.” 252
UCC section 2-207 provides that in transactions involving a
merchant and a non-merchant, such as a consumer, “[t]he additional terms
are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.” 253 If the
additional terms are proposals, does Starbucks accept the consumer’s
proposals when the customer takes possession of the product? 254 The issue
in the case law is whether the agreements subsequent to the original is a
counteroffer that has to be separately accepted by the buyer. 255 The cases
conflict. 256
245.
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
246.
See id. at 1148, 1150.
247.
See id.
248.
See id. at 1148, 1150.
249.
834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
250.
Id. at 234.
251.
Id. at 236.
252.
Id. It is not apparent why the court mentions that consumers are not asked
to say they agree in the context of a transaction on Amazon’s website since the decision does
not indicate consumers are given the opportunity to enter into the transaction speaking into
their computer’s microphone or any other type of device. See id. But the court’s reasoning
would seem to apply to consumers speaking into their virtual assistant and ordering goods.
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236; Martin, supra note 196; Perez, supra note 198.
253.
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
Merchant is defined in UCC section 2-104(1). Id. § 2-104(1). Section 2-207 contains a
different rule for transactions that occur between merchants. Id. § 2-207(2). In sharp contrast
to the provision that applies to merchant-non-merchant contracts, the presumption is that the
additional terms “become part of the contract unless” specific circumstances are present. Id.
254.
See id.
255.
See Ching, supra note 187, at 478–79.
256.
Compare Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding that U.C.C. § 2-207 does not apply because there was only one contract, formed when
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Being able to determine whether and when a contract is formed
becomes crucial when a dispute arises. 257 When a consumer uses a phone to
order goods and talks to the store’s employees, there is always the possibility
of a misunderstanding. 258 The risk of miscommunication is even greater
when the consumer orders through a virtual assistant. 259 This is illustrated by
situations in which virtual assistants have received orders that consumers
never authorized.260 For example, a consumer’s parrot ordered gift boxes
without the consumer’s knowledge. 261 Unauthorized purchases have been
made by children. 262 Orders have been placed based on words the virtual
assistant heard when consumers’ televisions broadcasted commercials
advertising products. 263 On the other hand, consumers trying to order
products using Alexa were unable to do so when the service stopped working
due to “technolog[ical] outages and service interruptions.” 264
In addition, researchers have been able to hack not only into
smartphones, but also smart speakers. 265 They were able to open consumers’
websites. 266 They claim hackers would be able to purchase goods.267

the customer had the opportunity to inspect the goods and the terms, and did not return the
goods), with Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding
that even if there was only one contract, UCC section 2-207 applies and consumer, as party
making the offer, was not bound by seller’s terms); see also Hillman, supra note 225, at 753
(stating that Judge Easterbrook was plainly wrong in finding that UCC section 2-207 did not
apply).
257.
See Ching, supra note 187, at 477.
258.
See id.
259.
See Gia Liu, Hey, I Didn’t Order This Dollhouse! 6 Hilarious Alexa
TRENDS
(Mar.
5,
2018
4:30
PM),
Mishaps,
DIGITAL
http://www.digitaltrends.com.home/funny-accidental-amazon-alexa-ordering-stories/.
260.
See id.
261.
Polly Want A-lexa? Clever Parrot Orders Amazon’s Virtual Assistant to
Turn Off the Lights — and the Robot Obeys, DAILY MAIL (May 15, 2018, 7:26 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5729837/Polly-want-lexa-clever-parrot-talks-virtualassistant-orders-turn-lights.html.
262.
Liu, supra note 259.
263.
Id.; see also Lisa Marie Segarra, It’s Not Just You: Amazon Admitted That
(Mar.
7,
2018),
Alexa
Has
Been
Laughing
at
People,
TIME
http://www.time.com/5190044/amazon-alexa-echo-laughing (reporting that users were
hearing Alexa having random laughing fits without being prompted).
264.
Sarah Gray, Amazon Alexa Lost Its Voice, Forcing Users to Use Light
(Mar.
2,
2018),
Switches
and
Check
Weather
Themselves,
TIME
http://www.time.com/5183713/amazon-alexa-down-outage/.
265.
Craig S. Smith, Alexa and Siri Can Hear This Hidden Command. You
Can’t., N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/technology/alexasiri-hidden-command-audio-attacks.html.
266.
Id.
267.
See id.
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UETA

The UETA has been enacted in the District of Columbia and fortyseven states. 268 Like E-Sign, UETA validates electronic records and
signatures. 269 UETA, however, also includes provisions that are absent from
E-Sign. 270 Most pertinent to the formation of contracts online is the section
providing that if there is an error when a consumer buys a product on a
website, the consumer can prevent being held liable.271 An example of the
type of error covered by this provision occurs when a consumer makes an
error by typing a number one to indicate an order for one computer, but then
accidentally also types a zero, resulting in an order for ten computers.272
If the seller provides the consumer with the opportunity to correct
the error, however, the consumer must take advantage of that opportunity in
order to escape liability. 273 In the typical online consumer transaction, the
seller provides that opportunity by taking the consumer to a confirmation
screen before the sale is finalized. 274 That screen describes the product the
consumer ordered, as well as other essential information such as the price
and quantity. 275 The consumer who does not want to be bound by the
transaction can refuse to confirm the order and thereby avoid liability. 276 If
the consumer does not refuse and continues the transaction, the consumer
268.
Dan DeNiculo, The Future of Electronic Wills, A.B.A. (Oct. 15, 2018)
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_aging/publications/bifocal/vol_38/issue-5--june2017/the-future-of-electronic-wills/.
269.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
270.
See id.
271.
Id. § 10.

Id.

In an automated transaction involving an individual, the individual may
avoid the effect of an electronic record that resulted from an error made by the
individual in dealing with an electronic agent of another person if the electronic
agent did not provide an opportunity for the prevention or correction of the error
and, at the time the individual learns of the error, the individual promptly notifies
the other person of the error . . . that the individual [does] not intend to be bound, . .
. takes reasonable steps . . . to return, [or] destroy [any] consideration received . . .
and has not used or received any benefit or value from the consideration.

272.
See id. The Official Comment to section 10 explains that the section
covers two types of mistakes. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 10, cmt. 1. One occurs when
the consumer makes a typing error, such as typing an order for 1,000 widgets when 100 is
intended. Id. The other occurs when the buyer’s information processing system changes the
buyer’s order of 100 widgets to an order for 1,000. Id. Another provision in UETA, but not
in E-Sign, is a provision governing attribution. Id. § 9.
273.
Id. § 10.
274.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 10. Comment 5 describes the
confirmation screen scenario. Id. § 10, cmt. 5.
275.
Id. § 10.
276.
Id.
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cannot rely on UETA to avoid liability. 277 Because sellers provide
consumers the confirmation screen, consumers will not be able to avoid
liability for errors. 278 With consumers increasingly engaging in transactions
on their mobile devices, questions may arise as to the adequacy of the format
used for the confirmation screen because of the small size of the screen on a
mobile device. 279
Transactions that consumers engage in through their virtual
assistants pose new challenges. 280 The UETA does not require the seller to
provide a confirmation screen. 281 Rather, it provides that the seller must give
the consumer an opportunity to prevent or correct an error. 282 The issue for
sellers is how they can provide the consumer with the equivalent of a
confirmation screen so consumers cannot later avoid liability on the contract
by claiming there was an error and they did not have any such opportunity. 283
F.

Case Law

Case law has attempted to apply traditional contract law to the
cyberspace environment. 284 The cases, however, involve clickwrap and
browsewrap agreements; they do not deal with issues that arise when parties
form contracts by touching or tapping on smartphones or talking to virtual
personal assistants. 285
As described above, the online environment is very different in
important respects than when the sellers and consumers deal with each other,
typically face-to-face, in the physical world. 286 Previously, in consumer
transactions there was an agreement written on paper and the consumer
usually had possession of the original or a copy. 287 There might be
disagreements about the meaning and legal effect of the terms, but ordinarily

277.
See id.
278.
See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 10, cmt. 5.
279.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 153, at i.
280.
See Penny Crosman, Is Amazon’s Alexa Ready for Person-to-Person
BANKER
(Mar.
19,
2018,
12:17
PM),
Payments?,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/is-amazons-alexa-ready-for-p2p-payments.
281.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 10.
282.
Id.
283.
See Cullinane v. Uber Techs, Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018);
Crosman, supra note 280.
284.
Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 64; Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220,
231–32, 235 (2d Cir. 2016). Karl Llewellyn refers to this as putting “new wine into old
bottles.” Llewellyn, supra note 13, at 64.
285.
See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61 n.10; Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235.
286.
See Budnitz, supra note 13, at 745.
287.
Restle, supra note 88.
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there is no dispute about what the written agreement says. 288 In cyberspace,
the terms of the agreement may be difficult or impossible to ascertain. 289
The seller may have replaced the agreement that was posted when the
consumer entered into the transaction with one or even many
modifications. 290 The seller may not have saved a copy of the agreement it
posted on its website at the time of the consumer’s transaction, and therefore,
cannot retrieve it. 291
Courts have struggled to apply traditional contract law to consumer
disputes. 292 They have examined the design and format of websites,
including the placement and color of hyperlinks to agreements. 293 They have
applied different rules depending on whether the method to obtain the
consumer’s consent was in a clickwrap or a browsewrap format.294 To make
matters more complex, at least one court thought the site it reviewed was a
hybrid—combining elements of both clickwrap and browsewrap. 295
In websites that obtain the consumer’s consent by means of a typical
clickwrap agreement, the consumer agrees to the online terms by clicking
with a mouse or touching a mobile device on a button that says “I agree.” 296
Often the “I agree” button is at the bottom of a scroll-down window that
contains the standard terms. 297 Courts have held that, in general, clickwrap
agreements are valid and consumers are bound by their terms. 298 They have
not ruled that these agreements are automatically valid, however.299 Many
courts reached that conclusion only after careful examination of the
website’s format and the manner in which consumer consent was obtained on
the website. 300 Clickwrap agreements may be invalid if not carefully
288.
See
Contracts
Basics,
FINDLAW,
http://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-contracts-forms/contracts-basics.html (last visited
May 1, 2019).
289.
See Sterling Miller, Ten Things: Website User Agreements, TEN THINGS
YOU
NEED
TO
KNOW
AS
IN-HOUSE
COUNS.
(June
9,
2015),
http://www.sterlingmiller2014.wordpress.com/2015/06/07/ten-things-website-useragreements/.
290.
See id.
291.
See id.
292.
Cullinane v. Uber Techs, Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018).
293.
Id. at 63; Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 236 (2d Cir. 2016).
294.
Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61 n.10. One judge identified four different types
of wrap agreements: Clickwrap, browsewrap, scrollwrap, and sign-in wrap. Berkson v. Gogo
LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 395–402 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
295.
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236.
296.
Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 397.
297.
Id.
298.
Id.
299.
See id.
300.
Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999). The court examined the size and placement of the challenged forum
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presented, and specific terms of the agreements have been successfully
challenged. 301
Moreover, some courts insist they are not applying new legal
requirements when determining the validity of clickwrap agreements. 302
Rather, these courts interpret and apply the same common law rules that
courts have applied for hundreds of years to oral and written agreements and
signatures on paper. 303
Some companies choose to obtain the consumer’s consent by
designing browsewrap agreements rather than clickwrap agreements. 304 A
website containing a browsewrap agreement does not include an “I agree”
button. 305 Indeed, consumers are never asked and have no opportunity to
indicate their consent in any affirmative way. 306 But, at least one page on the
website contains a hyperlink to another page that includes the agreement.307
As a result, consumers have the opportunity to read the agreement if the link
is clearly identified as a way to access the agreement. 308 “The defining
feature of browsewrap agreements is that the user can continue to use the
website or its services without visiting the page hosting the browsewrap
agreement or even knowing that such a webpage exists.” 309
In face-to-face transactions, consumers write their unique signatures
on a piece of paper that includes contract terms. 310 In the absence of proof
that the seller engaged in fraudulent conduct, courts assume the consumer’s
signature indicates the intention to adopt or accept a record. 311 In clickwrap
selection clause and “the style [and] mode of presentation.” Id. The court satisfied itself that
there was no basis for concluding that the clause was presented in such a way as to “conceal
or de-emphasize it[].” Id.; see also Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 397.
301.
Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 397–98; see also Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp.,
2015 WL 507584, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
302.
Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018).
303.
See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004)
(stating that although Internet Commerce “has exposed courts to . . . new situations, it has not
fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”).
304.
Jay Spillane, Passive Browsewrap Agreements Are Losing Enforceability,
PRIORI (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.priorilegal.com/blog/passive-browsewrap-agreements-arelosing-enforceability.
305.
RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, at 35 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2017).
306.
Id.
307.
Id.
308.
Id.
309.
Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373-LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013).
310.
See Signature Law: What Signing a Contract Means, ROCKET LAW.,
http://www.rocketlawyer.com/article/signature-law-cb.rl (last visited May 1, 2019).
311.
U.C.C. § 2-103(p) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (defining
sign).
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agreements, courts—in effect—substitute clicking the “I agree” button for
writing a signature. 312 A browsewrap agreement removes both the signature
and any signature substitute. 313
Courts have been less willing to validate browsewrap agreements
than clickwrap contracts. 314 Some courts apply traditional principles on the
formation of contracts. 315 One of these requires the “mutual manifestation of
assent, whether by written or spoken word or by conduct.” 316 Courts
applying that principle require evidence that the consumer had actual or
constructive knowledge of the seller’s terms and conditions. 317 To satisfy the
constructive notice requirement, the seller must put the consumer on inquiry
notice. 318 Courts examine both the design and content of the website, and the
webpage containing the agreement, to determine whether the requisite notice
was given. 319
Courts have held that the inquiry notice requirement has not been
satisfied when the link to the agreement “is buried at the bottom of the page
or tucked away in obscure corners of the website where users are unlikely to
see it.” 320 Courts have invalidated agreements where links are not obvious or
the agreement is not easily accessible because it requires several steps.321 A
court found that even a conspicuous link on every page of the website—
including a link close to buttons the user has to click on to complete a

312.

RESTATEMENT

Discussion Draft 2017).

OF

CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, at 33 (AM. LAW INST.,

313.
See id. at 35.
314.
Website Agreements: Browse-wrap vs. Clickwrap Agreements, DASH
FARROW LLP: BLOG (July 19, 2012), http://www.dashfarrow.com/blog/2012/July/websiteagreements-browse-wrap-vs-clickwrap-agre/.
315.
Hilary Smith, Note, The Federal Trade Commission and Online
Consumer Contracts, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 512, 524.
316.
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002)).
317.
Id. at 1176–77. Constructive knowledge is defined as “[k]nowledge that
one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and . . . that is attributed by law to a given
person.” Constructive Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
318.
Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177.
319.
Id.; Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016); Be
In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373-LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
2013); see also Zaltz v. JDATE, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 451–52 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Fteja v.
Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835–37, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
320.
Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175, 1177.
321.
Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 792 (N.D.
Ill. 2011); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). User
could not see the link without scrolling to the bottom of the screen. Id. Textual notice was in
small gray print against a gray background. Pollstar v. Gigmania LTD., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974,
981 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
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purchase—was insufficient. 322 Users are not bound by contract terms that
are hidden or difficult to reach. 323
Courts consider the sufficiency of a website’s inquiry notice
according to a reasonably prudent user standard. 324 It can be difficult to
apply that standard, however, because—as courts have acknowledged—the
level of online experience and sophistication varies greatly among different
consumers. 325 As a result, consumers’ familiarity with how websites notify
and provide access to browsewrap contracts is not uniform. 326 For example,
the design and format of a website targeted at millennials likely would not
meet the inquiry notice requirements for a website targeting the elderly. 327
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a narrow approach to consideration
of a user’s familiarity with websites. 328 The court refused to consider the
fact that the user, in the past, had experience with websites.329 It would
consider only the website involved in the case before it. 330
Adding to the confusion, it may not be clear to a court whether an
agreement is a clickwrap, a browsewrap, or some other type of online
agreement. 331 In Nicosia, the consumer argued that Amazon’s website
contained a browsewrap agreement. 332 Amazon contended that this
agreement was something in between. 333 For purposes of the appeal of the
district court’s grant of Amazon’s motion to dismiss, the court assumed the
agreement was a hybrid between the two types of agreements. 334 The court
asked “whether a reasonably prudent offeree would know that the . . .
[c]onditions of [u]se governed, such that her purchase manifested implied
assent to the additional terms.” 335 After a detailed examination and analysis
322.
Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178–79.
323.
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002).
Terms visible only by scrolling down to next screen. Id. at 20.
324.
Resorb Networks, Inc. v. YouNow.com, 30 N.Y.S.3d 506, 511 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2016); see also Nancy S. Kim, Online Contracting, 72 BUS. LAW. 243, 248 (2017).
325.
See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1179. The Ninth Circuit noted “the breadth of
the range of technological savvy of online purchasers.” Id.
326.
Id. “Negligence is defined as the doing of some act that a reasonably
prudent person would not do or the failure to do some act that a reasonably prudent person
would do under the same or similar circumstances.” Benton v. Diamond Servs., Inc., No. 923544, 1994 WL 57352, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 1994) (per curiam).
327.
See Resorb Networks, Inc., 30 N.Y.S.3d at 511.
328.
Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1179.
329.
Id.
330.
Id.
331.
See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 235 (2d Cir. 2016).
332.
Id.
333.
Id.
334.
Id. at 236. The court cautioned that it did “not mean to suggest that a
hybrid agreement is a type of agreement that Washington law would recognize as such.” Id.
335.
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236.
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of the design and content of Amazon’s website, the court held that
“reasonable minds could disagree on the reasonableness of notice.” 336
Consequently, the court vacated the district court’s motion to dismiss. 337
These cases involving both clickwrap and browsewrap agreements
are fact-specific. 338 Since the format and design of every website which
includes browsewrap agreements differs from one another, courts have been
unable to provide clear guidance on how sellers can offer browsewrap
agreements that courts will enforce. 339 Consequently, it is difficult for both
businesses and consumers to determine if a court would hold consumers
bound by the agreement’s terms in a disputed case based on prior published
cases. 340 It is highly unlikely that the website used by the seller in the
disputed case is so similar to those in earlier cases that the parties can
confidently predict how a court or arbitrator would rule in their case. 341
Arbitration is another reason for the lack of satisfactory case law
development. 342 Disputes increasingly are decided in private arbitration
forums. 343 The arbitrator’s decision is not public. 344 As a result, there is less
case law than if arbitration was not so widespread.345 The lack of case law
hinders sound development of the law. 346 This makes it even less likely the
case law will provide guidance as more contracts are formed in
cyberspace. 347
If a court decides an online contract has been formed, consumers and
sellers are contractually bound and incur significant responsibilities and
liabilities. 348 Consequently, it is important that online communications are

336.
Id. at 238.
337.
Id. at 240.
338.
See id. at 231–33; Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177
(9th Cir. 2014).
339.
See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177.
340.
See id. at 1178.
341.
See id. Moreover, arbitrators are not required to base their decisions on
judicial opinions. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2006).
342.
Schmitz, supra note 341, at 1211.
343.
Id. at 1211.
344.
Id. “[Arbitrations] do not produce published opinions that courts infuse
into public law.” Id. “[A]rbitrations are, by their very nature, private and not public.” Bert
K. Robinson, Arbitration: The Quest for Confidentiality, 58 LA. B.J. 180, 181 (2010).
345.
See Schmitz, supra note 341, at 1211.
346.
Id. at 1212.
347.
See id.
348.
See Challenges of E Commerce to Traditional Contracts, LAWTEACHER
(Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/contract-law/challenges-of-ecommerce-to-traditional-contracts-contract-law-essay.php.
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secure and the consumer’s privacy is protected.349 That is important, not
only to protect consumers, but also to benefit sellers. 350 Consumers who
trust sellers’ measures to protect privacy and security are more likely to
engage in e-commerce. 351 There is no federal law, however, ensuring the
security of online communications or the privacy of online transactions. 352
Consequently, there is no law to ensure the security and privacy of
consumers entering into contracts using cellphones and virtual personal
assistants. 353
Finally, there is no case law development dealing with issues that
arise when consumers enter into contracts by touching or tapping on the
small screen of a smartphone or talk to a virtual personal assistant.354 As the
number of consumers contracting in these new ways increases, and new
environments are introduced, the lack of applicable legal rules may make it
more difficult for businesses to feel confident that the sites they design for
online contracting will withstand legal challenges. 355
VI.

WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE?

Increasingly, consumers enter into contracts by touching or tapping
on the small screens of cellphones and talking to virtual personal
assistants. 356 Legislation and case law have failed to adequately address
contract formation questions that arise in the traditional online environment
of websites and mouse clicks. 357 Statutes and cases have not even begun to
consider the unique issues raised by contracting using cellphones and virtual
personal assistants. 358 New methods of entering into consumer contracts will
surely be developed. 359
Policymakers should decide what action to take in response to this
situation. 360 They could decide to enact new statutes. 361 Alternatively, they
349.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at iii; Budnitz, supra note 13, at 772;
Ken Blackwell, Protecting Online Privacy is a Nonpartisan No-Brainer, HILL (Oct. 1, 2018,
5:15 PM), http://www.thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/409348-protecting-online-privacy-isa-nonpartisan-no-brainer.
350.
See Angus, supra note 163.
351.
See id.
352.
See Blackwell, supra note 349.
353.
See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things:
Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 842 (2016).
354.
Id. at 77, 79.
355.
See Blackwell, supra note 352.
356.
See Elvy, supra note 353, at 863.
357.
Id. at 842.
358.
See id.
359.
See id. at 840.
360.
See id. at 842–43.
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could continue the current approach, which is to do nothing and rely on
courts to develop case law based on the transactions brought before them. 362
Whichever course they choose, non-governmental organizations could
provide valuable assistance to legislators and courts by developing model
laws, statements of principles, or standards. 363 Each of these alternatives is
explored below. 364
A.

Legislation

Legislation could be enacted on either the federal or state level. 365
The advantage of the state-by-state approach is the opportunity it gives each
state to determine what approach best suits the needs of their communities. 366
States may adopt different approaches. 367 Over time, a consensus hopefully
will emerge as to which is the best approach, as it did with adoption of the
UCC. 368 The problem, however, is that this would result in a patchwork of
statutes, at least in the short term. 369 That would make it difficult both for
businesses and consumers to know what law applies to their transactions. 370
This is particularly acute for online transactions where it may not be apparent
where the seller is located and what law applies. 371
The advantage of a federal law is the assurance of national
uniformity. 372 Cyber-contracting is subject to significant and frequent
changes as new technology is developed and applied to e-commerce. 373
Consequently, Congress might prefer a statute that sets general standards. 374
An agency such as the FTC could be given authority to issue more specific
361.
See Elvy, supra note 353, at 843.
362.
See Richard A. Mann & Barry S. Roberts, CyberLaw: A Brave New
World, 106 DICKINSON L. REV. 305, 330–31 (2001).
363.
See id. at 335–36, 338.
364.
See discussion infra Part VI.A & B.
365.
See Legal Issues in Contracting on the Internet, FINDLAW,
http://www.corporate.findlaw.com/business-operations/legal-issues-in-contracting-on-theinternet.html (last visited May 1, 2019).
366.
See id.
367.
See id.
368.
See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); Mann
& Roberts, supra note 362, at 329.
369.
See Mann & Roberts, supra note 362, at 338.
370.
See id.
371.
Id. at 344 (pointing out that in cyberspace “it is difficult to define . . .
where a transaction is located or formed”); see also South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct.
2080, 2101, 2104 (2018) (Roberts, J. dissenting) (describing how e-commerce enables a
company to easily do business nationally without needing a physical presence in each state).
372.
Mann & Roberts, supra note 362, at 338.
373.
See id.
374.
See id.
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regulations as the agency gains experience and expertise. 375 Furthermore, it
is much easier to revise regulations than legislation when changed
circumstances require adjustments. 376
Another approach is to enact both federal and state legislation. 377
This results in uniform rules nation-wide, pre-empting state law in certain
ways. 378 As with other federal consumer laws, states could be permitted
limited authority to devise their own requirements. 379
Policymakers would face important issues regardless of whether
legislation is federal or state-by-state. 380 For example, should the law rely
principally on disclosure to consumers or impose substantive requirements
on sellers? 381 Should the law establish general standards such as commercial
reasonableness, reasonable consumer expectations, state of the art
technology, etc.? 382
Or should it include specific prohibitions or
requirements? 383 Should the law primarily adopt common law and UCC
legal concepts or develop a new conceptual framework that takes into
account the very different context of small screens, touching, tapping,
authentication, and passwords? 384 Is a tap or a touch on a cellphone screen
equivalent to a click with a mouse? 385 Under what circumstances, if any,
should browsewrap agreements, which require no affirmative consent, be
permitted? 386 Should rules on contracting through apps be treated differently
than contracting through websites? 387
375.
See Mariam Baksh, Internet Society: FTC Should Craft Rules, Spell Out
Liability to Help Secure Internet of Things, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY: DAILY NEWs (Aug. 28,
2018), http://insidecybersecurity.com/daily-news/intranet-society-ftc-should-craft-rules-spellout-liability-help-secure-internet-things.
376.
See id.
377.
See Mann & Roberts, supra note 362, at 338.
378.
Id.
379.
Legal Issues in Contracting on the Internet, supra note 365.
380.
See id.
381.
See id.
382.
See id.
383.
See id.
384.
See Elvy, supra note 353, at 846, 863.
385.
Timothy Murray, Contract Drafting Concerns: Beware Browsewrap,
LEXIS PRACTICE ADVISOR JOURNAL (June 7, 2017), http://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practiceadvisor/the-journal/b/ipn/archive/2017/06/07/contract-drafting-concerns-bewarebrowsewrap.aspx.
386.
See id.; Browsewrap vs. Clickwrap, TERMSFEED: BLOG (Aug. 21, 2018),
http://www.termsfeed.com/blog/browsewrap-clickwrap/.
387.
Browsewrap vs. Clickwrap, supra note 386. Federal regulators have
issued guidelines addressed to the threats and risks consumer face when they use mobile
financial services apps, distinguishing those from accessing services on browser access from a
PC. See Penny Crosman, Should All Banks Have Mobile Apps?, AM. BANKER (June 16, 2016,
2:10 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/should-all-banks-have-mobile-apps. Bank
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A major obstacle to reaching a broad consensus on legislation is the
likely strong disagreement between businesses and consumers over
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration and class action waivers. 388 If the seller
can require the consumer to bring any and all claims in arbitration forums
and only as individual actions, then the impact of any legislation will be
questionable. 389 While some arbitrators may follow the requirements of that
statute, arbitrators are not required to follow the law. 390 Arbitrators are not
required to make written findings of fact or conclusions of law. 391 Decisions
are not public. 392 Supreme Court opinions have established the general rule
that under the FAA arbitration provisions in valid contracts are enforceable
and generally preempt state law.393 The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”) issued a rule prohibiting class action waivers in consumer
arbitration agreements but Congress overruled it. 394 Consequently, in light
of the probability that most online consumer contracts will include
arbitration clauses, the only way to ensure any cyber-contracting legislation
is enforced is to pass legislation that would exempt consumer transactions

websites have features that are different from those of bank apps. Andy Peters, Bank Websites
Said to Suffer from Attention Shift to Mobile, AM. BANKER (Feb. 10, 2015, 11:15 AM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-websites-said-to-suffer-from-attention-shift-tomobile.
388.
See Jennifer M. Keas & Jay N. Varon, Shouldn’t You Be Using
Arbitration Agreements to Reduce the Costs of Litigation and the Risk of Class Action
Claims?, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (May 10, 2017), http://www.foley.com/shouldnt-you-beusing-arbitration-agreements-to-reduce-the-costs-of-litigation-and-the-risk-of-class-actionclaims-05-10-2017/.
389.
See id.
390.
Schmitz, supra note 341, at 1216; see also Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v.
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that “[a]rbitration
provides neither the procedural protections nor the assurance of the proper application of
substantive law . . .”); Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 389 N.E.2d 456, 458 (N.Y. 1979) (pointing out
that “the arbitrator is not bound to abide by . . . those principles of substantive law . . . which
govern the traditional litigation process”); Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635 (N.Y.
1972) (stating that “[a]bsent provision to the contrary in the arbitration agreement, arbitrators
are not bound by principles of substantive law . . .”).
391.
See Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Consensual Special Magistrate:
Minnesota’s Appealable Alternative to Arbitration, BENCH & B. MINN., Jan. 2016, at 24, 25
(stating that under Minnesota law no record, findings of fact, conclusions of law, or opinions
supporting the arbitrator’s decision are required). Even if the arbitrator issues findings of fact
or conclusions of law, they are not reviewable by a court. Stephen Wills Murphy, Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 890 (2010).
392.
Keas & Varon, supra note 388.
393.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
394.
Rebecca D. Floyd, Populist Conundrum: Big Banks or Plaintiffs’ Bar?
Banks Win as Congress Overrides the CFPB Rule Banning Class Action Waivers in
Arbitration Agreements, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 165, 170–71, 182–83 (2018).
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from the FAA. 395 Legislation to invalidate class action waivers would also
ensure that consumers could bring lawsuits to enforce cyber-contracting
legislation. 396 In light of Congress’ overturning of the CFPB’s limited rule
restricting consumer arbitration and opposition from the business
community, it is doubtful legislation to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration and
class action waivers would be enacted in the near future. 397
Even assuming consumers could benefit from legislation despite
arbitration clauses and class action waivers, legislators face difficult choices
in drafting such legislation. 398 The statute could be based on rules and
standards developed by the courts, or the legislature could attempt to write a
law based on an entirely novel approach. 399
Assuming legislatures decide to base a statute on law already
developed by the courts, they would nevertheless face formidable
obstacles. 400 This is illustrated by the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”)
project to write a Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts. 401 As of
the time this Article was written, the proposed restatement had been through
nine drafts since the project began in 2012. 402 A crucial decision was made
at the outset: The restatement would set forth one set of provisions that
cover both traditional contracts and online contracts. 403 This was a
reasonable approach for a project that purports to be a restatement of present
395.
See CHRISTOPHER BORAN ET AL., THE USE AND ENFORCEABILITY OF CLASS
ACTION WAIVERS IN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, Westlaw W-0068537.
396.
See id.
397.
See Christopher G. Ward, Supreme Court Ends the Debate and Upholds
&
LARDNER
LLP
(May
21,
2018),
Class
Action
Waivers,
FOLEY
http://www.laboremploymentperspectives.com/2018/05/21/supreme-court-ends-the-debateand-upholds-class-action-waivers/.
398.
See id.; BORAN ET AL., supra note 395.
399.
See Ward, supra note 397.
400.
See id.; BORAN ET AL., supra note 395.
401.
RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft, 2017).
402.
See id.; A GUIDE TO THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS 28 (2018
Recompiled ed. 2018); Letter from Advocates for Basic Legal Equal., Inc., et al., to Council
Members of the Am. Law Inst. (Oct. 12, 2018) (on file with author); Project Meeting:
Restatement
of
the
Law,
Consumer
Contracts,
A.L.I.,
http://www.ali.org/meetings/show/restatement-law-consumer-contracts-oct-2017/ (last visited
May 1, 2019). There has been one Discussion Draft, three Preliminary Drafts, and five
Council Drafts. RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS xvii (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft 2017); A GUIDE TO THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS, supra; Letter from
Advocates for Basic Legal Equal., Inc., et al., to Council Members of the Am. Law Inst.,
supra; Project Meeting: Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts, supra.
403.
RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft 2017).

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

57

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 1

276

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

law. 404 The courts have not tried to develop separate rules or concepts for
online contracting. 405 Indeed, some courts explicitly declare they are
applying common law contract rules. 406
But there is a fundamental problem in trying to draft a restatement of
the law of consumer contracts that includes online contracting. 407 There are
few cases in few jurisdictions that have dealt with issues of online contract
formation; there is little uniformity of analysis and very few appellate-level
cases. 408 It is premature to issue a restatement of the law when there is no
consensus among the courts on what the law is. 409 Moreover, in the current
draft, the Reporters discuss only online cases that involve clickwrap,
browsewrap, or “Pay Now Terms Later” contracts. 410 They do not examine
cases involving online contracts in which the consumer signifies agreement
with a touch, a tap, or a voice because apparently none existed. 411 For that
reason as well, a restatement at this time is premature. 412 Consequently, the
404.
Id. at x.
405.
See id. at 5.
406.
See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018).
407.
Nicholas Malfitano, Criticism Follows Powerful Law Group to Next
Project — A Troubling Take on Consumer Contracts, FORBES (June 25, 2018, 5:15AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/06/25/criticism-follows-powerful-law-groupto-next-project-a-troubling-take-on-consumer-contracts/#6304ad9d2f60.
408.
RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft 2017). The Reporters found only four appellate cases involving browsewrap contracts.
Id. The Reporters discovered only eleven appellate decisions in which clickwrap contracts
were used. Id. at 34. Serious questions have been raised about the reliability of the collection
of cases the Reporters cite to justify the rules in the Restatement. Gregory Klass, Empiricism
and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45,
67 (2018). The Reporters for the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts explained why
the ALI decided to issue principles instead of a restatement. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 2 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2007). Their explanation applies
equally well to why a statement of principles concerning formation of online contracts would
be appropriate. See id. “In light of the many percolating legal issues that pertain to the
formation and enforcement of software agreements, an attempt to restate this law would be
premature. Reinforcing this view, software technology continues to develop, which
influences methods of doing business and changes or creates new legal issues.” Id.
409.
See id.
410.
RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft 2017).
411.
See id. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc. was published after the December
2017 Council Draft was issued. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 53 (1st Cir.
2018). The case involved consumers who downloaded an app on their iPhones and used the
app to create accounts. Id. at 55. Applying the principles of Massachusetts law — as stated in
a Massachusetts Court of Appeals case — the court held the arbitration clause was not
enforceable because the consumers “were not reasonably notified of the terms of the
Agreement.” Id. at 62. Therefore, “they did not provide their unambiguous assent to those
terms.” Id. at 64.
412.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS at 2.
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restatement—if approved by the ALI—will be seriously deficient as a
restatement if it purports to cover case law in which consumers agree to be
bound in these new ways. 413
Even if there were more than a few appellate-level cases, it is
questionable whether they could provide helpful guidance for legislators. 414
Courts decide issues concerning contract formation based on a detailed
examination of the content and format of the specific screens presented to the
consumer in the case before the court. 415 They apply general and vague
standards such as the reasonably prudent user. 416 It is doubtful the
conclusions reached in these cases could provide guidance to a business
trying to ascertain whether a court would approve of the content and format
of the unique website used by that company. 417
On the other hand, if legislatures enact laws that are too specific,
they may unduly restrict format and design options, and stifle innovation and
experimentation. 418 A creative business, for example, might want to test a
variety of types of websites with focus groups in order to determine which
best display the seller’s product, which are most user-friendly and which are
more likely to result in completed sales. 419 It may be difficult to draft
legislation that imposes specific requirements for formation of a binding
agreement that does not interfere with legitimate business objectives. 420
Congress could enact legislation that establishes general standards,
and delegate to the FTC authority to issue regulations. 421 As an interim
measure, the FTC might want to issue guidance as it did regarding how
sellers should make representations about products that are displayed on

413.
Malfitano, supra note 407.
414.
See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2017); Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64.
415.
Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64.
416.
Resorb Networks, Inc. v. YouNow.com, 30 N.Y.S.3d 506, 511 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2016); see also Kim, supra note 324, at 248.
417.
See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–64; Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d
220, 226 (2d Cir. 2016); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177–80 (9th Cir.
2014); Zaltz v. JDATE, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 454 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Fteja v. Facebook Inc.,
841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 840–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
418.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 2 (AM. LAW INST.
Discussion Draft 2007); Malan, supra note 56.
419.
See Web Site Focus Groups 101, BEACON: BLOG (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://www.beacontechnologies.com/blog/2010/12/web-site-focus-groups-101/.
420.
See Felix Hilgert, EU Legislation Watch: New Rules for Consumer
Contracts Under the Digital Content Directive, OSBORNE CLARKE (Aug. 21, 2017),
http://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/eu-legislation-watch-new-rules-for-consumercontracts-under-the-digital-content-directive/.
421.
See Baksh, supra note 375.
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small smartphone screens. 422 That FTC guidance suggests certain features
that the seller’s website should contain. 423
Most businesses likely would prefer to faithfully follow the FTC’s
guidance and avoid the Commission’s scrutiny. 424 Some businesses,
however, might figure out how to design a website that lacks some of the
features recommended by the FTC, but nevertheless, does not violate the
legislation’s required general standards. 425 As the FTC becomes more
familiar with the various ways in which businesses enter into online
contracts, and it develops greater expertise, it may find it advisable to issue
somewhat specific regulations. 426 The FTC may find it appropriate to first
regulate contract formation that takes place on desktops and laptops where
the consumer has the advantage of a larger screen. 427 At the same time, it
may be appropriate to publish guidance on contract formation on
smartphones that is adapted from its current guidance regarding product
representations. 428 Over time, it could refine this into a regulation, while
issuing guidance on new forms of electronic commerce such as ordering a
product by talking to a virtual assistant. 429
Unfortunately, legislation probably can never be sufficient because it
can neither anticipate future radical changes nor respond to them rapidly
enough. 430 Recent examples of such changes include the IoT, virtual
personal assistants, drones, and self-driving vehicles. 431 Therefore, even if a
422.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 153, at 10.
423.
See id. at 8–10. A bill introduced in Congress in 2017 includes
requirements for government websites that suggest some of the provisions the FTC might
consider. H.R. 3088, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). The bill requires the Secretary of Labor to
“establish and maintain standards and best practices for the provision of [employment]
services through electronic means, including . . . internet websites.” Id. The bill includes
specific standards for these websites: They must be friendly, up-to-date, and accessible by
mobile devices. Id. The bill also requires the Secretary to issue “‘best practices for assuring a
secure network and the protection of any personal information.’” Id. Although the FTC is an
independent agency, it may be influenced by the Trump administration’s policy to limit
agency guidance. See Cheryl Bolen, Trump Administration Offers Relief from Agency
Guidance, BNA: NEWS (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.bna.com/trump-administration-offersn57982089503/; What We Do, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do.
424.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); Jessica Rich, How the FTC Works for Your
Community – and Your Business, FTC (July 1, 2015, 1:11 PM), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2015/07/how-ftc-works-your-community-your-business.
425.
See Malan, supra note 56.
426.
See Baksh, supra note 375.
427.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 153, at 8–9.
428.
See id. at 6, 8–9.
429.
Martin, supra note 196; see also Smith, supra note 315, at 534.
430.
Malan, supra note 56.
431.
See Elvy, supra note 353, at 840; Elvy, supra note 112 at 82–83, 88;
Malan, supra note 56.
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suitable form of legislation could be developed and enacted, future
development of the law would need to combine legislation with other
initiatives, such as those considered below. 432
B.

Case Law

An alternative to enacting legislation would be to continue the
current situation, which is to allow the courts to develop the law of online
contracting case-by-case. 433 Undoubtedly, for some period of time there
would be a variety of approaches. 434 Some courts may follow previous cases
in their jurisdiction where the court confronted a comparable situation. 435
Others may decide to use cases in other jurisdictions as a guide. 436 It is
likely that most courts would continue to purport to follow the contract law
of their state, applying it to the new context of an online environment. 437
Some courts, however, may determine that new environments call for new
approaches. 438 For example, a court may decide that ordering goods by
talking to a virtual assistant is so different from traditional contracting that it
calls for new concepts. 439
Unfortunately, leaving the development of this body of law to the
courts has several disadvantages for both businesses and consumers. 440 For a
number of years, there would continue to be a lack of uniformity. 441 Perhaps
there would never be a consensus among all the courts across the country. 442
This would pose a great burden for online companies that do business in
several states. 443
Case law develops incrementally at a slow pace. 444 Therefore, it is
highly unlikely it will reflect the application of rapidly changing technology

432.
See Malan, supra note 56.
433.
Smith, supra note 315, at 524.
434.
See id.
ILL.
U:
BASIC
LEGAL
RES.,
435.
N.
http://www.libguides.niu.edu/c.php?g=425200&p=2904391 (last updated Jan. 3, 2019, 11:34
AM); see also Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2016).
436.
N. ILL. U.: BASIC LEGAL RES., supra note 435.
437.
See Smith, supra note 315, at 524.
438.
See Elvy, supra note 112, at 79–80.
439.
See id.
440.
Id. at 82.
441.
See id. at 80, 82.
442.
See id. at 80.
443.
See Elvy, supra note 112, at 79–80.
444.
See Rodrigo, Discuss the Role and Importance of Judicial Precedent in
English Legal System. What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of the Doctrine?,
WRITEPASS J. (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.writepass.com/journal/2017/01/discuss-the-role-
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to the online formation of contracts. 445 The situation today reflects this. 446
Current case law addresses websites and mouse clicks; it does not include
apps and consumers touching and tapping on small smartphone screens and
talking to virtual personal assistants.447
New ways for consumers to pay for goods illustrate some of the
changes now occurring and those in the near future. 448 When problems arise,
courts will have to determine how to apply legal rules to these novel
transactions. 449
IoT and artificial intelligence have resulted in the
widespread use of virtual assistants. 450 These devices are used to purchase
goods as well as pay for them. 451 In the near future, virtual assistants likely
will be used to perform many types of financial transactions.452 Consumers’
television remote controls may add some of the same e-commerce features as
virtual assistants. 453 Already, consumers can order movie tickets by talking
to their television remote controls. 454 Consumers can engage in financial
transactions with their smartwatches. 455 The Amazon Go stores employ an
example of invisible payments in which no device is used by the consumer or

and-importance-of-the-doctrine-of-judicial-precedent-in-english-legal-system-what-are-theadvantages-and-disadvantages-of-the-doctrine/.
445.
See id.
446.
See Leah Hamilton, 3 Key Legal Cases on Clickwrap, TERMSFEED (Dec.
12, 2018), http://termsfeed.com/blog/3-key-legal-cases-clickwrap/.
447.
See id.
448.
See Martin, supra note 196.
449.
See Rodrigo, supra note 444.
450.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at 1; Matthew Finnegan, A.I. and
Speech Advances Bring Virtual Assistants to Work, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 20, 2018, 4:43
AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/3264433/digital-assistants/ai-and-speechadvances-bring-virtual-assistants-to-work.html.
451.
Crosman, supra note 280. Customers of U.S. Bank can use Alexa to pay
their credit card bills. Id. In regard to using virtual assistants for financial transactions, one
bank official said, “This technology is moving very fast.” Id. Customers of Capital One Bank
can pay credit card bills using Amazon Echo’s Alexa. Limitless Potential, BANKER: MIDDLE
EAST, Apr. 30, 2018, at 73.
452.
Crosman, supra note 387.
453.
See Comcast and Fandango Launch Voice-Activated Movie Ticketing
(May
30,
2018),
Experience
on
the
Television,
COMCAST
http://corporate.comcast.com/press/releases/comcast-and-fandango-launch-voice-activatedmovie-ticketing-experience-on-the-television.
454.
Id.
455.
Mark Real, Michael Kors Unveils Runway Smartwatches with Wear OS,
HEADLINES
(Aug.
13,
2018,
12:33
PM),
ANDROID
http://www.androidheadlines.com/2018/08/michael-kors-unveils-runway-smartwatches-withwear-os.html. Smartwatches can also aid the elderly by monitoring their hearts and detecting
when they fall. Peter Loftus & Tripp Mickle, Smartwatch Adds Heart Monitoring and Fall
Detection, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2018, at B2.
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the merchant. 456 New technologies such as enhanced reality and virtual
reality may present e-commerce opportunities as well. 457
The legal rules courts try to apply to online contracting were
developed when parties agreed with a handshake or a signature on paper. 458
New types of hardware and new software programs require consumers to
enter into contracts in radically different ways. 459 Courts have not
considered whether those changes require a different analysis and different
legal rules. 460 They cannot even agree on who is the offeror and who is the
offeree. 461 But an ever-increasing number of people who have grown up
living in constant daily contact with various online environments will
become judges. 462 They may have an entirely different conceptual approach
to the formation of online contracts. 463

456.
Elan Fin. Servs., Mobile Apps, Wearables, & Invisible Payments: The
Journey Toward Frictionless Payments, CREDITUNIONS.COM (Nov. 5, 2018),
http://www.creditunions.com/articles/mobile-apps-wearables--invisible-payments-thejourney-toward-frictionless-payments/. In addition to Amazon Go, Standard Market in San
Francisco and stores in China are eliminating cashiers using a variety of apps, cameras,
sensors, scanners, and artificial intelligence. Nellie Bowles, Stealing from a Cashierless Store
(Without You, or the Cameras, Knowing It), N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/technology/standard-market-retail-automationbehavioral-data.html.
457.
See Joanna Stern, A Peek into Augmented Reality’s Future, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 9, 2018, at B4. The implementation of 5G service will provide greater opportunities for
new and faster services. Stu Woo, 5G Technology (A Special Report) — Why Being First in
5G Matters: The U.S., China, South Korea and Japan All See a Big Payoff from Winning the
Battle for the Wireless Future, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2018, at R1.
458.
See Restle, supra note 88; Electronic Signatures and Online Contracts,
NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/electronic-signatures-online-contracts29495.html (last visited May 1, 2019).
459.
See R3 & NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, CAN SMART CONTRACTS BE LEGALLY
BINDING
CONTRACTS?
7–8
(2016),
https://www.ilsa.org/ILW/2018/CLE/Panel%20%2311%20-%20norton-rose-fulbright--r3smart-contracts-white-paper-key-findings-nov-2.._.pdf.
460.
See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018).
461.
See All About Business Law, PBS: STANDARD DEVIATION,
http://www.pbs.org/standarddeviantstv/transcript_business.html (last visited May 1, 2019).
462.
See Laura Pappano, The iGen Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2018, at F6
(describing how colleges have learned to adapt to a generation of students who are digital
natives). Mobile devices are not really technology to them. Id. Banks are developing
electronic services tailored to meet the preferences of millennials for apps and websites. Brian
Patrick Eha, Big Banks Are Winning the Battle for Millennials, AM. BANKER (May 5, 2016,
4:39
PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/big-banks-are-winning-the-battle-formillennials.
463.
See Pappano, supra note 462.
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One way courts may be able to develop sensible rules is by testing
possible analogies. 464 For example, is a consumer entering into a contract
using a desktop or laptop and clicking on a button labeled “I agree” with a
mouse analogous to touching or tapping on a much smaller button on the
much smaller screen of a smartphone? 465 Social scientists with expertise in
perception and cognition may be able to provide information to inform a
court’s answer to that question. 466 If it is not analogous, how are tapping and
touching different, and do those differences require a different legal rule?467
Consumers have very different levels of skill when using computers,
as some courts have recognized. 468 Courts should consider whether legal
standards should vary depending on the type of consumer the product is
aimed at. 469 For example, products specifically targeting the elderly may call
for stricter rules or standards. 470 While this is the sort of distinction that
would be suitable for an agency such as the FTC, courts also have experience
making these determinations. 471
In addition, courts need to keep struggling with basic questions
related to online contract formation. 472 One example is: Who is “the master
of the offer?” 473 And who is the offeror? 474 Maybe the courts can resolve

464.
See Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761,
764–65 (2006).
465.
See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to
Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD.
L. REV. 452, 480 (2013); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft
2017).
466.
See Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 119 (2007).
467.
See id.; Designing for Touch:
The Science of Tap vs. Click,
ORTHOGONAL, http://www.orthogonal.io/user-experience-design/designing-touch-science-tapclick/ (last visited May 1, 2019).
468.
Nguyen v. Barnes and Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014).
469.
See Joshua C. P. Reams, Comment, Twenty-First Century Advertising and
the Plight of the Elderly Consumer, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 325, 349 (2016).
470.
See id.
471.
Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1179. For example, courts deciding cases under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act have developed the least sophisticated consumer standard.
Ellis v. Solomon & Solomon, P.C., 591 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1692 (2012); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996). For an example of an
agency establishing rules tailored to a specific transactional environment, see the FTC’s doorto-door sales rule. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2018).
472.
See Smith, supra note 315, at 524.
473.
Stephen Y. Chow, Contracting in Cyberspace: The Triumph of Forms?,
BOS. B.J., May–June 1997, at 16, 26.
474.
See id.
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their disagreement on that issue, or perhaps it all depends on the
circumstances. 475
Another issue arises in transactions, like those of the Starbucks and
Best Buy customer, where there is an underlying account agreement as well
as each individual sales transaction. 476 Is every sale a separate contract, or
does every sale constitute additional terms to the original contract
establishing the underlying account agreement? 477
A major impediment to timely and fruitful development of case law
on these questions is the ubiquity of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts. 478 Arbitration agreements result in far fewer
opportunities for courts to grapple with these issues. 479 This is a serious
problem, given the wide variety of hardware and software, resulting in many
different online contracting environments. 480 For the optimal development
of the law, courts need to be exposed to as many different online
environments as possible. 481 Case law development is incremental, with
each case serving as potential precedent or guidance for future cases. 482
Arbitration removes many cases from that source of precedent. 483 Sound
case law development will be difficult to achieve if the majority of consumer
transactions never reach the courts. 484

475.
See id. at 26–27.
476.
RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, at 35 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2017); Kristin B. Cornelius, Standard Form Contracts and a Smart Contract
Feature, INTERNET POL’Y REV. May 2018, http://www.policyreview.info/node/790/pdf.
477.
See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, at 35 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2017).
478.
Mindy R. Hollander, Note, Overcoming the Achilles’ Heel of Consumer
Protection: Limiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 46 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 363, 363 (2017).
479.
See id.; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration
Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1.
480.
See Cornelius, supra note 476.
481.
See Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403.
482.
Precedent and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis (Let the Decision Stand), IND.
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/2675.htm (last visited May 1, 2019).
483.
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631, 1661–62 (2005) (opining that arbitration “eliminates the development of public
precedent . . . we hope that our public litigation system will ensure predictable, fair, and
consistent interpretation of the society’s laws”); see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 63–64
(describing how courts respond to new business practices by following precedent or
depart[ing] from earlier molds).
484.
See Hollander, supra note 478, at 363; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff,
supra note 479.
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C.
Independent Development of Principles, Standards, Model Acts, and
Best Practices
Independent organizations could provide a useful role by drafting
principles, standards, model statutes, and best practices that could serve as
guides for legislatures and courts developing the law of consumer cybercontracting. 485 For example, the ALI has issued model acts and principles
for software contracts. 486 Industry associations have published best practices
policies. 487 Consumer organizations have recommended model acts. 488
Assuming organizations will develop guides that specifically address
cyber-contracting, the challenge for legislatures and courts will be to
determine which guides to follow. 489 Those suggested by the industry likely
will not be consistent with or supported by consumer groups, and vice
versa. 490 In addition, because the marketplace changes so significantly and
rapidly, guides may quickly become obsolete. 491 Furthermore, policymakers
will have to decide among a variety of approaches, including required
disclosures, substantive rules, dispute and error resolution mechanisms, and
burdens and presumptions. 492
Despite the difficulties, independent
organizations should be encouraged to consider making this contribution to
the future evolution of the law of online contracting. 493
485.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, at 2.
486.
See id. The principles are “intended to guide the drafting of software
contracts and assist in judicial resolution of disputes involving software [contracts].”
Principles
of
the
Law,
Software
Contracts,
A.L.I.,
http://www.ali.org/publications/show/software-contracts/ (last visited May 1, 2019). The
Uniform Commercial Code is an example of a model act that has been adopted by every state
and the District of Columbia, but with many jurisdictions making limited modifications.
Mooney, Jr., supra note 140, at 1346–47.
487.
SPARK INST., INC., INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICE DATA SECURITY REPORTING
2
(2017),
http://www.sparkinstitute.org/pdf/SPARK%20Data%20Security%20Industry%20Best%20Pra
ctice%20Standards%209-2017.pdf.
488.
See
Model
State
Laws,
NAT’L
CONSUMER
L.
CTR.,
http://www.nclc.org/legislation-regulation/model-state-laws.html (last visited May 1, 2019).
The National Consumer Law Center, along with other consumer organizations, has drafted
many model acts.
Id.; Uniform Laws, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform (last visited May 1, 2019).
489.
See Uniform Laws, supra note 488.
490.
Compare SPARK INST., INC., supra note 487, at 1, with Model State Laws,
supra note 488.
491.
See Maria Matarelli, How Can Businesses Adapt to a Rapidly Changing
World?, FORBES (Jan 5, 2018, 6:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2018/01/05/howcan-businesses-adapt-to-a-rapidly-changing-world/#3aecac955930.
492.
See Uniform Laws, supra note 488.
493.
See Christopher Tay, Contracts, Technology, and Electronic Commerce:
The Evolution Continues, 9 J.L. & INFO. SCI. 177, 177–78 (1998).
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In order to gain consumer trust and comfort, entering into contracts
online needs to be done in an environment that is secure. 494 Independent
organizations have developed standards for certifying a company’s data
security and privacy protection. 495 Policymakers should encourage the
development of programs for monitoring and evaluating consumer websites
for their security, privacy protection, clarity, transparency, and ease in the
contract formation process. 496
VII.

CONCLUSION

Legal rules related to the formation of contracts are crucial to every
transaction. 497 They are necessary when disputes arise about when parties
entered into a contract, and even whether they entered into a contract at
all. 498 Considering how they went about agreeing is a vital component in
evaluating whether there is a valid contract and what the terms of that
contract are. 499
The legal rules that apply to each of these issues have been thrown
into doubt when companies and consumers form contracts online. 500 Courts
and legislatures have failed to respond in a timely and adequate manner. 501
Meanwhile, new online e-commerce environments are constantly introduced
into the marketplace, causing the law to fall further behind. 502
In order to flourish, e-commerce needs legal rules for online contract
formation that provide clarity and certainty for businesses while permitting
494.
See Sue Pelletier, 3 Ways to Make Your Contracts More Cyber-Secure,
MEETINGSNET (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.meetingsnet.com/negotiating-contracts/3-waysmake-your-contracts-more-cyber-secure.
495.
See Resilinc Awarded Two of the World’s Most Stringent Data Security
PRWEB
(Aug.
28,
2018),
and
Privacy
Certifications,
CISION
http://www.prweb.com/releases/resilinc_awarded_two_of_the_worlds_most_stringent_data_s
ecurity_and_privacy_certifications/prweb15717147.htm. Cision PRWeb reported that the
company complied with requirements for “the ISO/IEC 27001 standard for information
security; the US-EU Privacy Shield Framework; and the EU’s Global Data Protection
Regulation.” Id.
496.
See Task Force on Cybersecurity, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS.
(Jan. 23, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/task-forces/task-force-on-cybersecurity.aspx.
497.
See Dodd & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 3; Nimmer, supra note 115, at
260.
498.
Nimmer, supra note 115, at 260.
499.
See id.; Dodd & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 3–4.
500.
See Budnitz, supra note 13, at 742; Challenges of E Commerce to
Traditional Contracts, supra note 348.
501.
See A Primer on the Basic Law of E-Commerce, LAW OFFICES STIMMEL,
STIMMEL & SMITH, http://www.stimmel-law.com/en/articles/primer-basic-law-e-commerce
(last visited May 1, 2019).
502.
See Malan, supra note 56.
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them to innovate and experiment. 503 Consumers need laws that ensure they
know what they are agreeing to and to do so in a setting that is secure. 504

503.
See Challenges of E Commerce to Traditional Contracts, supra note 348.
504.
See Armel Nkunzimana, E-Commerce and Consumer Protection, SERV.
MAG. (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.theservicemag.com/e-commerce-and-consumer-protection/.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Research, development, and investment in data-centric technologies 1
has skyrocketed in recent years.2 Market adoption and customer use of datacentric technologies have followed a similar trend.3
Data-centric
technologies are proliferating at a faster pace than previous innovations.4
While data-centric applications have spread, intellectual property law
regimes have been slow to react. 5 Critical questions about intellectual
property protection have been understudied and the scope, standards, and
relationships between actors involved with data-centric technologies is

1.
Data-centric technologies is the term used throughout this Article to refer
to both 3D printing and artificial intelligence. See discussion infra Parts II–V. While datacentric technologies utilize and are controlled by software, data-centric technologies are more
closely linked to the physical world than software. Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, 3D Printing: Digital
Infringement & Digital Regulation, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 37, 66 (2016)
[hereinafter Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation]. This Article is focused on
the digital foundations that drive industrial applications in the physical world. See discussion
infra Parts II–V. Data-centric technologies are defined as technology capabilities that create
information content that directly controls, modifies, or responds to the physical world. Tabrez
Y. Ebrahim, Trademarks & Brands in 3D Printing, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 1, 7 (2016) [hereinafter Ebrahim, Trademarks & Brands]. Data-centric technologies’
information content resides in the digital world, yet its impact is in the physical world of
industrial applications. Id. at 7, 15.
2.
See Navin Shenoy, Innovating for the Data-Centric Era, INTEL:
NEWSROOM (Aug. 8, 2018), http://newsroom.intel.com/editorials/data-centric-innovationsummit/; Neil Tyler, The Future Is Datacentric, According to Intel, NEW ELECTRONICS (Mar.
13, 2018), http://www.newelectronics.co.uk/electronics-interviews/the-future-is-datacentricaccording-to-intel/170703/.
3.
Shenoy, supra note 2.
4.
See Tyler, supra note 2.
5.
See MICHAEL WEINBERG, IT WILL BE AWESOME IF THEY DON’T SCREW IT
UP: 3D PRINTING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE FIGHT OVER THE NEXT GREAT
DISRUPTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
12
(2010),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/3DPrintingPaperPublicKnowledge.pdf.
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unclear. 6 A number of doctrinal disruptions have arisen with 3D printing
and artificial intelligence, particularly with patent law and copyright law.7
While trade secrecy has been an alternative intellectual property
protection mechanism proposed for the data-centric world, trade secrecy has
some downsides. 8 Trade secrecy of data-centric technologies reduces
incentives for creators and inventors, requires corporations to spend
resources on policies and reasonable steps to maintain trade secrecy, and
produces socially harmful results with innovations that do not enter the
public domain. 9 Unlike trade secret law, patent law and copyright law are
based on the notion that inventorship and authorship will be rewarded by
governmental incentives. 10 Therefore, data-centric technologies that could
attain copyright or patent protection incentivize an author or inventor to
recoup costs of research and development.11
There remain doctrinal quandaries concerning patentability and
copyrightability of two data-centric technologies: 3D printing and artificial
intelligence. 12 Data-centric technologies are defined to be information flows
more closely connected to the physical world than historical definitions of
software and computer code. 13 For example, 3D printing is considered a
data-centric technology because its use of Computer Aided Design (“CAD”)
files provide digital data for eventual printing of physical goods and
6.
See id.
7.
See Lucas S. Osborn, Trademark Boundaries and 3D Printing, 50 AKRON
L. REV. 865, 868–70 (2017); Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence and Copyright, WIPO
MAG., Oct. 2017, at 14, 17.
8.
David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 758–60 (2019) (suggesting that innovators of data-centric
technologies, such as software and business methods, tend to focus away from patents and
towards trade secrecy); Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 377, 379 (2017) (contending that inventions that generate data that is distinct
from the operation and use of the invention can be maintained as a trade secret).
9.
RONALD T. COLEMAN, JR. ET AL., TRADE SECRETS — THE BASIC
PRINCIPLES
AND
ISSUES
4
(2014)
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committees/intellectual/t
rade-secrets-the-basic-principles-and-issues.authcheckdam.pdf; Simon & Sichelman, supra
note 8, at 432–33.
10.
Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
11.
See id.
12.
See Lucas Osborn, 3D Printing and Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 254, 254 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu
eds., 2016); Sean Semmler & Zeeve Rose, Artificial Intelligence: Application Today and
Implications Tomorrow, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 86 (2018).
13.
Marco Conti & Andrea Passarella, The Internet of People: A Human and
Data-Centric Paradigm for the Next Generation Internet, COMPUTER COMM., Oct. 2018, at 51,
51.
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objects. 14 Additionally, for example, artificial intelligence is considered a
data-centric technology because its information flows can be mathematically
trained from unique data sets for use in physical systems. 15 Unlike historical
definitions of software and computer code, such as source code and object
code, data-centric technologies directly connect with or control the physical
world through the laws of probability theory and information science. 16
This Article focuses on the patent law and copyright law doctrinal
disruptions of data-centric technologies. 17 Part II is descriptive and provides
the technological foundations and commonalties of data-centric technologies,
3D printing, and artificial intelligence. 18 It describes the similarities of
information representation of the physical world, blurring of the digital and
physical divide, ease of transmission, and ability to dramatically improve the
physical world through modifications in the digital realm. 19 Part III
describes the doctrinal foundations of inventorship in patent law and
authorship in copyright law as a few of a growing number of doctrinal
concerns, and introduces the ramifications posed by 3D printing and artificial
intelligence technologies. 20 Part IV.A describes litigation that has resulted
from the unclear doctrinal boundaries of copyright and patent protection of
data-centric technologies. 21 It identifies recent litigation and summarizes the
doctrinal issues underlying the disputes. 22 Part IV.B provides a conceptual
foundation and normative justifications for a new spectrum-based view on
legal standards. 23 It formulates a two-by-two matrix as a conceptual
framework of data-centric technologies encompassing axes of human to nonhuman and physical to digital. 24 It proposes that standards relevant to patent
14.
Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in
an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1321 (2015); see also Osborn, supra note
12, at 257–58.
15.
See Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86–87 (defining artificial
intelligence as “the process of simulating human intelligence through machine processes,”
specifying that machine learning, as a subset of artificial intelligence, learns from user-fed
data to respond to new data); Phillipe Aghion et al., Artificial Intelligence and Economic
Growth 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23928, 2017) (defining
artificial intelligence as “the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior or
an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.”).
16.
Stan Schneider, The Data-Centric Future, EMBEDDED SYSTEMS EUROPE,
Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 30, 30; see also Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 87.
17.
See discussion infra Part II.
18.
See discussion infra Part II.
19.
See discussion infra Part II.
20.
See discussion infra Part III.
21.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
22.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
23.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
24.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
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law and copyright law have not been static, but instead have been and
continue to be dynamic. 25 It suggests that the doctrinal origins of patent law
and copyright law were grounded in the human/physical conceptualization,
but data-centric technologies have now introduced human-digital, nonhuman/physical, and non-human/digital considerations. 26
The
conceptualization matrix will be reformulated with time progression to
become dominated with non-human/digital considerations and
inconsequential human/physical considerations. 27 This analysis suggests that
authorship and inventorship should not be evaluated within the human and
physical realms, but should also consider non-human and digital realms,
which would have prevented the recent litigation identified in Part IV.A. 28
The implication for innovation is that unclear doctrinal boundaries will
lessen incentives for copyright and patent protection in a data-centric world
and increase trade secrecy considerations.29 Part V concludes that datacentric technologies’ doctrinal disruptions necessitate reevaluation of
copyright and patent doctrines. 30
II.

FOUNDATIONS OF DATA-CENTRIC TECHNOLOGIES

The concept of data-centric technologies refers to technologies that
transmit, represent, modify, and/or control physical objects through digital
operation or use. 31 For instance, 3D printing technology can scan, modify,
and transmit a physical object for eventual production of the object at a 3D
printer located elsewhere. 32 Additionally, artificial intelligence technology
can generate statistical information about physical objects and interpret,
modify, and transmit that statistical information for control of physical
objects. 33 Specifically, these technologies operate mostly in the digital world
yet their beneficial use is in the physical world.34 While information content
25.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
26.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
27.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
28.
See W. Keith Robinson & Joshua T. Smith, Emerging Technologies
Challenging Current Legal Paradigms, 19 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 355, 357, 372 (2018);
discussion infra Part IV.A.
29.
Levine & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 758–60.
30.
See discussion infra Part V.
31.
See Tan Wee Kwang, The Future of Production: IoT, AI, Robotics,
Wearables and 3D Printing, ENTERPRISE INNOVATION: EGOV (Apr. 26, 2017),
http://www.enterpriseinnovation.net/article/future-production-iot-ai-robotics-wearables-and3d-printing-51643031.
32.
Stefan Bechtold, 3D Printing and the Intellectual Property System 3
(World Intellectual Prop. Org., Working Paper No. 28, 2015).
33.
See Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86–87.
34.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1321–22.
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technologies have generated data about physical objects, 35 data-centric
technologies are not limited to simply monitoring and estimating
performance of physical objects. 36 Instead, data-centric technologies offer
unique capabilities of controlling and transmitting a massive amount of
information about the physical objects. 37 When data-centric technologies are
utilized, information concerning physical objects and their control and
creation can be transmitted across national borders. 38
Some common traits of data-centric technologies are that they
depend on digital foundations, 39 blur the digital and physical divide, 40 and
dramatically improve physical goods in some way. 41 Both 3D printing and
artificial intelligence have underlying information content that is governed
by the law of mathematics and probability; yet, their resulting output is
applicable in the physical world of goods, objects, products, and systems. 42
Data-centric technologies’ information content produces information

35.
See K. J. Bathe et al., Some Recent Advances for Practical Finite Element
Analysis, 47 COMPUTERS & STRUCTURES 511, 511, 513–14 (1993) (illustrating finite element
procedures using iterative methods for analysis and structures with the use of computers);
Sergey P. Zotkin et al., About Development and Verification of Software for Finite Element
Analysis of Beam Systems, 111 PROCEDIA ENGINEERING 902, 902–03 (2015) (describing
structural analysis using the finite element method).
36.
See Betchold, supra note 32, at 3–5; Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at
86–87.
37.
See Kwang, supra note 31.
38.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual
Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 713 (2009).
39.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1321–22. Data-centric
technologies are digital in nature, but unlike pure software, which refers to data instructions
and executable code consisting of machine language instructions, data-centric technologies
refer to embodying and directly influencing the physical domain through software. Id.
40.
Id. at 1321. 3D printing’s use of CAD files blurs the divide between
digital representation of physical objects as blueprint instruction files. Id.; Lucas Osborn,
Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 553, 555 (2014) [hereinafter Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing];
Lucas Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing Technology
and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811, 812 (2014) [hereinafter Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates,
and the Public]. Artificial intelligence blurs the divide between statistical methods that learn
from data sets to make predictions of future input data in a physical system or a manufacturing
process. See Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86–87.
41.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1321. 3D printing improves
development time through the use of prototyping to develop test products, which can quickly
be modified for production. Kwang, supra note 31. Artificial intelligence improves product
design, yield, and efficiency of physical goods and systems, such as manufacturing systems
and autonomous vehicle systems. See id.
42.
Ebrahim, Trademarks & Brands, supra note 1, at 7–9; Semmler & Rose,
supra note 12, at 86–87.
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goods. 43 The digital foundations of data-centric technologies have enabled
cross-border transmission or control of information goods without being
hindered by slow-to-respond copyright and patent laws. 44 However, unclear
scope of protection, legal standards, and legal relationships between actors of
copyright and patent protection of data-centric technologies have created
doctrinal disruptions that necessitate greater discussion. 45
A.

3D Printing

3D printing is a technology that enables creation, replication,
modification, and transmission of three-dimensional objects via instructions
from a digital file—a CAD file. 46 The process of 3D printing starts with the
creation of a digital representation in a CAD file of a physical object for
eventual 3D printing. 47 CAD files serve as templates and blueprint
instructions of the physical object that is 3D printed. 48 The creation of a
CAD file is either from scanning an existing three-dimensional object or
from creating a digital representation of a physical object in a computer
program. 49 The CAD file, which is the brain of the 3D printing operation, is
utilized to print the physical object by slicing the digital object into
electronic 2D layers that are sent to the 3D printer layer-by-layer to produce
the object layer-by-layer. 50 In effect, 3D printing technology enables users
to turn digital blueprints and digital models into physical objects with the
press of a button. 51 3D printing challenges intellectual property laws through
its digital approach to production and its customization. 52 The information
content of physical objects is embedded in CAD files, which can be

43.
See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities,
56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 140–41 (2004) (describing that information goods, while unlike tangible
goods, still may entail the use of the bundle of rights analogy in balancing relevant competing
interests); Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing, supra note 40, at 572.
44.
See Dinwoodie, supra note 38, at 713; Lipton, supra note 43, at 164.
45.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1325–27.
46.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 41;
see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality and Digital Patent Infringement, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES (T. Aplin,
ed. forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author).
47.
Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1329.
48.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 41.
49.
Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public, supra note 40, at 814.
50.
Id. at 812, 814.
51.
Weinberg, supra note 5, at 2.
52.
See Michael Henry, How 3D Printing Challenges Existing Intellectual
PATENT
LAW
FIRM
(Aug.
13,
2018),
Property
Law,
HENRY
http://www.henrypatentfirm.com/blog/3d-printing-challenges-patent-law.
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modified, replicated, and shared digitally as information content and digital
data, away from control from centralized actors in a democratized fashion.53
B.

Artificial Intelligence

There is no single definition of artificial intelligence, 54 which is a
term that was first introduced in 1956 at an academic research conference. 55
The connotation of artificial intelligence has changed over time and with
rapid technological development. 56 The lack of a precise or commonly
53.
John Hornick, 3D Printing and IP Rights: The Elephant in the Room, 55
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 801, 804–05 (2015) (defining away from control to mean making
objects without anyone knowing or without being able to control it).
54.
KAY FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & YOON CHAE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
COLLIDES
WITH
PATENT
LAW
5
(2018),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_48540_WP_End_of_Innovation_Protecting_Patent_La
w.pdf (defining artificial intelligence as “a computerized system exhibiting behavior
commonly thought of as requiring intelligence” or “a system capable of rationally solving
complex problems or taking appropriate action to achieve its goals in real-world
circumstances”); Aghion et al., supra note 15, at 2 (defining artificial intelligence as “the
capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior” or “an agent’s ability to achieve
goals in a wide range of environments”); Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86 (defining
artificial intelligence as “the process of simulating human intelligence through machine
processes”); W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: Applications and
Legal Issues, SCITECH. LAW., Fall 2017, at 10, 10 (defining artificial intelligence as relying on
“[s]uch algorithms . . . best described as black-box”); Chris Smith, Introduction, in THE
HISTORY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 4, 4 (2006) (defining artificial intelligence as “a system
which amplified people’s own knowledge and understanding”); Roger Parloff, Why Deep
Learning is Suddenly Changing Your Life, FORTUNE, (Sept. 28, 2016, 5:00 PM),
http://www.fortune.com/ai-artificial-intelligence-deep-machine-learning/ (defining modern
artificial intelligence as “a vast range of technologies—like traditional and rules-based
systems—that enable computers and robots to solve problems in ways that at least
superficially resemble thinking”).
55.
NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A HISTORY OF
IDEAS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 77 (2009) (ebook). The term artificial intelligence came from a
proposal titled “Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence” that was submitted to the
Rockefeller Foundation in August 1955. Id. The proposal specified:

Id.

We propose that a [two] month, [ten] man study of artificial intelligence
be carried out during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College . . . . The study is
to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other
feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can
be made to simulate it . . . . For the present purpose the artificial intelligence
problem is taken to be that of making a machine behave in ways that would be
called intelligent if a human were so behaving.

56.
Joost N. Kok et al., Artificial Intelligence:
Definitions, Trends,
Techniques, and Cases, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 1–2 (2009). The following definitions
of artificial intelligence are based on The New International Webster’s Comprehensive
Dictionary of the English Language, EncyclopedicEdition:
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accepted definition has made artificial intelligence seem like a black-box. 57
The breadth of each word, artificial and intelligence, conflates the
definitional problem of the nebulous and interdisciplinary phrase artificial
intelligence. 58 Artificial intelligence has been broadly defined as a program
running on a computer system that is able to learn and adapt itself in a
dynamic environment. 59 This Article utilizes machine learning, a sub-field
of artificial intelligence that applies algorithms to parse data and learns from
it to make a prediction about the physical world, when referring to artificial
intelligence. 60 Artificial intelligence technology, specifically machine
learning, 61 utilizes algorithms to change its output based on experiences, and
such learning can either be supervised learning or unsupervised learning. 62

Id. at 2.

An area of study in the field of computer science. Artificial intelligence
is concerned with the development of computers able to engage in human-like
thought processes such as learning, reasoning, and self-correction.
The concept that machines can be improved to assume some capabilities
normally thought to be like human intelligence such as learning, adapting, selfcorrection, etc.
The extension of human intelligence through the use of computers, as in
times past physical power was extended through the use of mechanical tools.
In a restricted sense, the study of techniques to use computers more
effectively by improved programming techniques.

57.
See Price II, supra note 54, at 10.
58.
Kok et al., supra note 56, at 1–2.
59.
Nicolas Miailhe & Cyrus Hodes, The Third Age of Artificial Intelligence,
17 FIELD ACTIONS SCI. REPS. (Special Issue) 6, 6 (2017).
60.
Id. at 7; Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87,
89 (2014); see also MARIETTE AWAD & RAHUL KHANNA, EFFICIENT LEARNING MACHINES:
THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND APPLICATIONS FOR ENGINEERS AND SYSTEM DESIGNERS 1 (2015)
(describing machine learning as being able to predict future events or scenarios unknown to
computers; quoting Arthur Samuel as describing machine learning to be the “field of study
that gives computers the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed;” quoting Tom
Mitchell as describing machine learning in the context of “[a] computer program is said to
learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P, if
its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with experience E”).
61.
Surden, supra note 60, at 88–89 (defining machine learning techniques as
algorithms that have the ability to improve in performance over time on some task, by
detecting patterns in data in order to automate complex tasks and make predictions).
62.
INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE
LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION 7 (2017), http://www.ico.org.uk/media/fororganisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf (defining machine
learning generally as being “the set of techniques and tools that allow computers to ‘think’ by
creating mathematical algorithms based on accumulated data” specifying that supervised
learning involves algorithms based on labelled datasets, such that the algorithms are trained
how to map form input to output with the provision of correct values assigned to them, and
where the initial training phase creates models of the world on which predictions can be made
in a subsequent prediction phrase; and specifying that unsupervised learning involves
algorithms that are not trained, but are left to find regularities in input data without what to
look for).
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Machine learning has gained prominence in a variety of applications since its
computational techniques and tools can automatically design models from
large amounts of observed data without relying on rule-based
programming.63 The ability to train existing data sets allows for the
production of data-generating patents, or inventions that result from
generating valuable data by design or use.64
C.
Digitization
Transmission

Commonalities:

Digital

Control

and

Digital

3D printing and artificial intelligence are different technologies yet
they share common traits of digitization and the sheer volume of data
creation. 65 These data-centric technologies have been enabled by increased
computing power that allow for easier data modification, storage, and
transmission. 66 For example, advancements in graphics processing units
have allowed for quicker and easier digital slicing of 3D printing CAD files
comprising complex objects. 67 As another example, advancements in
hardware resources and new computer architectures for high performance
computing allow for analysis of massive data sets based on specified
workflows. 68
63.
ALEX SMOLA & S. V. N. VISHWANATHAN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE
LEARNING 3–7 (2008) (describing a variety of machine learning applications, where there
exists a nontrivial dependence between some observations for which a simple set of
deterministic rules is not known, such as: (1) web page ranking, which is a process of
submitting a query to a search engine to find webpages relevant to the query and returning
them in an order of relevance; (2) collaborative filtering, where Internet bookstores utilize
users’ past purchase and viewing decisions information to predict future viewing and purchase
habits of similar users; (3) speech recognition, where an audio sequence is annotated with text
or where handwriting is annotated with a sequence of strokes; and (4) classification, where
spam filtering programs can identify whether an email contains relevant information or not,
such as a frequent traveler email, based on the type of user); see also GIANLUCA BONTEMPI,
HANDBOOK: STATISTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING
9
(2017)
http://di.ulb.ac.be/map/gbonte/mod_stoch/syl.pdf.
64.
See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 378–79.
65.
See DAVID REINSEL ET AL., THE DIGITALIZATION OF THE WORLD: FROM
EDGE
TO
CORE
2–3
(2018),
http://www.seagate.com/files/www-content/ourstory/trends/files/idc-seagate-dataage-whitepaper.pdf.
66.
Zulfiqar A. Memon et al., CPU-GPU Processing, INT’L J. COMPUTER SCI.
& NETWORK SECURITY, Sept. 2017, at 188, 188.
67.
Xipeng Zhang et al., A GPU-based Parallel Slicer for 3D Printing, in
13TH IEEE INT’L CONF. AUTOMATION SCI. & ENGINEERING, 55–56 (2017); Tony Kontzer, How
GPUs Can Kick 3D Printing Industry into High Gear, NVIDIA: NVIDIA BLOG (June 6,
2017), http://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2017/06/06/3d-printing/; NVIDIA GVDB Voxels,
NVIDIA, http://developer.nvidia.com/gvdb (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
68.
Mauro Garofalo, GPU Computing for Machine Learning Algorithms, 60
(2011) (unpublished thesis, Universita’ degli Studi di Napoli Federico ll),
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These data-centric technologies enable information-based product
development from digital transmission and digital control. 69 In both
technologies of 3D printing and artificial intelligence, control over the
physical good, object, product, or system is not entirely by an originatorhuman, who was the creator or inventor. 70 Instead, data-centric technologies
enable for non-human, digital control. 71 In the case of 3D printing,
democratization of manufacturing leads to making goods and parting away
from control by bypassing the traditional supply chain. 72 The ability to
easily modify, share, and transmit 3D printing CAD files has created new
interactions between creators, distributors, and end-users of physical objects
and products. 73 In the case of artificial intelligence—specifically machine
learning—computer programs make predictions and take action based on a
training set drawn from hypotheses. 74 In both cases, digital control is not
directed by the creator-inventor human, but instead by someone or something
else—another person or entity in 3D printing, and a learning algorithm in
artificial intelligence. 75 The issue of digital control of data-centric
technologies creates new patent law and copyright law doctrinal quandaries
concerning the scope of protection. 76

http://dame.dsf.unina.it/documents/TESI_GAROFALO_FINALE.pdf; Tulasi Bomatpulli et
al., High Performance Computing and Big Data Analytics — Paradigms and Challenges, 116
INTL. J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 28, 28 (Apr. 2015).
69.
See Memon et al., supra note 66, at 188; Ulf Koester, Product
Development: The Digital Thread in Industry 4.0, ORACLE (June 7, 2018),
http://blogs.oracle.com/today/product-development-the-digital-thread-in-industry-40.
70.
See REINSEL ET AL., supra note 65, at 2–3.
71.
See Azita Martin, The Difference Between Knowledge-Centric and DataCentric Approaches, MAANA (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.maana.io/2016/09/knowledgepower-not-data/.
72.
See Hornick, supra note 53, at 804–05 (suggesting that away from control
with 3D printing includes, “3D printing at home from blueprints obtained [from] peer-to-peer
[networks], . . . scanning and [3D] printing anything, . . . buying 3D printed products on the
black market,” obtaining other’s CAD files from the Internet; therefore, with selfmanufacturing, traditional supply chains will be disturbed, such that traditional manufacturers
will be forced to sell blueprint CAD files and retail outlets will face challenges in selling
products).
73.
See REINSEL ET AL., supra note 65, at 2–3; Kontzer, supra note 67.
74.
KE-LIN DU & M. N. S. SWAMY, NEURAL NETWORKS AND STATISTICAL
LEARNING 39, 39 (2014).
75.
See Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing, supra note 40, at
559; Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86–87.
76.
See discussion infra Part III.
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The result of digital control not residing in the creator-inventor is
digital transmission.77 Data-centric technologies allow for the transmission
of information content concerning physical goods, objects, products, or
systems. 78 In the case of 3D printing, CAD files, which represent the
physical object that can be printed with de minimis effort, can be transmitted
from computer-to-computer or from one CAD file-sharing website to
another. 79 In the case of artificial intelligence—specifically predictive
analytics—which allows for the prediction of future outcomes and trends
based on large scale datasets, artificial intelligence can find and transmit
potentially valuable information about the physical world. 80 Artificial
intelligence “can increase the efficiency of industrial operations,” monitor
damage to equipment, and enable repairing actions. 81 The valuable
information from predictive analytics can take a variety of forms, which can
affect the value of a commercial good, object product, or system. 82 In both
cases, digital transmission disrupts traditional supply chains and traditional
relationships between commercial actors—between the manufacturer and
distributor in 3D printing and between the manufacturer and marketer in
artificial intelligence. 83 The issue of digital transmission of data-centric
technologies creates new patent law and copyright law doctrinal quandaries
which require evaluating statutes. 84

77.
See Kholid Rafsanjani, Data Transmission — Digital Data Transmission,
CCM (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:42 AM), http://www.ccm.net/contents/703-data-transmission-digitaldata-transmission.
78.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1321–22, 1332.
79.
See id. at 1319, 1332.
80.
ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL
CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 15–16 (2016).
81.
IAN WALDEN & THEODORA A. CHRISTOU, LEGAL AND REGULATORY
IMPLICATIONS OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 5 (June 2018),
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/327013729_Legal_and_Regulatory_Implications_of_
Disruptive_Technologies_in_emerging_market_economics.
82.
See Thomas H. Davenport, A Predictive Analytics Primer, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.hbr.org/2014/09/a-predictive-analytics-primer (providing as
examples customer lifetime value, next best offer, most likely to buy next, forecasts, and
determination of best ads as examples of forms of predictive analytics).
83.
See id.; Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing, supra note 40, at
562; WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 5.
84.
See Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing, supra note 40, at
586, 589.
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Information Property Commonalities

Data-centric technologies comprise information flows and
information ownership. 85 Intellectual property protection has existed for
“information products [such as] computer software and Internet business
[models].” 86 However, data-centric technologies, which share digital
characteristics of other information products, are different because their
information content has direct applicability in the physical world. 87 For
example, 3D printing CAD files are digital blueprint representations of
physical objects that can be produced with the simple click of a button.88 As
another example, artificial intelligence—specifically machine learning—
contains algorithms that provide valuable predictive information about the
physical world. 89
The mixing of digital and physical with data-centric technologies
challenges how we think about intellectual property protection. 90 Moreover,
such digital-physical mixed objects force reevaluation of whether intellectual
property protection even applies. 91 Data-centric technologies may contain
information property 92 that is not necessarily protected by a specific
intellectual property right or may thrive even without intellectual property
protection akin to the theory of the IP negative space. 93 Some aspects of
data-centric technologies fit comfortably well within traditional intellectual
property protection, such as printer equipment and ink with 3D printing and
computer readable media and methods with artificial intelligence.94
However, intellectual property law encounters quandaries with the digitalphysical mixed aspects, where the absence of or lack of clarity in information
property protection causes doctrinal disruptions. 95 This makes protecting
data-centric technologies more difficult for intellectual property owners. 96
85.
See Conti & Passarella, supra note 13, at 51–52.
86.
Lipton, supra note 43, at 143.
87.
See Ebrahim, Trademark & Brands, supra note 1, at 7.
88.
Id.
89.
INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, supra note 62, at 9; Davenport, supra note 82.
90.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
91.
See id. at 356–57.
92.
See Lipton, supra note 43, at 140 (suggesting that information property
refers to private rights in information containing some degree of control over the relevant
information).
93.
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 317, 319 (2011) (defining IP negative space as “a series of nooks, crannies, and . . .
oceans . . . where creation and innovation thrive in the absence of intellectual property
protection”).
94.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65.
95.
See id. at 357, 364.
96.
See id.
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DOCTRINAL QUANDARIES

Data-centric technology is a type of emerging, disruptive technology
for which the law has struggled to keep pace with its development and
adoption. 97 One reason is that data-centric technologies have challenged the
precise meanings of intellectual property doctrines, which did not envision
such technological advancements. 98 Another reason is that data-centric
technologies challenge the scope of intellectual property doctrines, which
may overlap or possibly have voids in coverage. 99 Additionally, data-centric
technologies create new interactions among actors that challenge the scope
of protection intended for each actor in a marketplace. 100 In sum, intellectual
property laws—particularly patent law and copyright law—are either illdefined or ill-suited for data-centric technologies, which have outpaced
intellectual property law’s response and adaptation. 101
There are numerous motivations for clarifying doctrinal patent law
and copyright law quandaries with data-centric technologies, or for any
emerging technology. 102
First, intellectual property law can enable
innovation and normatively steer technological development. 103 Second,
decisions about the scope of intellectual property coverage shapes society,
social futures, and sources of power. 104 Third, intellectual property law can
affect the diffusion of new technologies, the demand takeoff, and the creation
of complementary infrastructure. 105 These reasons motivate identification,
herein in Part III, of the doctrinal quandaries in each of patent law and
copyright law based on the foundations of 3D printing and artificial
intelligence identified in Part II. 106

97.
Id. at 356; WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 3.
98.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
99.
Daniel Harris Brean, Patenting Physibles: A Fresh Perspective for
Claiming 3D-Printable Products, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 841 (2015); see also
Rosenblatt, supra note 93, at 319.
100.
See WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 4; Lucie Gaget, Artificial
Intelligence and 3D Printing: Meet the Future of Manufacturing, SCULPTEO: BLOG (Oct. 24,
2018),
http://www.sculpteo.com/blog/2018/10/24/artificial-intelligence-and-3D-printingmeet-the-future-of-manufacturing.
101.
Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
102.
Id.; Rosenblatt, supra note 93, at 318.
103.
See WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 3.
104.
Stephen Hilgartner, Intellectual Property and the Politics of Emerging
Technology: Inventors, Citizens, and Powers to Shape the Future, 84 CHI. KENT L. REV. 197,
198–99 (2009).
105.
See Shenoy, supra note 2; Tyler, supra note 2.
106.
See discussion infra Parts II, III.
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3D Printing

3D printing is an emerging technology that challenges how we think
about tangible and digital objects. 107 Intellectual property law scholars have
identified numerous doctrinal challenges with 3D printing CAD files under
patent law and copyright law, as well as trademark law. 108 The uncertainty
among the scope of protection afforded by intellectual property laws for 3D
printing CAD files has necessitated reevaluating the relationships between
actors in a traditional manufacturing value chain, since a producer can also
be a consumer. 109 Some scholars have developed proposals for reforming
intellectual property laws and proposed new regulations in response to the
emergence of 3D printing. 110
1.

Patent Law Disruptions

3D printing technology disrupts the patent system due to digitization
and decentralized production. 111 The heart of the doctrinal patent law
disruption created by 3D printing is “the CAD file, [which is] the digital
representation of a physical object [and] . . . a crucial component of the 3D
printing process.” 112 The digital-physical blur of 3D printing CAD files
presents challenges with patentable subject matter,113 digital patent
107.
Lucas S. Osborn, Doctrinal Quandaries with 3D Printing and Intellectual
Property, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. INTELL. PROP. LITIG., Summer 2016, at 18, 18.
108.
Osborn, supra note 7, at 868–69; see also Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 102, 112 Stat. 2860, 2861 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (2012)).
109.
See Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at
48.
110.
Brean, supra note 99, at 838, 842 (proposing the creation of new
Beauregard-like patent claim format to protect CAD files per se); Ebrahim, Digital
Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 67–70 (proposing the creation of a Digital
Millennium Copyright & Patent Act (“DMCPA”) and reformation of the repair-andreconstruction doctrine); Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103, 112 Stat. at 2863.
111.
Geertrui Van Overwalle & Reinout Leys, 3D Printing and Patent Law: A
Disruptive Technology Disrupting Patent Law?, 48 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 504, 506 (2017).
112.
Id. at 512.
113.
Id. at 511–12 (suggesting that CAD files may face considerable patentable
subject matter challenges similar to traditional software application claims, and instead
proposing copyright as an alternative means of protection or suggesting focusing on the
physical aspect of CAD file if considering patent protection); Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, 3D
Bioprinting Patentable Subject Matter Boundaries, 41 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1, 44 (2017)
(suggesting that post-processing and integration of 3D bioprinted materials may challenge
patentable subject matter doctrine when they are indistinguishable from natural tissues and
organs); Phoebe H. Li, 3D Bioprinting Technologies: Patents, Innovation, and Access, 6 L.
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infringement, 114 and the International Trade Commission’s (“ITC”)
jurisdiction over importation of a patented article entering the United
States, 115 as well as civil procedure challenges. 116
First, 3D printing disrupts patentability because a CAD file, which is
essentially a mix of software instructions and program code that digitally
represents a three-dimensional object, may be too abstract to satisfy 35
U.S.C. § 101 or too challenging to claim in traditional patent claim format. 117
One patent law scholar has proposed using Beauregard patent claims for 3D
printing CAD files, but has also acknowledged limitations. 118 Additionally,
there has been debate on whether 3D printing of nature-based substances, in
3D bioprinting, would qualify as patentable subject matter. 119 This debate
has centered on whether 3D bioprinting technology has advanced to the point
of creating tissues and organs that are exact replicas of nature and on the
unsettled law of genetic replication. 120
Second, 3D printing disrupts patent infringement doctrine because it
challenges the reach of the infringement statute.121 A doctrinal assessment of
3D printing patent infringement focuses on what constitutes infringement
related to digital CAD files and whether laypeople qualify as indirect
infringers. 122

INNOVATION & TECH. 282, 288 (2014) (suggesting that certain cloning and human embryo
related inventions produced by 3D bioprinting may not be patentable because they violate the
morality exception in European patent law); Timo Minssen & Marc Mimler, Patenting
Bioprinting-Technologies in the US and Europe: The Fifth Element in the Third Dimension,
in 3D PRINTING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: INSIGHTS FROM LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY 13 (Rosa M. Ballardini et al. eds., 2017) (suggesting that perfect replication of
human organs via 3D bioprinting could blur the distinction between patentable and
unpatentable subject matter).
114.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 49;
see also Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1323–24.
115.
See Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1917–
20 (2015).
116.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 49;
see also Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1332–33.
117.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Brean, supra note 99, at 852; Van Overwalle
& Leys, supra note 111, at 512.
118.
See Brean, supra note 99, at 842–845.
119.
See Ebrahim, supra note 113, at 3.
120.
Id. at 10; In re Roselin Inst., 750 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that patent claims directed to the famed Dolly the Sheep were not patent eligible
since a cloned animal would be an exact genetic replica).
121.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
122.
See id.; Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1327.
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A statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) concerning direct
infringement 123 and applied to 3D printing raises a number of questions, such
as: (i) is the CAD file itself considered an object, if someone uses a 3D
printer to print a patented object when the object is made without
authorization or without a license from the patent owner?; (ii) is the making
of a CAD file considered to be the making of a patented item under the
statute?; and (iii) is an offer to sell considered a true offer, since the sale of a
CAD file involves potentially selling many items—due to the CAD file’s
potential ability to make many items? 124
A statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) concerning indirect
infringement could be interpreted to find anyone who posts a CAD file on a
file-sharing networking to be an indirect infringer. 125 Thus, 3D printing
intermediaries, 3D printing service companies, and anyone posting or
transferring CAD files on websites or peer-to-peer networks could be
accused of indirect patent infringement. 126
However, since direct
infringement is a necessary element of indirect infringement and it may be
difficult to ascertain the occurrence of the 3D printing infringing step, then
indirect patent infringement may not be clear cut. 127 Additionally, since
indirect infringement requires active inducement and it may be difficult to
find anyone who provided printing instructions, then indirect patent
infringement may be an even more challenging determination. 128
A statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) concerning
contributory infringement 129 and applied to 3D printing also raises doctrinal
interpretation questions, such as: Is a CAD file considered a component of a
123.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (specifying that “whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
124.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1327–28, 1332–36.
125.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (stating “[w]hoever actively induces [the]
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer”); Ebrahim, Trademark & Brands,
supra note 1, at 50–51.
126.
See Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at
51–52; Holbrook & Osbourne, supra note 14, at 1332, 1334.
127.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961); Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra
note 1, at 49.
128.
See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 760, 766
(2011); Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1335–36.
129.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (specifying that patent owners may have a claim
against actors who while not directly infringing, aid and abet the direct infringer, by, for
example, supplying an individual component of a patented invention, more specifically,
requiring: (i) somebody offering to sell, selling, or importing into the U.S.; (ii) components of
a patented device; (iii) knowing the components are adapted for use in infringement of a
patent without substantial non-infringing use; and (iv) which result in an act of direct
infringement).
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patented device or does a digital representation of a physical object suffice to
be considered a component? 130 The uncertainty in the scope of contributory
patent infringement could be problematic for patent owners who may raise
claims in litigation against CAD file creators and CAD file distributors.131
The patent infringement disruptions of 3D printing also encounter
territoriality issues, since 3D printing CAD files can be transmitted across
borders. 132 The digital-physical blur of CAD files arises in doctrinal issues
of jurisdiction, such as whether the ITC’s breadth of statutory authority of
importation of articles encompasses the regulation of CAD files. 133 The
scope of whether the word articles includes electronic transmission of digital
data representing articles has not been considered by Congress and has only
recently been addressed by the Federal Circuit. 134
Each of these doctrinal disruptions stems from patent law lacking a
meaningful patent protection for the CAD file. 135 Quite simply, patent law
struggles with protecting digital representations of patentable physical
objects. 136 In doing so, the patent regime is challenged by 3D printing in
patentability and infringement.137
2.

Copyright Law Disruptions

3D printing technology disrupts copyright law since it challenges the
notions of copyright requirements and derivative works. 138 First, 3D printing
technologies face challenges with copyright protection due to the conceptual
separation between creative and functional features and the status of a
derivative work. 139
Second, 3D printing technologies are prone to
Napsteriz[ation], or similar peer-to-peer infringement issues faced by digital
music files. 140 The peer-to-peer reproduction and distribution issues raise

130.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1345–48.
131.
See id. at 1353.
132.
See Daniel Harris Brean, Patent Enforcement in Cyberterritories, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at i–ii).
133.
See Kumar, supra note 115, at 1911–12.
134.
See id. at 1912–13.
135.
See Brean, supra note 99, at 840.
136.
See id.
137.
See id.
138.
See MICHAEL WEINBERG, WHAT’S THE DEAL WITH COPYRIGHT AND 3D
PRINTING?
4
(2013),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/What%27s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyright_%
20Final%20version2.pdf.
139.
See WEINBERG, supra note 5, at 5–6.
140.
Brean, supra note 99, at 857; see also Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14,
at 1332–33.
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enforcement and civil procedure challenges in copyright law similar to that
of patent law. 141
Copyright protection over CAD files may be problematic in cases
where the 3D printed objects are not purely aesthetic. 142 The doctrine of
severability in copyright law prevents an object with both artistic and useful
features to attain copyright protection. 143 There is no straightforward
severability test and, therefore, a fact-finding inquiry into copyright
protection creates uncertainty as to the scope of copyright protection. 144
The possibility of copyright protection in 3D printing is further
complicated with the notion of derivative works. 145 This doctrinal issue is
based on the doctrinal assessment of CAD files in a digital environment,
which complicates whether copyright protects the design of the eventual 3D
printed object. 146 While unsettled, one viewpoint considers that a CAD file
that is protected by copyright would require permission from the copyright
holder to 3D print the object, since the physical object would be a derivative
work of the design in the CAD file. 147 This problem is further complicated
by whether the change in the 3D printed physical object is so minor and too
trivial to be entitled as a derivative work. 148
B.

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence technologies challenge the way we think about
patent law and copyright law doctrines. 149 Artificial intelligence applications
minimize the separation between human-generated content and machine141.
See Brean, supra note 99, at 857; Kumar, supra note 115, at 1912.
142.
WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 9.
143.
Id. (stating that if the aesthetic and functional features cannot be
separated, then copyright law errs on the side of keeping useful objects available to the entire
public and prevents attachment of copyright protection).
144.
ANGELA DALY, SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 3D PRINTING REVOLUTION
26 (2016).
145.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining derivative work as “a work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”);
WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 19.
146.
WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 14.
147.
See id. at 19 (describing that copying and/or distributing the object into
3D-printed physical form would require permission from the copyright holder, but this
distinction can vary depending on whether the digital object in the CAD file was created by
scanning an object or was created digital in the CAD file itself); DALY, supra note 144, at 26.
148.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101; WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 19.
149.
Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356–57; Guadamuz, supra note 7, at
17.
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generated content. 150 However, much of patent law and copyright law
focuses on either purely human control or human-machine interactions but
has yet to counter machine generated content. 151 As artificial intelligence
applications proliferate, patent law and copyright law will increasingly need
to respond to a world in which human, human-machine interactions, and
machine generations move closer together. 152
Some aspects of artificial intelligence technologies fit well within
traditional intellectual property law doctrines.153 For example, inventors
have obtained patents on equipment, processes, and chemicals controlled by
artificial intelligence technologies.154 Even some underlying business
methods of artificial intelligence technologies have successfully resulted in
issued U.S. patent claims. 155 As another example, musicians could
conceivably obtain copyright protection on artistic and musical works with
the help of artificial intelligence technologies. 156
However, intellectual property laws encounter difficulties when
algorithms can learn and make predictions on data. 157 These techniques are
different from the use of computational statistics, mathematical optimization,
or finite element analysis as computational research tools, which have been
utilized to solve equations concerning the physical world for many years. 158
Recent advances in computing power, algorithms, and sensor technology,
and the proliferation of data as a strategic asset, have enabled computers to
make data-driven decisions that affect the physical world.159 For example,
machine learning is being utilized for autonomous vehicles, 160 medical
imaging interpretation and diagnosis, 161 oil and gas exploration, 162 and
150.
See Guadamuz, supra note 7, at 17; JJ Charlesworth, AI Can Produce
Pictures, but Can It Create Art for Itself?, CNN: STYLE (Sept. 10, 2018),
http://www.cnn.com/style/article/artificial-intelligence-ai-art/index.html.
151.
See Bechtold, supra note 32, at 19; WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 2.
152.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65; Neil Ballinger, The
Proliferation of Artificial Intelligence in 2019 Could Lead to a New Talent Gap, DRUM: NEWS
(Jan. 29, 2019, 4:35PM), http://www.thedrum.com/news/2019/01/29/the-proliferationartificial-intelligence-2019-could-lead-new-talent-gap.
153.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65.
154.
See id. at 365; FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 5, 8.
155.
See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 754, 758.
156.
Guadamuz, supra note 7, at 17.
157.
FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 6, 8.
158.
See id. at 5; DU & SWAMY, supra note 74, at 39.
159.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 5–6; REINSEL ET AL.,
supra note 65, at 2.
160.
LEX FRIDMAN ET AL., MIT AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY STUDY:
LARGE-SCALE DEEP LEARNING BASED ANALYSIS OF DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND INTERACTION WITH
AUTOMATION 3, http://www.arxiv.org/abs/1711.06976.
161.
Maryellen L. Giger, Machine Learning in Medical Imaging, 15 J. AM. C.
RADIOLOGY 512, 512 (2018).
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predictive maintenance of manufacturing systems. 163 The ability to
determine anomalies and predict solutions in behavior profiles of physical
phenomena makes protection of machine-controlled physical phenomena
difficult for intellectual property owners. 164
1.

Patent Law Disruptions

Artificial intelligence technologies infuse the role of a machine in
the invention process. 165 The algorithms at the heart of artificial intelligence
are arguably playing a role in conception and reduction to practice of
inventions. 166 Some algorithms substitute the human in the inventive
process, and other algorithms augment the human in the inventive process. 167
While conceptually, such algorithms do not think in the cognitive sense of
humans, the line between what is attributable to a human and what is
attributable to a human-machine interaction becomes blurred. 168
The involvement of artificial intelligence technologies in the
invention process raises doctrinal patent law issues concerning
inventorship, 169 non-obviousness, 170 and enablement. 171 These doctrines
162.
Hossein Hassani & Emmanuel Sirimal Silva, Big Data: A Big
Opportunity for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industry, 42 OPEC ENERGY REV. 74, 74, 78
(2018).
163.
Gian Antonio Susto et al., Machine Learning for Predictive Maintenance:
A Multiple Classifier Approach, 11 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUS. INFORMATICS 812, 812–13
(2015); SUMEET KAUL ET AL., PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE AND THE SMART FACTORY:
PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE CONNECTS MACHINES TO RELIABILITY PROFESSIONALS THROUGH
THE POWER OF THE SMART FACTORY 3 (2017).
164.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 6.
165.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 357.
166.
MPEP § 2138.04 (9th ed. Rev 8, Jan. 2018) (quoting Townsend v. Smith,
36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929) (defining conception as “the complete performance of the
mental part of the inventive act and it is the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite
and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in
practice . . . .”); Id. § 2138.05 (stating that reduction practice, which “may be an actual
reduction or a constructive reduction to practice,” requires recognition and appreciation of the
invention); Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2016)
(emphasis in original) (explaining that “conception of an invention does not require that the
inventor know that the invention will work for its intended purpose,” and that conception does
not require “reduction to practice [nor] experimentation”).
167.
Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and Patent Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 489, 490 (2018).
168.
See id. at 490–93; Surden, supra note 60, at 89 (suggesting that the idea
that computers are learning is a metaphor and does not mean that machines are replicating the
cognitive abilities of humans in human learning).
169.
MPEP § 2137.01.
170.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
171.
Id. § 112(a).
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assume a human being as the inventor for inventorship, as a standard for
comparison of non-obviousness, and as providing some act of ingenuity to be
eligible patentable subject matter.172 The specific meanings of these
doctrines have profound implications for ownership and control of the
invention, as well as for management of innovation and competition. 173
First, artificial intelligence technologies seem to challenge patent
law’s inventorship doctrine, which is based on conception. 174 U.S. patent
law defines an inventor as being a human being, as evidenced in the
statement: “The threshold question in determining inventorship is who
conceived [of] the invention. Unless a person contributes to the conception
of the invention, he is not an inventor.” 175 Inventorship in U.S. patent law is
attributed to conception, which is defined as “the complete performance of
the mental part of the inventive act,” presumably achieved by a human
being. 176 The doctrinal issue is whether artificial intelligence technologies
qualify under the inventorship requirement of U.S. patent law. 177
Additionally, the creation and use of artificial intelligence technologies raises
the doctrinal issue of whether the human beings that assist artificial
intelligence technologies also qualify as inventors. 178 The doctrinal problem
with either the artificial intelligence technology or the human assisting the
artificial intelligence technology stems from patent law’s restrictive
definition of inventor and imprecise definition of conception. 179 Is the term
inventor in U.S. patent law limited to only a person, or does person have a
more expansive meaning? 180 Is conception in U.S. patent law restricted to a
mental act by a human being only? 181 U.S. patent law has not addressed
these questions. 182
Second, artificial intelligence technologies also challenge the nonobviousness doctrine, which is a threshold requirement for patentability in

172.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 9–10.
173.
See Vertinsky, supra note 167, at 493; Iain M. Cockburn et al., The
Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Innovation 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. W24449).
174.
See MPEP § 2138.04; Lemley, supra note 166, at 1172.
175.
MPEP § 2137.01 (quoting In re Hardee, 233 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1123
(Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks 1984)).
176.
MPEP § 2138.04.
177.
FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 9–10.
178.
Id. at 10.
179.
See MPEP §§ 2137.01, 2138.04.
180.
See id.; Patrick G. Gattari, Determining Inventorship for US Patent
Applications, INTELL. PROP. & TECH L.J., May 2005, at 16, 16.
181.
See MPEP § 2138.04; Gattari, supra note 180, at 16.
182.
See MPEP § 2138.04.
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U.S. patent law. 183 The finding of obviousness is based on ascertaining the
difference between the claimed invention and the prior art based on the
“person of ordinary skill in the art,” or a PHOSITA, which is also known as
POSITA. 184 The POSITA is defined as “a hypothetical person who is
presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention,” 185 and
is also a “person of ordinary . . . creativity, not an automation.” 186 Thus, U.S.
patent law’s standard for obviousness involves a comparison with a
hypothetical person with knowledge of the relevant art or similar
technologies. 187 A doctrinal problem arises because inventions generated by
artificial intelligence technologies may not be comparable to the capabilities
of a POSITA. 188 Artificial intelligence technologies may develop inventions
based on learning from data representations—capabilities and computational
horsepower that is lacking in human beings. 189 In the rare case of an
extraordinary human being who possessed computational-like pattern
detection capabilities, they would be unable to develop the invention
generated by the artificial intelligence technology that learns from data
representations. 190 Another doctrinal problem arises from the phrase
relevant art, which may be problematic with inventions generated by
machine learning techniques that rely on training of unique data sets, since
machine learning algorithms are capable of changing their behavior to
enhance their performance; hence, the relevant art would conceptually
change. 191 Since relevant art is not static in a machine learning context, then
this aspect of the obviousness comparison standard is inapplicable for
comparison purposes. 192 Thus, the obviousness doctrine is problematic with
inventions generated by artificial intelligence technologies due to limitations
with the phrase person, unclear implications with the phrase not an
automation, and dynamic interpretation with the phrase relevant art. 193

10.

183.

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 154, at

184.
MPEP § 2141.03.
185.
Id.
186.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
187.
See id. at 419–20.
188.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 5.
189.
See Lance Whitney, Are Computers Already Smarter Than Humans?,
TIME (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.time.com/4960778/computers-smarter-than-humans/.
190.
Id.
191.
MPEP § 2141.03 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018); see also Surden, supra note
60, at 89–90.
192.
MPEP § 2141.03; see also Surden, supra note 60, at 89–90.
193.
MPEP § 2141.03; see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d
1034, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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Third, inventions generated by artificial intelligence technologies
may not satisfy the enablement requirement of U.S. patent law. 194
Enablement requires that “one skilled in the art must be [able] to make and
use . . . that defined by the claim(s) of the particular application or patent.” 195
Similar to the issues with the obviousness standard requiring a POSITA, the
enablement requirement also faces challenges with the phrase “one skilled in
the art.” 196 In order for an invention created by a machine learning algorithm
to meet enablement, “one skilled in the art”—whether a person or machine
learning technique—would need access to the same data set utilized by the
machine learning algorithm that created the invention. 197 Since inventions
created by machine learning are based on detecting patterns in data and
making predictions based on training, one would not be able to make and use
the invention without data and without sophistication in knowing the same
machine learning technique. 198 The enablement standard is problematic with
artificial intelligence technologies due to the inapplicability of the phrase
“one skilled in the art.” 199
Each of these doctrinal disruptions stems from patent law lacking
meaningful patentability standards and terms applicable to artificial
intelligence technologies. 200 Quite simply, patent law struggles with its
focus on a human being in its patentability requirements. 201
2.

Copyright Law

The conceptual difficulties with copyright law for artificial
intelligence technologies concern the doctrines of authorship, 202
originality, 203 and work made for hire. 204 Copyright law protects original

(2012).

194.

FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112

195.
MPEP § 2164.
196.
Id. §§ 2141, 2164.01; Frank A. DeCosta & Aliza George Carrano,
Intellectual Property Protection for Artificial Intelligence, WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP., Aug.
30, 2017, at 3.
197.
MPEP § 2141; DeCosta & Carrano, supra note 196, at 3.
198.
DeCosta & Carrano, supra note 196, at 3.
199.
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
200.
FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4.
201.
Id. at 8–9.
202.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (stating that “[c]opyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship . . . .”).
203.
H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (which
codifies developments in case law that require some independent creation by the author and
modest quantum of creativity); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (which codifies developments in case law
that copyright protects an author’s expression of an idea, but not the idea itself).
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works created by authors, and the doctrinal issues concern whether copyright
protection can be attained for computer generated works. 205 Similar to
artificial intelligence technologies that develop functional patentable
inventions embodying utility, artificial intelligence technologies can develop
potentially copyrightable works embodying creativity. 206 Thus, similar to—
although distinct from—ingenuity and inventorship issues with artificial
intelligence patents, creativity and authorship issues arise with copyrightable
works from artificial intelligence technologies.207
First, copyright law is a form of protection for anyone who creates
original work[s] of authorship. 208 The problem with works generated by
artificial intelligence technologies—or computer-generated works—is that
they do not fit “the standard model of copyright law, [for] which a person” is
the author who creates the work. 209 Artificial intelligence can output what
appears to be a work created by its underlying technology, “but there [is] no
person whose actions resemble those of a traditional author.” 210 In such a
case, the meaning given by copyright law’s existing construction of
authorship does not qualify works generated by artificial intelligence
technologies. 211 The lack of a spark of human brilliance and the lack of
human creativity showing some creative spark would suggest that copyright
law would not qualify computer generated works for authorship. 212 In fact,
the U.S. Copyright Office has indicated that a work must be created by a
human being to qualify as a work of authorship. 213 The unresolved question

204.
17 U.S.C. § 101; Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in
Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (1986).
205.
Samuelson, supra note 204, at 1185 (defining computer generated work as
“software [that] automatically generates output that is not identical to its own text, some of
which is potentially copyrightable and some of which is not.”).
206.
See id. at 1197; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b), FIFTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE,
supra note 54, at 4.
207.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4; Samuelson, supra
note 204, at 1192, 1195–97.
208.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
209.
Bruce E. Boyden, Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 378
(2016).
210.
Id.
211.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 8.
212.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991);
Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship, Disrupted: AI Authors in Copyright and First Amendment
Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 592 (2017); see also Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of
Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395, 398 (2016) (providing as
reasoning, that how creativity defined as quintessentially human faculty would prohibit
computers, or artificial intelligence technology utilized by computers, from being authors).
213.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES 313.2 (3d ed. 2014) (stating that “the Office will not register works produced by a
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on this doctrinal issue is whether the artificial intelligence technology is an
assisting mechanism to a human being, or whether the authorship was not
truly fully executed by a human being. 214
Second, depending on how the invention is developed by the
artificial intelligence technology, it may or may not contain the requisite
originality. 215 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 216
the Supreme Court ruled that the Copyright Clause requires originality,
which means that “(1) the work must be independently created (2) with a
modicum of creativity.” 217 However, copyright law has not defined the
precise boundaries and scope of creativity. 218 While the lack of clarity
concerning creativity has not caused much litigation concerning creativity
since Feist, copyright law is facing a doctrinal disruption with creations from
artificial intelligence technologies. 219 The notions of independent creation
and modicum of creativity are being strained by human-machine interactions
or machine-generated works of artificial intelligence technologies. 220
Third, the work made for hire doctrine of copyright law could either
help to complicate or to resolve doctrinal copyright disruptions of artificial
intelligence technologies. 221 The work made for hire doctrine, which is
found in “Section 201(b) of the Copyright Act, states: ‘In the case of a
work-made-for-hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title.’” 222 Thus, a
person who is an employer and one who has played no role in the creation of
the work could be treated as the author and owner of the work. 223 The
doctrinal problem stems from “a broad, utilitarian interpretation of [the]
author[],” and hence, for the work made for hire doctrine. 224 A person who
is a motivating factor in producing can be considered to qualify as the author
for the work made for hire, and in doing so, would treat the employer as the

machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any
creative input or intervention from a human author.”).
214.
Samuelson, supra note 204, at 1192.
215.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012); Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 919, 920 (2012).
216.
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
217.
Lee, supra note 215, at 920.
218.
Id. at 920–21.
219.
Id.; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
220.
Lee, supra note 215, at 920–21.
221.
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012); Bridy, supra note 212, at 400–01.
222.
Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for ComputerGenerated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 275 (2016) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
223.
Id. at 276.
224.
Id. at 277; see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
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author. 225 The treatment of a work generated by artificial intelligence
technology as a work made for hire would provide a solution to the
aforementioned doctrinal copyright problems of vesting legal rights in a
machine for a computer-generated work. 226 However, the level of human
interaction with an artificial intelligence technology would weigh on the
assessment of the work made for hire doctrine. 227 For example, a small
degree of human interaction with an artificial intelligence technology could
prevent attributing authorship to the employer. 228 Thus, similar to the
unresolved question of authorship with artificial intelligence technology, the
applicability of the work made for hire doctrine depends on whether the
authorship was not truly fully executed by a human being. 229
IV.

INITIAL DATA-CENTRIC LITIGATION & A CONCEPTUAL PROPOSAL

The law’s struggle “to keep pace with technological developments”
has always raised questions about intellectual property protections in
emerging areas. 230 Data-centric technologies are not an exception. 231 Some
of the aforementioned doctrinal quandaries have created unclear boundaries
concerning patent law and copyright law protections, which has resulted in
initial litigation. 232
A.

Doctrinal Problems in Recent Litigation

There is a mismatch between traditional intellectual property law
doctrinal frameworks and new innovation with data-centric technologies,
which has resulted in recent litigation. 233 These cases have centered over
tensions in the scope of protection. 234

225.
Denicola, supra note 222, at 277 (quoting Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne,
Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
226.
Bridy, supra note 212, at 400.
227.
See id. at 399–400.
228.
See id.
229.
See id. at 400.
230.
Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
231.
See id. at 356–57.
232.
See supra Section III.B.
233.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283,
1286–88 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018); Purepredictive,
Inc. v. H20.AI, Inc., No. 17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139056, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 29, 2017).
234.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1286–87; Naruto, 888 F.3d
at 420; Purepredictive, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139056, at *7–21.
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3D Printing Patent Law Dispute Over Articles

In ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade
Commission, 235 the dispute centered on the interpretation of the term articles,
which the ITC has the power to regulate under section 337 of the Tariff
Act. 236 The doctrinal issue concerned whether the production of digital data
sets of infringing digital patient data files was considered to be unfair
importation into the United States. 237 In evaluating whether a patent owner
could assert whether another entity was importing infringing articles, the ITC
interpreted articles broadly to include all intangible digital information and
asserted jurisdiction over digital information, resulting in an appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 238 After a challenge of the
ITC’s decision, the Federal Circuit challenged the ITC’s decision that its
jurisdiction included digital files and held that Congress had never intended
the ITC to have authority over the Internet. 239 While the Federal Circuit
determined that Congress had directly spoken on this issue concerning
articles, it also brought to light the imprecise and vague meaning of
articles—which Congress may still want to clarify further. 240 This case
highlighted the mismatch between a definition intended by Congress and the
patent law’s inability to keep with digitization and digital transmission of 3D

235.
810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
236.
Id. at 1286–87; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
237.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1286–88; Barclay Oudersluys,
Following ClearCorrect: A Guideline for Regulating Digital Trade, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
653, 659–60 (2017).
238.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1286; Oudersluys, supra note
237, at 659–60; see also Kumar, supra note 115, at 1912, 1924–25 (summarizing that the
litigation involved plastic, invisible braces for repositioning teeth and a series of custom-made
aligners for successively straightening a patient’s teeth, wherein the sequence of events
included: (1) uploading digital scans of patients’ teeth to a server in Houston; (2) digital
modification by creating digital models of patients’ teeth in Pakistan; and (3) retransmission
back to Houston for downloading and eventual 3D printing of physical models of the patient’s
teeth to create aligners; noting that none of the patent claims were directed to a tangible
object, but instead were directed to methods of creating dental appliances, digital data sets,
and digital treatment plans; stating that the ITC interpreted the term articles broadly to include
all intangible digital information).
239.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1294, 1302; see also
Oudersluys, supra note 237, at 661–62.
240.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1291–92, 94; Oudersluys,
supra note 237, at 661–62.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss3/1

96

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 3

2019]

DATA-CENTRIC TECHNOLOGIES

315

printing. 241 It provided motivation for how the law should evolve in light of
a proliferating data-centric technology. 242
2.

Artificial Intelligence Patent Law Dispute Over Predictive Analytics

In Purepredictive, Inc. v. H2O.AI, Inc., 243 the dispute centered on
patent eligibility of predictive analytics and whether the mere running of data
through a machine goes to the “general abstract concept of predictive
analytics rather than a specific application.” 244 The case, which is being
appealed to the Federal Circuit, centers around whether an artificial
intelligence technology—specifically machine learning ensembling in the
form of predictive analytics that “could be performed by humans”—qualifies
as patentable subject matter or is an abstract idea. 245 This case highlights the
mismatch between patent law’s origination on human-based considerations
in the physical world and emerging artificial intelligence technologies that
focus on non-human considerations in a digital world. 246
3.

Artificial Intelligence Copyright Law Dispute Over Monkey Selfie

In Naruto v. Slater, 247 the dispute centered on whether animals could
sue for copyright infringement and on who had rights to a photograph taken
by a macaque. 248 The case concerned the doctrinal issue of whether animals
had the statutory standing to sue for copyright infringement under the
Copyright Act. 249 While the case did not concern data-centric technology,
but instead a monkey, the underlying issue of the lack of specificity of
241.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1291–92, 1295; Kumar,
supra note 115, at 1912, 1924–25; Oudersluys, supra note 237, at 661.
242.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1291–92; Oudersluys,
supra note 237, at 658, 664.
243.
No. 17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139056, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 29, 2017).
244.
Id. at *15.
245.
Id. at *4, 6, 13–15.
246.
See id. at *7.
247.
888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). This monkey selfie litigation is being
classified under artificial intelligence for the purposes of this Part IV and for the purposes of
this Article, even though it does not fit the prior definition of artificial intelligence technology.
Paulina Julia Perkal, Monkey Business Finally Settled: The Monkey Selfie Disputes, KLUWER
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Feb. 5, 2018), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/02/05/monkeybusiness-finally-settled-monkey-selfie-disputes/; see also Naruto, 888 F.3d at 431. The
reason for introducing this monkey selfie case here is to provide an analogy of a non-human
consideration, which has similar consideration as artificial intelligence technology with
respect to copyright law. Perkal, supra; Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420.
248.
Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420.
249.
Id.
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copyright law for animals—and arguably other non-humans, such as
artificial intelligence technology—is similar. 250 This case highlights the
mismatch between copyright law’s coverage to certain entities, touching on
the similar consideration of authorship with artificial intelligence
technology. 251
B.

Conceptual Data-Centric Matrix to Address Doctrinal Disruptions

Data-centric doctrinal disruptions of an initial litigation is a result of
intellectual property law’s traditional assumptions that do not keep pace with
emerging technologies. 252 While there may not be “a single model legal
framework to govern” emerging technologies, intellectual property law
should still evolve and clarify its scope of protection in order to avoid
litigation. 253
This Part introduces a broad, over-arching conceptual
framework for intellectual property law’s treatment of scope of protection in
present day, in the past, and in the likely future. 254
1.

Introducing the Conceptual Data-Centric Doctrinal Matrix

The doctrinal disruptions brought by data-centric technologies and
the recent litigation concerning data-centric technologies can be
conceptualized as levels of interpreting domains of human, non-human,
physical, and digital. 255 This Part has conceptualized patent law and
copyright law statutes not as a static and narrow interpretation, but instead as
a dynamic and broad interpretation. 256 First, key patent law and copyright
law terms have varying meanings that are being brought to the forefront due
to unimagined, yet now feasible, data-centric technological developments. 257
Second, the scope of protection provided by patent law and copyright law
will continue to change as data-centric technology continues to advance at a
much faster pace than regulations. 258
These considerations are
250.
Id. at 425–26.
251.
Id. at 420.
252.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
253.
WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 3.
254.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
255.
Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420; ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Purepredictive Inc. v. H2O.AI, Inc., No.
17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139056, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017).
256.
Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57
IDEA: J. FRANKLIN PIERCE CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. 431, 453 (2017); see also discussion supra
Part IV.B.1
257.
Hristov, supra note 256, at 437–38, 453.
258.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65.
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conceptualized in the forthcoming figures, starting with the present-day
pictorial representation of scope of coverage not as a dot or circle, but
instead as two-by-two matrix encompassing these multiple domains:

This conceptual data-centric doctrinal matrix demonstrates that
patent law and copyright law definitions, scope, and standards should be
evaluated in multiple domains, such as: (1) non-human in digital domain; (2)
human in digital domain; (3) non-human in physical domain; and (4) human
in physical domain. 259 This conceptual framework demonstrates that patent
law and copyright law is multi-faceted and more complex than what may
have been intended in their originations. 260
2.

From the Past to the Current Time

The aforementioned conceptual data-centric doctrinal matrix can
better be understood by evaluation from a time standpoint. 261 As shown
here, in the past, during the origination of patent law and copyright law
statutes, the definitions, scope, and standards were based on only physical
and human considerations—shown as region four, prior to the current time
and closer to time, below. 262

364–65.

259.
260.

See id. at 372.
See Kumar, supra note 115, at 1911; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at

261.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65.
262.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 213, at 313.2 (stating that “To qualify as a work of authorship
a work must be created by a human . . . . [T]he Office will not register works produced by a
machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any
creative input or intervention from a human author.”); Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at
364–65.
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Thus, the origination of patent law and copyright law in this
conceptual framework is based on the past—without digital and without nonhuman aspects. 263 However, present-day time has required patent law and
copyright law to evaluate data-centric technologies with considerations of
digital and non-human interpretations. 264 Thus, at the current time, the
definitions, scope, and standards of patent law and copyright law doctrines
are not limited to only human in physical domain, but instead, also
encompass non-human in digital domain, human in digital domain and nonhuman in physical domain. 265 The cause of recent litigation of data-centric
technologies is that data-centric technologies, in the current time, are being
evaluated by the origins of patent law and copyright law from a prior time
that based principles only on human and physical principles. 266
3.

From the Current Time to a Future Time

In order to prevent future litigation, patent law and copyright law
will need to evolve not only from their past framework to apply to a datacentric current framework, but also anticipate and prepare for a future
263.
256, at 440.
264.
356–57.
265.
266.

See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 9; Hristov, supra note
Hristov, supra note 256, at 433; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–66.
See Perkal, supra note 247.
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framework. 267 Conceptually speaking, patent law and copyright law will
need to prepare for a future where data-centric technologies will need more
clarity and precision of non-human/digital considerations that will be
prevalent and dominating—shown in the future matrix closer to +time for
region 1, as shown below. 268 The future of data-centric technologies will
also need more clarity and precision of human/digital considerations—shown
in the future matrix closer to +time for region 2, as shown below—and nonhuman/physical considerations—shown in the future matrix closer to +time
for region 3, as shown below. 269
However, the human/physical
considerations will be less relevant in the future of data-centric
technologies—shown in the future matrix closer to +time for region 4, as
shown below. 270

Thus, this conceptualization has implications for how patent law and
copyright law should evolve in light of rapidly developing and proliferating

267.
FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4; Hristov, supra note 256,
at 453; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 372.
268.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4; Robinson & Smith,
supra note 28, at 372.
269.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 14; Robinson & Smith,
supra note 28, at 372.
270.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 14; Robinson & Smith,
supra note 28, at 365–67.
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data-centric technologies. 271 First, patent law and copyright law should not
remain static, but should anticipate the need to evolve. 272 Second, patent law
and copyright law should focus on non-human and digital considerations. 273
Third, they should also anticipate an increase in unique, future doctrinal
disruptions not only in the non-human/digital domain, but also in the
human/digital domain and in the non-human/physical domain. 274 These
considerations will impact incentives for inventors and creative authors, and
in doing so, impact the breadth, pace, and scope of innovation and
advancement of data-centric technologies. 275
V.

CONCLUSION

Data-centric technologies such as 3D printing and artificial
intelligence are rapidly proliferating and gaining adoption. 276 Digitization of
the physical world into digital operation or use has enabled transmission or
control of information goods. 277 However, the information content view of
the physical world has caused doctrinal disruptions with patent law and
copyright law. 278 Imprecise and unclear definition, scope, and standards has
challenged doctrines and resulted in initial litigation.279 Data-centric
technology disputes will continue unless patent law and copyright law
embrace and better define the non-human and digital worlds, rather than
remaining tied to doctrinal concepts only in the human and physical
worlds. 280

38.
365.

271.

Kumar, supra note 115, at 1911; see also Hristov, supra note 256, at 437–

272.

See Hristov, supra note 256, at 453; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at

273.
See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018); Guadamuz, supra
note 7, at 19; Hristov, supra note 256, at 453; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 365.
274.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 41;
Hristov, supra note 256, at 453; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 365; Van Overwalle &
Leys, supra note 111, at 507–08.
275.
Hristov, supra note 256, at 453; see also Guadamuz, supra note 7, at 17.
276.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 41;
Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 358.
277.
See Lipton, supra note 43, at 141, 143.
278.
See id. at 157, 164; Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation,
supra note 1, at 42; Hristov, supra note 256, at 453; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 365,
372.
279.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283,
1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Perkal, supra note 247.
280.
See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018); Hristov, supra
note 256, at 453; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 365, 372.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss3/1

102

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 3

TELEHEALTH, CHILDREN, AND PEDIATRICS: SHOULD THE
DOCTOR MAKE HOUSE CALLS AGAIN, DIGITALLY?
DR. LAURA C. HOFFMAN *
I.
II.
III.

IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 322
DEFINING TELEHEALTH AND ITS APPROPRIATE USE IN PEDIATRICS
....................................................................................................... 323
LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE USE OF TELEHEALTH ............................ 324
A.
Practicing Telehealth........................................................ 325
1.
Physician-Patient Relationship ............................ 325
2.
Standard of Care .................................................. 328
3.
Informed Consent ................................................ 331
B.
Telehealth Practice Crossing State Lines ......................... 335
1.
Liability and Liability Insurance.......................... 335
2.
Licensure Limitations and State Telehealth Laws 337
C.
Equipment ......................................................................... 338
1.
Standards of Practice ........................................... 338
2.
Who is Liable? ..................................................... 339
3.
FDA Regulation and Telehealth .......................... 341
D.
Security ............................................................................. 344
THE PROS AND CONS OF TELEHEALTH USE FOR PEDIATRIC CARE 346
A.
Benefits of Telehealth in Pediatrics .................................. 346
B.
Disadvantages of Telehealth in Pediatrics ....................... 347
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 349

“Children represent one of our most vulnerable populations, and as
such, require special considerations when participating in telehealth
encounters.” 1

*
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1.
AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR PEDIATRIC
TELEHEALTH 3 (2017).
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INTRODUCTION

Although telehealth was initially developed primarily for those in
rural areas who have difficulty accessing traditional health care services due
to distance, the use of telehealth has significantly expanded in the past
decade across various groups, including children and adolescents, through
pediatrics. 2 “Pediatricians can use telemedicine for a broad range of
applications. Telemedicine can be used for tele-education, teleconsultation,
telepractice, and teleresearch.” 3 The growth of the acceptance of telehealth
in pediatrics is also evidenced by the American Academy of Pediatrics’
(“AAP”) agreement for utilization of SnapMD. 4 Additionally, with a rising
shortage of medical professionals in pediatrics unable to sustain the growing
need for pediatric care, the potential benefits of telehealth cannot be
overlooked. 5 As the use of telehealth becomes more prevalent in pediatrics,
the opportunities for entrepreneurs to impact this area have increased to
create greater access to health care for this vulnerable population that is not
only more efficient, but also cost effective. 6
A number of recent entrepreneurial endeavors have demonstrated a
growing interest in pediatrics. 7 In 2016, Tyto Care began marketing an athome medical kit to enable parents to obtain medical information of their
children that can be delivered to their pediatricians who also have the Tyto
Care technology. 8 While reserved for non-urgent care, the kit is designed to
provide efficiency by avoiding the necessity of an in-person doctor’s office
2.
See John Commins, Pediatric Telemedicine Poised for Growth Spurt,
HEALTHLEADERS (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/innovation/pediatrictelemedicine-poised-growth-spurt; Telehealth Use in Rural Healthcare, RURAL HEALTH INFO.
HUB, http://www.ruralhealthinfo.org/topics/telehealth (last updated Mar. 26, 2019).
3.
Bryan L. Burke Jr. et al., Telemedicine: Pediatric Applications, 136 AM.
ACAD. PEDIATRICS e293, e294 (2015).
4.
Cara Livernois, American Academy of Pediatrics Selects SnapMD as
Telehealth Provider, AI IN HEALTHCARE: CONNECTED CARE, (May 24, 2018),
http://www.aiin.healthcare/topics/connected-care/american-academy-pediatrics-selectssnapmd-telehealth-provider.
5.
Id.
6.
See id.; Brit Morse, This Startup Has a Small Army of Therapists with
Laptops, Ready to Help People Anywhere, INC. (May 7, 2018), http://www.inc.com/britmorse/dotcom-therapy-30-under-30-2018.html; Josh Wilson, Majority of Parents Plan to Use
(Apr.
23,
2017),
Telemedicine
for
Pediatric
Care,
NEMOURS
http://www.nemours.org/about/mediaroom/press/dv/majority-of-parents-plan-to-usetelemedicine.html.
7.
See Morse, supra note 6; Rina Raphael, Can This Home Medical Kit Save
You from Constant Doctor Visits?, FAST COMPANY (May 10, 2018),
http://www.fastcompany.com/40565776/can-this-home-medical-kit-save-you-from-constantdoctor-visits.
8.
Raphael, supra note 7.
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visit and significantly assisting parents who are employed and/or have
otherwise complicated daily schedules. 9 Started in 2015, DotCom Therapy
is a telehealth therapy startup that has partnered with schools to provide
children with a variety of therapy services including “speech therapy,
occupational therapy, mental health, and teleaudiology services.” 10 Other
examples have shown a growing market for telehealth with options available
at retailers. 11
This Article explores the different challenges that arise in
incorporating telehealth into pediatrics, especially for entrepreneurs. 12 First,
this Article explains how telehealth has been applied, specifically in
pediatrics. 13 Next, the Article explores the various legal barriers involving
telehealth with particular attention to these issues as they relate to pediatric
care, including: Physician-patient relationship, standard of care, informed
consent, liability/liability insurance, equipment, and security. 14 This Article
then examines the benefits and disadvantages that have been raised in the use
of telehealth in relation to pediatric care. 15 Finally, this Article concludes by
offering recommendations to those entrepreneurs who hope to have an
influence on the future development of telehealth in pediatrics. 16
II.

DEFINING TELEHEALTH AND ITS APPROPRIATE USE IN PEDIATRICS

As the focus of this Article is the use of telehealth, specifically as it
relates to pediatric care, it is imperative to have a working knowledge of how
certain terms are defined within this specialty. 17 In 2015, the AAP released
its own technical report on the use of telemedicine in pediatrics. 18 In
defining telemedicine, the AAP deferred to the definition used by the
American Telemedicine Association (“ATA”). 19
The ATA defined
telemedicine as: “[T]he use of medical information exchanged from one site
to another via electronic communications to improve a patient’s clinical
9.
Id.
10.
Morse, supra note 6.
11.
Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e296.
12.
See discussion infra Part III–IV.
13.
See discussion infra Part II.
14.
See discussion infra Part III.
15.
See discussion infra Part IV.
16.
See discussion infra Part V.
17.
See discussion infra Part III.
18.
Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e293. It should be noted that, according
to this technical guidance document: “All technical reports from the [AAP] automatically
expire [five] years after publication unless reaffirmed, revised, or retired at or before that
time.” Id.
19.
Id. at e293, e304 n.1.
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health status.” 20 The AAP recognized that the term telehealth has a more
expansive definition than telemedicine. 21 “Telehealth has historically had a
broader definition, encompassing telemedicine’s clinical care for patients and
tele-education, teleresearch, and disaster response.” 22 Despite this, the AAP
acknowledged the interchangeability of telemedicine and telehealth,
describing the common use of these terms as synonymous. 23 For purposes of
this Article, the term telehealth will be used generally to describe all
telemedicine services unless reference is made to a specific document’s use
of a particular term. 24
A primary consideration for pediatric care is whether there is an
appropriate age for which a child may have medical care and treatment using
telehealth. 25 The ATA’s April 2017 Operating Procedures for Pediatric
Health—approved by the AAP—specifically advises against the use of
telehealth with a child under the age of two unless there has been a prior inperson relationship developed and referral is made for telehealth services
based on a chronic or medically complex condition. 26
III.

LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE USE OF TELEHEALTH

The AAP guidance summed it up quite simply when it stated,
“[l]egal barriers can be substantial” with regard to the use of telehealth.27
“Liability in the context of telemedicine means the exposure of a physician
to a claim for damages for alleged medical malpractice or negligence while
providing telemedicine services.” 28 The AAP identified several issues that
should be examined with regard to legal liability, including: The physicianpatient relationship, roles and communications responsibilities, patient
abandonment, technological failures, liability insurance, site of malpractice
action, standard of care, informed consent, security, and unknown legal risks
associated with telemedicine. 29 The following sections will explore a
number of these issues. 30
20.
Telemedicine or Telehealth – Definitions, TELEHEALTH ALLIANCE OF OR.,
http://www.ortelehealth.org/content/telemedicine-or-telehealth-definitions (last visited May 1,
2019).
21.
Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e293.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
See discussion infra Part III.
25.
See AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, supra note 1, at 2–3.
26.
Id. at 3.
27.
Burke Jr. et. al., supra note 3, at e300.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B, III.C, III.D.
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Practicing Telehealth
1.

Physician-Patient Relationship

Physicians who engage in the practice of telehealth will be subject to
liability for medical malpractice.31 Drawn from the traditional elements of
tort law, the prima facie case for a malpractice liability claim is relatively
uniform across jurisdictions. 32 Indeed, as noted in Rolon-Alvarado v.
Municipality of San Juan, 33 the elements of medical malpractice liability are
fairly comparable among varying jurisdictions.34 In order to prevail, the
patient-plaintiff must prove each of the following elements: (1) the
physician had a duty to act according to accepted professional standards; (2)
the physician breached that duty by deviating from the applicable standard of
care; (3) the patient suffered injury; and (4) a causal connection exists
between the breach of duty and the patient’s injury. 35 “For telemedicine
physicians, the most significant issues will be: (1) [d]oes the telemedicine
physician owe the patient a duty of care, [i.e.,] has a physician-patient
relationship been established? (2) [w]hat is the applicable standard of
telemedical care or, more accurately, what are the applicable standards of
care?” 36
To be successful in a claim for medical malpractice, a plaintiffpatient must, among other things, prove the existence of a physician-patient
relationship as it is from this relationship that a duty is created of the
physician to the patient. 37 “In the context of telemedicine, several factors
need to be considered in determining when, or if, a physician-patient

31.
See Christopher J. Caryl, Malpractice and Other Legal Issues Preventing
the Development of Telemedicine, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 192–93 (1997–1998).
32.
Id. at 193; see also Hollis v. United States, 323 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir.
2003); Arkin v. Gittleson, 32 F.3d 658, 664 (2d Cir. 1994); Rolon-Alvarado v. Municipality of
San Juan, 1 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1993); MacGuineas v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 566, 569
(D.D.C. 1990).
33.
1 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 1993).
34.
Id. at 77 n.2; see also Hollis, 323 F.3d at 336 (applying Texas law); Arkin,
32 F.3d at 664 (applying New York law); Fletscher v. United States, No. C-92-20151, 1993
WL 151223, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 1993) (applying California law); MacDonald v. United
States, 767 F. Supp. 1295, 1307 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law); MacGuineas,
738 F. Supp. at 569 (applying Maryland law); Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084,
1099 (D. Conn. 1984) (applying Connecticut law).
35.
Hollis, 323 F.3d at 336; Rolon-Alvarado, 1 F.3d at 77 n.2; Caryl, supra
note 31, at 193.
36.
LYNN D. FLEISHER & JAMES C. DECHENE, TELEMEDICINE AND E-HEALTH
LAW § 1.04(3), LexisNexis (last visited May 1, 2019).
37.
Id. § 1.04(3)(a).
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relationship exists.” 38 Among one of the chief considerations that arises is
distinguishing whether a website is simply providing general information to
a patient or is in an interactive format that is being utilized by licensed
physicians and patients. 39 When a website is distinguishable as an
interactive site, it will be deemed a practice location. 40
In a court’s determination of whether a physician-patient relationship
exists in the context of telehealth, the following considerations will be made:
A physician-patient relationship likely will be found
where: (1) the telemedicine physician and the patient see each
other during the telemedicine visit; (2) where an actual exam takes
place; (3) where the physician provides diagnosis, treatment or
other care on which the patient relies; (4) where the physician has
access to the patient’s medical records; and (5) where the
physician accepts a fee for the telemedicine consultation. 41

A number of cases have found that a physician-patient relationship
has been established without a physician actually physically seeing a
patient. 42 The AAP guidance further indicates that as telehealth medical
malpractice will likely be similarly aligned to telephone medical malpractice,
the physician-patient relationship may attach to both the on-site physician as
well as the remote consultant. 43 “Extrapolating from case law on telephone
use, it is reasonable to conclude that a physician-patient relationship has been
established with both the on-site treating physician and the remote consultant
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(a)(i); P. Greg Gulick, EHealth and the Future of Medicine: The Economic, Legal, Regulatory, Cultural, and
Organizational Obstacles Facing Telemedicine and Cybermedicine Programs, 12 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 351, 393–94 (2002). But lack of payment may not immunize the physician from
liability, except when the physician’s services fall under a state’s Good Samaritan laws.
Compare Blanchard v. Murray, 771 N.E.2d 1122, 1131–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (finding that
even though an obstetrician did not charge for services related to the performance of a
caesarean section, it was still a question of fact as to whether the obstetrician was liable for
negligence because she was given prior notice of the patient’s condition), with 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 49/25 (2018) (Illinois Good Samaritan law conferring civil immunity to physicians
under certain circumstances, including not charging the patient any fee for the service). See
also Henslee v. Provena Hosps., 373 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809–15 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (discussing
good faith requirement for without fee element of the Illinois statute).
42.
Diggs v. Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd., 8 P.3d 386, 388–89; 391 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2000); McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), overruled
in part by Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354 (2002); Bienz v. Central Suffolk Hosp.,
557 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139–40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); see also Caryl, supra note 31, at 195–96.
43.
Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e300.
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during a telemedicine encounter if the remote consultant participates in the
history, examination, diagnosis, and development of the treatment plan.” 44
Case law has developed in the area of telephone communications
establishing a physician-patient relationship. 45 Several cases have been
illuminating. 46 For example, the Supreme Court Appellate Division of New
York held that a telephone call was sufficient to create a doctor-patient
relationship. 47 Courts have even found a past relationship between a
physician and patient sufficient to create the requisite physician-patient
relationship and, thus, to establish a duty. 48 This has specifically occurred
within the area of pediatrics. 49
Indeed, courts have found physician-patient relationships in the most
casual of circumstances. 50 For example, in Wilson v. Teng, 51 a pediatrician
who had a previous relationship with a patient may have had a duty to the
patient when she encountered her in the emergency room while she was
seeing another patient and simply exchanged a few words with her. 52 The
Alabama Supreme Court held that there was a genuine issue of fact as to
whether Dr. Teng breached the standard of care by not admitting the patient
to the hospital despite the fact that, at the time Dr. Teng encountered the
patient, she was neither an emergency physician nor was she even in the
emergency room to see that particular patient. 53
“Thus, in the telemedicine context, it is unlikely that courts will
allow a physician to avoid responsibility for a missed diagnosis or other
negligent act on the basis of never having met or directly examined the
patient.” 54

44.
Id.
45.
Bienz, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 139–40.
46.
See id. at 140; Diggs, 8 P.3d at 389, 391; McKinney, 692 N.E.2d at 1050.
47.
Bienz, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 140; see also Diggs, 8 P.3d at 389 (finding that the
test to be applied is “whether a sufficient relationship existed between [the doctor and patient]
such that, as a matter of policy, [the doctor] owed [the patient] a duty of reasonable care”).
Even though the advice was communicated over a telephone wire rather than in person, the
existence of a doctor-patient relationship was an issue of fact for the jury. Bienz, 557
N.Y.S.2d at 140.
48.
See Wilson v. Teng, 786 So. 2d 485, 499 (Ala. 2000).
49.
Id. at 487.
50.
See id. at 499.
51.
786 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 2000).
52.
Id. at 487–88.
53.
Id. at 499.
54.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(a)(i).
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Standard of Care

Another legal barrier that occurs in telehealth can occur with regard
to the standard of care. 55 As the AAP points out, there is the potential for a
variety of standards for telehealth practice, which substantially complicates
this area. 56 “The standard of care for telemedicine may vary depending on
technological sophistication, available options, and patient expectations.” 57
In order to succeed in a medical malpractice case, a plaintiff-patient, after
establishing the physician-patient relationship, will need to substantiate the
standard of care. 58 The standard of care in medical malpractice must be
established as follows:
The standard of care element of a malpractice case is a two-part
inquiry. First, the applicable standard of care must be established.
Second, a determination must be made as to whether the
physician-defendant breached that standard. Historically, the
accepted standard of care for malpractice cases was defined as the
degree of care exercised by clinicians, in good standing, in the
same or similar locality as the defendant physician. 59

One development that has occurred with regard to standard of care
has been the courts’ adoption of recognized national standards, in particular,
with regard to specialties. 60 While it was believed that the traditional
standard of care would be applicable to physicians, standards of care have
evolved due to the technological nature of the medical care being provided to
patients in these instances. 61
Telehealth creates a host of additional issues in the delivery of health
care. 62 Of particular concern, in the area of standard of care for a medical
malpractice claim, a plaintiff may be challenging “whether the use of
telemedicine was appropriate.” 63 The appropriateness or suitability of a
physician opting to use telehealth to deliver medical care can arise in a
number of circumstances. 64
55.
Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e300.
56.
See id.
57.
Id.
58.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b).
59.
Id. at § 1.04(3)(b); Caryl, supra note 31, at 197.
60.
See Caryl, supra note 31, at 197–98. “In recent years, however, national
standards of care, particularly specialty care, have been recognized and accepted by most
courts.” FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b).
61.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b).
62.
Caryl, supra note 31, at 192–93.
63.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b)(i).
64.
See id.
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Among the myriad tele-specific issues that may arise in a
telemedicine malpractice suit are questions relating to: (1)
whether the use of telemedicine was appropriate in the specific
circumstances of the patient’s care; (2) whether the best available
technology, e.g., store and forward vs. dynamic imaging, was
used; and (3) whether it was sufficient, for example, to have a
pathology assistant rather than a physician select and transmit
patient images. Few standards currently exist to address these
issues. 65

As new technologies emerge, physicians may be hesitant to use such
technologies for fear of creating a greater potential to face liability. 66 At the
other end, there may be a legal argument by a plaintiff-patient that telehealth
should have been used in the course of care in the case of misdiagnosis—i.e.,
a test should have been read by a remote expert/specialist that would have
made a different diagnosis. 67
Another issue that arises as to standard of care is whether or not a
difference exists in the clinical standards required of a physician with the
introduction of the use of telehealth in the delivery of medical care. 68 “With
respect to some medical procedures and services, there will be little
distinction between the way a physically-present physician and a
telemedicine physician should perform. In such circumstances, the standard
of care in both cases should be similar.” 69 However, this does not mean it
will always be the case that standards will be the same when a patient’s care
involves a technological component. 70 In some specialties, the nature of the
specialty has already incorporated telehealth’s use to such a degree that it has
become virtually a regular part of that specialty. 71 However, there are
instances of medical care in which the use of telehealth presents a new
dynamic that demands an adjustment in the standard of care. 72 “In many
other cases, however, the customary standard of care for a particular

Id.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b)(ii).
Id.
See id.
Id.

72.

FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b)(ii).

In other instances, certain uses of telemedicine, such as the transmission of
digitized pathology images, already have become part of the customary practice of
care for that specialty. In these cases, standard practice is fairly well-established
and both physicians and patients are comfortable with the use of telemedicine in the
provision of care.
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procedure may have to be modified significantly to accommodate, inter alia,
the fact that the physician will not be able to touch the patient.” 73 Several
states have regulated the standard of care for the use of telehealth that,
unsurprisingly, differ by state. 74 Despite these attempts to provide
consistency for telehealth practice in terms of a standard of care, the
establishment of standards in this area have been described as a moving
target. 75 A pertinent example of how a state’s standard of care can impact a
telehealth startup business is demonstrated by an Illinois order which
prohibited a company from treating and prescribing for online patients due to
the lack of previous physician-patient relationship and physical exam. 76
More will be discussed in a later section regarding the licensure barriers that
have already existed for physicians to practice medicine across state lines but
presents an even greater challenge to the various startup businesses that want
to pursue a purely telehealth medical practice.77 States still have an
enormous ability to regulate and essentially dictate the boundaries of the
73.
74.

Id.; Caryl, supra note 31, at 199.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b)(ii).

Some states already have promulgated regulations that attempt to specify applicable
standards of care for telemedicine practice. And, as expected, they vary from state
to state. Colorado’s regulation requires the standard of care for telemedicine
treatment to be the same as the standard of care for in-person treatment. Florida’s
regulation states that prescribing medicine based solely on an electronic medical
questionnaire fails to meet the required standard of care. Texas has a rule similar to
Florida’s, which states that the standard of care is not met merely by an online or
telephonic evaluation of the patient. The regulations state that “[t]reatment and
consultation recommendations made in an online setting, including issuing a
prescription via electronic means, will be held to the same standards of appropriate
practice as those in traditional in person settings.” The Texas regulation requires
the physician to diagnose the patient using acceptable medical practices, discuss
treatment options with the patient, and be available for follow up care, if necessary.
At least two states require that a physician treating a patient via telemedicine keep
that patient’s records confidential.

Id.; see also TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 111.003 (West 2017); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 540-x-9-.11
(2018); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 540-x-15-.01 (repealed 2015); 10 COLO. CODE REGS. § 2505-10,
8.200.3.B (LexisNexis 2018); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r 64B8-9.0141 (2018); FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r 64B15-14.0081 (2018); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r 64B8-9.014 (repealed and
reenacted as 64B8.9.0141 (2018)); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 360-3-.07 (2018); MONT. ADMIN. R.
24.156.810 (repealed 2018); 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 174.4 (2018); 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §
174.8 (2018).
75.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b)(ii).
76.
Id.
In November 2002, the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation ordered
MyDoc.com, an Indiana-based medical consultation company, to stop treating and
prescribing to online patients ‘without the benefit of prior physician-patient
relationship or physical exam.’ The order also alleges that the company violated
the Illinois Medical Practice Act by practicing medicine without a license.

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Tyler Chin, Firm Treating Strangers by Web Shut Out by
Illinois Directive, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 4, 2002, at 21).
77.
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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practice of medicine within its borders.78 It should also be noted that a
number of voluntary telehealth standards have been developed by various
associations. 79
3.

Informed Consent

“Informed consent refers to a process of communication between a
patient and physician that results in the patient’s authorization or agreement
to undergo a specific medical intervention.” 80 The AAP has identified the
importance of informed consent in the use of telehealth; “[s]pecial consent
may be necessary regarding the risks associated with the use of telemedicine,
including involvement of nonmedical staff, recording of the interaction, and
the vulnerability of the equipment to failure.” 81 The failure of a physician to
obtain proper consent can result in legal consequences. 82 “In most states, a
physician who fails to obtain informed consent from a patient may face
liability for assault, battery, fraud, and/or negligence.” 83 The first case
credited for the doctrine of informed consent is Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital. 84 States have developed different standards for
evaluating the doctrine of informed consent, including the professional
standard and the reasonable patient standard. 85 “Additionally, some states
require the disclosure of specific factors including diagnosis, nature and
purpose of treatment, potential risks and outcomes, skill or status risks,
alternatives, prognosis without intervention, prognosis with intervention, and
potential conflicts of interest as part of the informed consent process.” 86
While much more can be said, generally, about informed consent, the
importance here is that the duty of a physician to obtain informed consent
still applies in the telehealth context.87 Several states have laws mandating
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
(N.Y. 1957).

Id. at 93.

See FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(b)(iii).
Id.
Id. § 1.04(3)(c)(i).
Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e300.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(c)(i).
Id.
105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y 1914), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3

In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not merely negligence.
It is trespass. Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body, and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages.

85.
86.
87.
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Id.
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physicians practicing telehealth obtain informed consent. 88 While physicians
may traditionally obtain informed consent orally, much more emphasis is
made on getting written consent when medical care is delivered by means of
telehealth, even to the extent that some states require consent to medical care
be in written format when delivery involves telehealth.89 Additionally,
telehealth necessitates the possibility of having to obtain informed consent in
more than one instance. 90 The introduction of technology into traditional
health care delivery amplifies the significance of acquiring multiple informed
consents. 91
Moreover, the practice of telemedicine raises novel
informed consent issues and more than one type of consent may be
necessary. A practitioner should consider documenting consent
for the general risks of a treatment or procedure, as well as special
consent for the specific risks associated with the use of
telemedicine for that treatment or procedure. Additionally, in the
context of the interstate practice of telemedicine, both the
teleconsulting physician’s home state and the patient’s home state
may impose other specific informed consent duties on the
physician. 92

It has also been stressed that as the use of technology in medical care
is likely to be novel for a patient, it is critical that a physician is careful in
explaining a number of things to the patient for consent. 93
Because the use of telemedicine will be a new experience
for most patients, the treating physician is well advised to . . .
explain to the patient the risks and benefits associated with
receiving medical care from a telemedicine physician and/or
through the use of telemedical technology. At a minimum, the
patient should know that a telemedicine consult: (1) necessitates
that the treating physician and the telemedicine physician discuss
the patient’s health information via telecommunication
technology; (2) may require that non-medical staff be involved in
the consult for the purposes of operating the technology, both at
the treatment site and at the teleconsult physician’s site; and (3)
may be recorded by audio, video, or some other medium. . . . The
patient also should be informed that, as with any technology,
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(c)(ii)(A).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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telemedicine systems are vulnerable to failure and unauthorized
access. . . . In addition, the patient should be advised of his or her
rights to privacy and informed consent. Finally, the patient should
be informed regarding the state(s) in which the telemedicine
physician is licensed and should be advised of the procedure for
follow-up. . . . Patients should be told up front which physician—
the referring physician or the teleconsult physician—should be
contacted if the patient has any follow-up questions. 94

The AAP also emphasized the importance of informed consent
regarding possible technology failure in its 2015 technical assistance:
“When any electronic device is used, plans should be in place to deal with
problems such as system failure, loss of power, or loss of connectivity.
Telemedical informed consent should include this potential problem.” 95 It is
critical to know that, similar to licensure, informed consent will vary by state
in terms of requirements and will often require an obtained oral consent to be
captured in writing. 96
A number of special considerations come up in the area of informed
consent involving pediatrics that were addressed by the ATA in its April
2017 Operating Procedures for Pediatric Health. 97 The ATA gives general
guidance regarding informed consent as follows:
Prior to the initiation of a telemedicine encounter, except
in the case of emergency, the provider or designee shall inform
and educate the patient and/or legal representative about the nature
of telemedicine service compared with in-person care, billing
arrangements, and the relevant credentials of the distant site
provider.
The provider or designee should also include
information about the timing of service, record keeping,
scheduling, privacy and security, potential risks, mandatory
reporting, and billing arrangements. Providers should consider
whether consent for care is based on a specific condition, episode
of care or a period of time. The information shall be provided in
simple language that can be easily understood by the patient and/or
legal representative. The provider shall follow state-specific
requirements for the use of translation services for consent, and the
provider may utilize translation services as necessary for consent
in the absence of such state-specific requirements.
These
considerations are particularly important when discussing
technical issues like encryption or the potential for technical
94.
95.
96.
97.
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failure. As with in-person care, providers should also make an
effort to obtain the assent of pediatric patients participating in
telehealth services in a manner appropriate to their
understanding. 98

Additionally, the ATA provides guidance on the age of consent for
telehealth practice involving pediatric care. 99 While this becomes more of an
issue concerning adolescence, it is something important to be mindful of
with regard to informed consent in the context of telehealth as well as the
applicable state laws. 100 Finally, the ATA provided guidance regarding
emergency scenarios that may arise. 101 The ATA articulated the following
guidance for informed consent in emergency care in pediatrics using
telehealth:
In certain limited emergency situations, as with in person
care, the informed consent requirement may be waived. A health
care professional’s decision to treat combined with parental
consent and patient assent, when appropriate, is the preferred
scenario for the provider working in a medical emergency. When
any one of those factors is absent or unclear, the health care
provider shall be (1) knowledgeable of state and federal laws
related to a minor’s right, or lack thereof, to consent for testing and
treatment and (2) prepared to confront the ethical challenges
surrounding those same issues. 102

Id. at 5.

98.
99.
100.

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 4–5.

101.
102.

AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.

Age of Consent: The age at which a person may lawfully consent to
care can vary with the health condition at issue, the person’s state of residence, or
the state where the patient is at the time of the telemedical visit. Minors in all states
have the right to consent to testing and treatment for a sexually transmitted disease
(“STD”). In many states, minors also have the right to consent to: (1) outpatient
treatment for mental health issues; (2) prenatal care; (3) contraceptive services;
and/or (4) alcohol and substance abuse. The age of consent for these various
conditions can vary not only among states, but also within a given state. For
example, in one state the age of consent is [twelve] years for treatment for an STD
and [fourteen] years for substance abuse. The provider shall be aware of each
state’s rules in which the patient is physically located for that visit. In certain
environments additional elements of consent may need to be considered.
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Telehealth Practice Crossing State Lines
1.

Liability and Liability Insurance

Another issue that comes up in medical malpractice cases involves
the issue of liability. 103 In the telehealth context, multiple providers have the
potential to be involved, which leads to the question of who will ultimately
be liable in the event that something goes wrong. 104 Although it is not
groundbreaking for there to be multiple providers of medical care involved in
a patient’s treatment, the introduction of telehealth practice does create
another wrinkle in the liability determination and one that apparently has not
been addressed. 105
Although relevant cases have not yet arisen in the
telemedicine context, general principles of joint and several
liability should apply when apportioning liability between, for
example, the local treating physician and the remote telemedicine
specialist. However, as with many legal issues arising from
telemedicine practice, apportionment of liability will be a matter of
state law, and thus will vary from state to state. 106

Additionally, the AAP recognized the potential legal barrier—in
terms of the insurance coverage—that someone practicing telehealth has
when the telehealth physician’s practice of medicine crosses state lines: “If a
physician crosses a state line to practice telemedicine, he or she must
determine whether malpractice insurance covers out-of-state telemedicine
encounters and whether the coverage is sufficient for the distant state.” 107
The issue of liability insurance will be important to companies that have
developed specifically to be able to provide telehealth coverage across state
lines. 108 Regardless, the issue of liability insurance may be even more
complex generally for physicians practicing telehealth. 109
“Exacerbating concerns over potential telemedicine malpractice
liability is the fact that medical malpractice liability insurance policies may
not cover allegations of telemedicine malpractice. Yet, physicians who are
103.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(2).
104.
See id. at § 1.04(3)(d).
105.
See id.
106.
Id. § 1.04(3)(d).
107.
Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e300.
108.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(d)–(e).
109.
See id. § 1.04(3)(e); Alicia Gallegos, Telemedicine Poses Novel Legal
NEWS
(Oct.
6,
2015),
Risks
for
Doctors,
CARDIOLOGY
http://www.mdedge.com/chestphysician/article/103362/health-policy/telemedicine-posesnovel-legal-risks-doctors.
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involved in the practice of telemedicine may be in particular need of such
coverage.” 110
Liability insurance may not cover telehealth practitioners in a
number of other ways. 111 “For one thing, malpractice liability insurance
policies may not cover telemedicine activities that cross state lines, or where
the physician is found to be practicing telemedicine without a license.” 112
Another distinction that may be made in liability insurance coverage with
regards to telehealth is whether the coverage pertains to actual medical care
and/or technical error that may occur as a result of the use of technology. 113
It is important that a physician consider this in ensuring proper liability
coverage for telehealth practice.114
“A liability insurer also may not provide telemedicine coverage
where the alleged malpractice arises from actions or omissions relating to the
telecommunications rather than the medical aspects of the service.
Accordingly, physicians should ensure that their malpractice liability
insurance policy covers such telemedicine-related telecommunications
errors.” 115
It has been recommended that the physician practicing telehealth
should be mindful of the extent of liability coverage and have the following
items included in liability coverage. 116
Specifically, a telemedicine physician’s medical malpractice
liability insurance policy should contain an endorsement
specifying that the policy covers medical malpractice and related
claims arising from medical diagnosis, treatment, consultation
and/or referral, including claims arising in connection with the use
of telecommunications technology, and that such coverage is
provided for every state the telemedicine physician enters. 117

It is also likely that the telehealth practitioner will face increased
costs associated with liability coverage. 118 Another issue that is of
significance in consideration of liability insurance for telehealth is
technology failures. 119 It is advised that the telehealth physician pursue
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(e).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gallegos, supra note 109.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(3)(e).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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coverage for equipment failure, if at all possible, and consider other options
for coverage if that is unavailable. 120
Further, telemedicine adds the additional risk of equipment failures
and transmission errors. Because of these unresolved issues,
telemedicine practitioners are likely to find that, if in fact they can
obtain comprehensive telemedicine coverage, it is likely to come
at a significantly higher price. If a malpractice insurer is unwilling
to cover failures of telecommunications problems, telemedicine
equipment failure or similar non-medical claims, a telemedicine
practitioner may wish to seek a general negligence insurance
policy to cover such failures. 121

Thus, issues of liability and liability coverage are extremely
important for the physician practicing telehealth—in particular, due to the
fact that practitioners may practice across state lines and that the introduction
of technology into medical care requires extra layers of protection to account
for the possibilities of technological, as well as equipment, malfunctions. 122
2.

Licensure Limitations and State Telehealth Laws

One of the biggest issues for startup businesses that endeavor to
provide telehealth services is that state laws will often limit the ability to
cross state lines due to licensure. 123 Because of differing telehealth laws, a
telehealth startup may need to have physicians licensed in multiple states. 124
The complexity that exists due to the lack of a national telehealth law is
explained by the AAP as follows:
However, the use of interstate telemedicine often requires
participants to be licensed in both states, which can be a
formidable barrier, particularly for telemedicine providers who
work in multiple states. Many states have recognized the value of
allowing out-of-state physicians to share their knowledge and
expertise and have therefore granted specific exceptions to their
licensing rules. Nevertheless, all states still have the authority to
license and regulate the practice of medicine within their borders,
and physicians who practice telemedicine must carefully follow

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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the rules in each state that they enter electronically to provide
medical care. 125

The AAP has pointed to several cases that have been litigated that
emphasize the significance of state control and regulation over the ability to
practice medicine within its state’s borders, although it is done by a
physician remotely. 126
C.

Equipment
1.

Standards of Practice

In addition to the state laws regulating telehealth practice as
described above and case law that has developed on these issues, a number
of standards or guidelines have been developed with regard to the oversight
of equipment and technologies being used in the practice of telehealth—“in
an effort to assure the clarity, reliability, interoperability, and
interconnectivity of telemedicine equipment.” 127 An example of such
standards are those used for digital imagining and the equipment that stores
this information. 128 The ATA’s 2017 Operating Practices for Pediatric
Health has a number of provisions for guidance specific to equipment. 129 An
important first provision acknowledges that the equipment used for telehealth
in pediatrics has to be such that it is appropriate for the child based on a
number of factors: “Equipment used for provision of pediatric telehealth
services should be appropriate to the age, size, and developmental stage of
the child, including size, comfort, accuracy, and validity of
measurements.” 130 Another notable provision by the ATA is the need for
someone to be present who can properly operate the equipment and that the
telehealth practitioner appropriately evaluates whether the images provided
by the technology are adequate for diagnosis purposes. 131
For any telehealth encounter, there shall be at least one
party to the encounter who is capable of operating all involved
equipment in accordance with the specifications for the use of that
equipment. Providers should be aware that the use of some
equipment in children may pose unique challenges relating to
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 301.
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patient cooperation, size, comfort, and technique, and should be
comfortable with the use of all involved equipment in children.
Providers shall determine whether the quality of the device output
and displayed images are sufficient for the diagnosis and/or
management of the patient’s condition. 132

Further, the ATA advises planning due to any technological or
equipment failure: “Telehealth providers shall have a technical support plan
and contingency plan in place in the event of technology or equipment
failure during an encounter.” 133
Of particular interest regarding equipment are the latest
technological developments for telehealth involving children, such as the
Tyto Care home kit described at the beginning of this Article; however, the
ATA has refrained from providing any direct guidance on these technologies,
finding them too novel to adequately assess them. 134 This is according to the
ATA’s 2017 Operating Procedures for Pediatric Health. 135
“Peripheral examination devices designed for home use by parents or
other nonclinical caregivers are an emerging technology. However, further
study of the accuracy and effectiveness of these devices is required before
any recommendations can be made regarding their use.” 136 With the
growing use of such technologies, the ATA will likely develop guidelines
regarding these items, as well. 137
2.

Who is Liable?

Besides the standards for use of equipment, it has already been
mentioned that a physician practicing telehealth may be subject to liability
for malfunctioning equipment as it has been advised that telehealth
physicians get liability insurance to cover the possibility of equipment
failure. 138 The AAP pointed out in its guidance regarding pediatrics: “The
liability for technology failures may be shared by all involved parties. A
supervising physician may be at risk for equipment failure, although the
[ATA] has no record of any such lawsuit.” 139 A physician using telehealth to
deliver medical care may be subject to liability in a number of instances
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
note 3, at e300.
139.
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including: “[A] physician’s negligent selection of telemedicine equipment,
misuse of the equipment, or misdiagnosis or mistreatment based on faulty
data received from the equipment.” 140 However, if the particular defect of
the equipment is latent, the telehealth physician will not be liable. 141
While physicians and health care entities may be held liable for
negligence in the care, maintenance, or use of telemedicine
equipment, providers will not likely be liable for latent defects.
However, plaintiffs who are injured by telemedicine equipment
that is defective and unreasonably dangerous may sue the
manufacturers and distributors of the equipment under a theory of
strict liability. 142

The rationale behind this is that the manufacturer or seller is in the
best position to bear financial responsibility based on its relationship to the
public. 143 A strict liability claim involving a latent defect may take the
following forms:
A strict liability claim against a manufacturer could arise from a
misdiagnosis based upon defective machinery that produced, for
example, defective image resolution, sound quality, speed of
encoding, or delivery of data. Under a theory of strict liability,
manufacturers and distributors of defective and unreasonably
dangerous telemedicine products may be jointly and severally
liable for injuries to the patient caused by such products unless one
defendant party can prove that its co-defendant was solely at fault.
One hundred and sixty [h]ospitals and practitioners, in general, are
not subject to strict liability claims, since they are not engaged in
the business of selling or supplying products but instead provide
professional services. 144

Understanding the potential liability that a telehealth practitioner
may be subjected to by the use of equipment is an important consideration in
entering into this area of practice. 145

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(4)(b).
Id.
Id. at § 1.04(4)(c).
Id.
Id.
See FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(4)(c).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss3/1

122

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 3

2019]

TELEHEALTH, CHILDREN, AND PEDIATRICS

3.

341

FDA Regulation and Telehealth

In addition to the issues already discussed regarding equipment, a
substantial portion of regulation may occur involving the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), which can be implicated in the area of telehealth
due to the use of both equipment and technology. 146 Specifically, the FDA is
implicated in the oversight of medical devices which are those “intended for
use in the diagnosis . . . treatment, or prevention of disease.” 147 Device is
defined under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related
article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is: (1)
recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopoeia, or any supplement to them; (2) intended for use in
the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other
animals; or (3) intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its
primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on
the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon
being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended
purposes. 148

Overall, there have been specific barriers to approval of medical
devices in pediatrics. 149 The FDA has specified regulatory authority over
telehealth services in a number of categories. 150 The following is the
guidance provided with regard to technologies as they relate to telehealth for
FDA regulation. 151
Given the breadth of that definition, it is not surprising that
telemedicine systems—and many of their components—fall within
the regulatory purview of the FDA. The FDA Working Group on
Telemedicine has defined clinical telemedicine as the “delivery
and provision of health care and consultative services to individual
146.
Id. at § 1.04(4)(c)–(d).
147.
Medical
Device
Overview,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/importprogram/importbasics/regulatedproducts/ucm510630.ht
m (last updated Sept. 14, 2018).
148.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(1)– (3) (2012).
149.
Melissa Jenco, AAP Brings Need for Pediatric Medical Devices to
NEWS
(Aug.
17,
2018),
Forefront,
AAP
http://www.aappublications.org/news/2018/08/17/fdadevices081718.
150.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(4)(d).
151.
Id.
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patients and the transmission of information related to care, over
distance, using telecommunications technologies,” including the
following activities: (1) [d]irect clinical, preventive, diagnostic,
and therapeutic services and treatments impacting the clinical care
of a specific patient; (2) consultative and follow-up services; (3)
remote monitoring, including the remote reading and interpretation
of patient’s procedures; (4) rehabilitation services; and (5) patient
education delivered in the context of delivering health care to
individuals. The FDA has determined that devices used in
activities [one] through [four] are subject to [Center for Devices
and Radiological Health] (“CDRH”) regulatory authority, and
those related to activity [five] are integral to that authority when
the education delivered is medical device labeling information. 152

The FDA’s CDRH plays a major role in the approval of medical
devices that are used in the delivery of medical services using telehealth. 153
A 1996 Report of the FDA noted CDRH’s responsibility
for ensuring the safety and efficacy of the medical devices used in
telemedicine systems, and described its telemedicine-related
activities, including pre-market review of telemedicine devices,
post-market surveillance, quality systems regulations (good
manufacturing practices), control, and standards development.
The FDA is likely to have the greatest impact on the development
and future use of telemedicine technology through its premarket
review activities. Many of the telemedicine devices cleared for
marketing by the FDA in recent years have been classified into
Class II. Manufacturers of Class II medical devices must meet
performance standards and/or comply with the requirements of
[s]ection 510(k) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §
360(k) and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Once a
medical device has been cleared for marketing, any modification
to the device made by the manufacturer that “could significantly
affect the safety [and] effectiveness of a device,” such as an
alteration in the device’s indications for use, may trigger further
review by the FDA. 154

152.
153.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.; Telemedicine Related Activities, FDA: CTR. FOR DEVICES &
RADIOLOGICAL
HEALTH
(July
11,
1996),
[http://web.archive.org/web/19961019084/http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/telemed.html].
154.
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There are a variety of other ways the FDA is involved in regulation
concerning telehealth, which in and of itself could likely be more fully
explored in a complete article of its own. 155 Other areas of regulation
include: “radiology devices related to medical image communication,
storage, processing, and display,” medical devices used by patients that
involve monitoring including implanted pacemakers that allow monitoring of
the patient’s cardiac data by transmission of the data directly from the device
to the physician’s office, robotic devices, and mobile medical applications
used with smartphones and tablets. 156 It should be noted that medical
applications can also be subjected to regulation by the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”). 157
Another twist in the area of regulation by the FDA is an
understanding that there are differences between regulation of the
manufacturer of a medical device as opposed to regulation of a physician
who chooses to use a medical device to deliver medical services using
telehealth. 158 In fact, there has been recognition of this distinction to the
extent of indicating that the physician’s actual use of a device is not at issue
when it comes to FDA regulation. 159
While FDA’s regulatory interest in telemedicine technology has
obvious implications for telemedicine equipment manufacturers,
its impact on physicians, hospitals and other users of the
equipment is less than clear. The issue of whether a manufacturer
may distribute a medical device is a separate matter from the issue
of whether a physician who receives the device—or manufactures
it himself—may use it. More specifically, physicians’ decisions to
use a particular telemedicine device within the scope of their
medical practice may be implicitly exempt from regulation under
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Although there is no
express provision in the Act, both the courts and the FDA have
recognized that the Act was never intended to limit a physician’s
ability to treat patients. In September 1996, FDA officials testified
before Congress that “once a product is approved for marketing for
a specific use, FDA generally does not regulate how, and for what
uses, physicians prescribe that [product].” 160

155.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, §1.04(4)(d).
156.
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157.
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158.
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160.
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Additionally, modifications of devices by physicians have also been
typically free of FDA regulation. 161 “As a general rule, unless the physician
is involved in active marketing or commercialization of the modified device,
particularly in interstate commerce, the practice-of-medicine doctrine should
effectively immunize the physician from regulation by the FDA.” 162
Finally, it is important to point out that there are possible
consequences of using unapproved devices for telehealth. 163 Of critical
consideration, “even if a physician’s use of an unapproved—or a modified—
telemedicine device does not run afoul of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
it would no doubt greatly increase the risk of medical malpractice liability
should a patient be injured in connection with the use of the device.” 164
Additionally, there are potential fraud concerns that arise when
reimbursement is being sought for telehealth services and an unapproved
device is used. 165
D.

Security

Another potential legal issue that undoubtedly comes into play with
the introduction of technology into health care is a patient’s personal
information and how this information is protected.166 In 2015, the AAP
recognized this as one of the potential legal barriers in the practice of
telehealth in pediatrics: “Security policies and procedures for telemedicine
systems must be designed and operated in compliance with the final [Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act] directive on the subject, titled
‘Standards for Privacy of Individually Identified Health Information’—
published in 2002, and applicable state laws governing patient
confidentiality.” 167 Similarly, the ATA has advised of the importance of

Reform & Oversight House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 61 (1996) (statement of Michael
Friedman, Deputy Comm’r for Operations, FDA).
161.
Id.
162.
Id. (citing John J. Smith, Physician Modification of Legally Marketed
Medical Devices: Regulatory Implications Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 254 (2000).
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(4)(d). “Moreover, a
physician or hospital’s requests for reimbursement for telemedicine services involving the use
of an unapproved medical device may raise false claims or fraud and abuse concerns.” Id.
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See Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e300.
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Id.; see also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
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adherence to state and federal laws regulating the security of this information
in its 2017 Operating Procedures. 168
Providers shall comply with all federal and individual
state laws and regulations regarding child privacy, including but
not limited to [the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act], [the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act], [the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act]
and [the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act]. All existing
laws and regulations regarding patient privacy and confidentiality,
including laws pertaining to protection of privacy when minors
consent for their own health care, apply to telehealth encounters
just as they do for traditional encounters; however, there may be
additional language specifically for security of patient privacy and
confidentiality when care is delivered via telehealth. 169

Further, the ATA advises that the provider should always ensure that
a secure connection is maintained throughout the duration of the telehealth
encounter. 170 In the event the provider becomes aware that there is a security
concern which may leave private information susceptible to being
compromised, the ATA advises termination of the encounter immediately. 171
Recording of a telehealth encounter creates additional special
considerations. 172 If a telehealth encounter is recorded, the telehealth
practitioner must be aware of applicable state laws for recording these
encounters and is required to notify the patient—or in the case of a child, the
child’s guardian or legal representative—that the encounter is being
recorded, as well as to obtain consent prior to recording the encounter. 173 If
a telehealth encounter is recorded, a copy is also to be timely made available
to the patient, if requested, and in accordance with any other applicable
policy determinations regarding recordings. 174
Another area of importance in security involves the transfer of
digital images taken in the course of the patient’s care to ensure that such
images are properly maintained and transmitted safely by means of a secure
connection. 175 The ATA cautions particular care with regard to children in
this area: “The transmission of pediatric patient images, in particular,
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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represents a special situation which is subject to numerous state and federal
regulations regarding both private health information and child privacy.” 176
Thus, it is critical that a telehealth practitioner is mindful of both
state and federal laws regarding these issues of security. 177
IV.

THE PROS AND CONS OF TELEHEALTH USE FOR PEDIATRIC CARE

Like any new advancement in a particular field, the pros and cons of
the use of telehealth for pediatric care are being scrutinized as a means of
providing access to traditional health care services. 178
A.

Benefits of Telehealth in Pediatrics

One of the major benefits of the use of telehealth in pediatrics is the
access to care that is created for children who would otherwise be
disadvantaged by distance/location or specialized health care needs.179
There is significant disparity in the geographic
distribution of pediatric physicians across the country, resulting in
many underserved regions. Underserved communities are most
commonly found in rural regions but can include suburban and
urban settings. This maldistribution of workforce results in
differential access and is at least partly to blame for differential
health outcomes between rural and nonrural populations,
particularly for those children with special health care needs. The
literature shows that access barriers related to distance can be
partly addressed with the use of telemedicine technologies, which
can also minimize burdens of parents and other caregivers missing
work, children missing school, and costs and risks associated with
travel. 180

The availability of these services to children who would otherwise
not have them also leads to a greater quality of care. 181
Another benefit of the use of telehealth in pediatrics is that it can
increase the expertise of pediatricians which, in turn, can increase the amount
of time pediatricians have for treating additional children resulting in greater
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
See James P. Marcin et al., Comm. on Pediatric Workforce, The Use of
Telemedicine to Address Access and Physician Workforce Shortages, 136 PEDIATRICS 202,
203–06 (2015).
179.
Id. at 203, 205.
180.
Id. at 203.
181.
Id. at 204.
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efficiency of pediatric care. 182 As has been acknowledged, there is a
shortage of pediatricians, and the ability of the current pediatricians to be
able to care for more children is of vital importance to this specialty. 183
Additionally, it has been suggested that the use of telehealth in
pediatrics can improve quality of care. 184 The AAP has cited multiple
reasons why this is the case. 185
First, by increasing health care access for children, particularly for
children living in rural communities, the use of telemedicine
technologies can help reduce missed appointment rates, increase
adherence to recommended therapies, and help ensure the
appropriate frequency of recommended physician visits. Second,
studies have shown that telemedicine can enhance both comfort
and facility in managing specific medical subspecialty issues. 186

Further, the use of telehealth can not only improve communications
between the pediatrician and patient/family but can also lead to ensuring
more comprehensive care than the patient would have experienced
otherwise. 187
B.

Disadvantages of Telehealth in Pediatrics

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing telehealth practice involving
pediatrics is that choosing to develop a startup—and what becomes a standalone practice—is not seen as being compatible to the current best practices
for pediatrics, especially if it is truly divorced from in-person care. 188
Specifically, the AAP has cautioned that the model embraced by these types
of telehealth service providers is contrary to the prevailing model for
providing pediatric services. 189
The use of telemedicine care by virtual health care providers, such
as those linked to retail-based clinics, entrepreneurs, or insurers
whose business model is to provide health care services to patients
via smart phone, laptop, or video-consult kiosk without a previous
physician-patient relationship, previous medical history, or handson physical examination, other than what can be accessed via the
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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technology, can undermine the basic principles of the [PatientCentered Medical Home] model. 190

According to the AAP, “[i]n isolation, the use of virtual telemedicine
care represents the antithesis of the medical home model of quality pediatric
care:
[C]are that is patient-centered, comprehensive, team-based,
coordinated, accessible, and focused on quality and safety.” 191 Additionally,
the AAP raises a number of issues with regard to providing pediatric care in
this way. 192
Virtual health care services are provided episodically and are
lacking the essentials of the patient’s medical record. Increasing
fragmentation of care is the result, which leads to incomplete or
redundant services and wastes health care dollars.
More
importantly, virtual telemedicine care in isolation does not provide
timely and comprehensive follow-up with the patient and the
medical home. 193

The AAP cautions parents against relying on a telehealth model of
care, arguing that while it may sound appealing for a variety of reasons, the
model does not promote the best interests of the child’s health care. 194
A major disadvantage of having a telehealth practice are the
significant costs associated with such a practice. 195 The AAP has described
the extent of these costs as follows:
The implementation of telemedicine requires an initial
financial
investment
in
equipment,
software,
and
telecommunications. There are often ongoing costs associated
with maintenance of technology and personnel costs associated
with training and technical support. These costs can represent a
significant barrier for pediatric physicians and other clinicians who
care for children. The underserved practices and locations most
likely to benefit from telemedicine are probably those least likely
to afford the initial financial investment or ongoing
maintenance. 196
190.
Id. at 205.
191.
Id.
192.
Id. at 206.
193.
Marcin et al., supra note 178, at 206.
194.
Id. at 206. “Although such novelty care appeals to parents because it can
be faster, more convenient, and more affordable than an office visit, the loss of continuity of
care, quality of care, and patient safety shows why this telemedicine care model should not be
embraced.” Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
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This will be particularly burdensome to a telehealth startup which
does not have the luxury of any connection to a hospital or medical facility to
potentially assist in this type of financial investment. 197
Another challenge facing telehealth practitioners which has already
been substantially addressed by the various legal issues is the fact that
telehealth practice laws vary by state. 198 “All physicians practicing intraand interstate telemedicine must comply with state licensing and other
practice rules in every state in which they practice, in person and via
telemedicine.” 199
An additional cost that must be inevitably born by the telehealth
practitioner is to cover the cost of medical malpractice insurance, as
previously discussed. 200
Another potential barrier with additional costs associated
with care delivery with the use of telemedicine is related to
malpractice insurance. Malpractice insurance most often covers
in-person care and should cover care delivered to patients in
remote health care facilities and possibly in other states.
Physicians should review their current malpractice policy to be
certain that the appropriate malpractice coverage that includes the
treatment of patients using telemedicine is included. 201

This type of medical malpractice coverage will be extremely
important for a telehealth practitioner that decides to practice telehealth in
multiple states. 202 As the telehealth practitioner engages in practice in
multiple states, the practitioner will be subjected to the applicable telehealth
laws in all of those states, thereby creating a greater chance for malpractice
to occur as well as the liability that can attach for technology malfunctions or
errors. 203
V.

CONCLUSION

With the continued shortage of pediatricians and the ability of
technology to allow parents to access health care services for their children
in a variety of situations—from those who are living in rural areas to those
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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children who have special needs which makes a doctor’s house call virtually
a less stressful scenario—telehealth offers a variety of benefits to ensure
children have access to and receive necessary health care.204 However, it is
also clear that for any pediatrician or physician to decide to engage in
telehealth services to provide pediatric care, it is critical that he or she is
aware of the possible legal issues, consequences, and role that state laws, in
particular, will play in impacting any sort of telehealth practice. 205 Further,
specific guidelines, such as those provided by the AAP and ATA, are
essential for the specialized nature of pediatrics in treating and serving
children as a population. 206
Additionally, the development of technologies for use by parents in
the home to assess their children are still in their infancy, making it difficult
for entities like the ATA to take a position on their use and effectiveness in
providing access to health care for children, or providing guidance otherwise
on the use of such technologies. 207 Overall, technologies for use in pediatrics
have been slow to develop and gain approval with the FDA, generally. 208 It
is expected that guidance on these newer in-home technologies will develop
over time, as the evidence of their use becomes more prevalent.209 However,
those who manufacture and sell these products need to be aware of the
regulations they will be subjected to, including approval by the FDA for
medical devices, liability for latent defects, and other security regulations.210
For entrepreneurs in telehealth to be successful in pediatrics, they are
going to need to develop innovative ways of ensuring that this vulnerable
population does not inevitably experience a greater hindrance to receiving
adequate health care by splintering the care, which creates gaps between the
telehealth services they provide and health care provided by the child’s
primary pediatrician—assuming the child has an established pediatrician.211
A disruption of care of this nature is discouraged by the AAP guidance for
pediatric care. 212 An independent telehealth provider of pediatric care can
and should be done through coordination with the child’s primary
pediatrician—if the child has one—and immediate follow-up to ensure
medical records are not only consulted, but updated to reflect the telehealth
204.
Marcin et al., supra note 178, at 203.
205.
See Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e300.
206.
See AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, supra note 1, at 1–3.
207.
Id. at 3.
208.
Jenco, supra note 149.
209.
See id.
210.
See FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 36, § 1.04(4)(c); Burke Jr. et al.,
supra note 3, at e299; Medical Device Overview, supra note 147.
211.
See Burke Jr. et al., supra note 3, at e296.
212.
See id.
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appointment and treatment. 213 In the alternative, if a stand-alone telehealth
practitioner is going to engage in pediatric service, it will need to make
fundamental operational changes by having a face-to-face with the child
from the beginning and as a regular part of continued care, so as to
discourage reliance on episodic telehealth visits which is currently
discouraged by best practice standards in pediatrics, as detailed by the
AAP. 214 If the doctor makes house calls again—now virtually—it must be in
a way that ultimately benefits the long-term care and well-being of the child,
rather than simply providing episodic care that disrupts the continuity of care
for the child. 215

213.
214.
178, at 206.
215.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article builds on the Author’s prior work investigating the
privacy and security implications of mobile application (“mobile app”)
mediated health research 1 conducted by “independent scientists, 2 citizen
*
Stacey A. Tovino, JD, PhD, serves as the Judge Jack and Lulu Lehman
Professor of Law and the Founding Director of the Health Law Program at the UNLV William
S. Boyd School of Law. Professor Tovino thanks Dean Jon Garon, Professor Kathy
Cerminara, and Professor Marilyn Uzdavines for the invitation to participate in Nova Law
Review's Symposium—Progression 2018: Using Law to Facilitate an Efficacious Innovation
Economy. Professor Tovino also thanks Lena Rieke, Law Library Fellow, Wiener-Rogers
Law Library, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law, for her outstanding research assistance
and Nova Law Review for its careful editorial assistance.
1.
See Sarah Moore et al., Consent Processes for Mobile App Mediated
Research: Systematic Review, J. MED. INTERNET RES. MHEALTH & UHEALTH, Aug. 2017 at 3,
4 (discussing Apple’s ResearchKit and Android’s ResearchStack, two open source
frameworks that any scientist can use to create a mobile research app); Vincent Tourraine, List
SCI.
(Feb.
1,
2016),
of
All
ResearchKit
Apps,
SHAZINO:
http://blog.shazino.com/articles/science/researchkit-list-apps/ (listing more than a dozen
mobile research apps designed using ResearchKit); About the Study, MPOWER,
http://parkinsonmpower.org/about (last visited May 1, 2019) (describing a mobile app
mediated research study that monitors the symptoms and progression of Parkinson’s disease).
2.
See Amber Dance, Solo Scientist, 543 NATURE 747, 747 (2017) (reporting
the story of Jeffrey Rose, an independent scientist who conducts research without the benefits
of a traditional bricks-and-mortar employer); Carrie Arnold, Going Rogue, SCI. (May 17,
2013, 8:15 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2013/05/going-rogue (reporting the story
of Ethan Perlstein, an independent scientist who engages in scientific research without
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scientists, 3 and patient researchers 4 (collectively, independent scientists) 5 as
well as [the] mobile app developers and data storage companies that support
them.” 6 As background, mobile “apps are a fast-growing category of
software typically installed on personal smartphones and wearable devices.” 7
Used for a wide range of health-related activities, including fitness, health
education, health predictions, diagnosis, health care delivery, treatment
support, chronic disease management, disease surveillance, epidemic
outbreak tracking, and health research, mobile apps have tremendous
versatility and promise. 8
university, pharmaceutical company, research institute, or government agency affiliation, and
without public funding).
3.
See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Citizen Science on Your Smartphone: An
ELSI Research Agenda, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 897, 897 (2015) (explaining that the term
citizen scientist originally referred to “nonprofessionals who assist[ed] professional scientists
by contributing observations and measurements to ongoing research enterprises;” also
explaining that the term “now includes nonprofessionals who conduct scientific experiments
of their own design independent from professional scientists;” clarifying that citizen science
has been made possible by “online crowdsourcing, big data capture strategies, and
computational analytics,” among other technological developments); Todd Sherer,
AM.:
BLOGS
(Apr.
12,
2017),
Parkinson’s
Disease
at
200,
SCI.
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/parkinsons-disease-at-200/
(referencing
technology that citizens use to participate in research investigating Parkinson’s disease).
4.
See Jenny Leese et al., Evolving Patient-Researcher Collaboration: An
Illustrative Case Study of a Patient-Led Knowledge Translation Event, J. PARTICIPATORY
MED., no. 1, 2017, at 3, 3 (discussing patient engagement in research).
5.
Paul Wicks et al., Accelerated Clinical Discovery Using Self-Reported
Patient Data Collected Online and a Patient-Matching Algorithm, 29 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 411, 411–12 (2011) (analyzing data reported on a website by patient
researchers with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”) who experimented with lithium
carbonate).
6.
Stacey A. Tovino, Going Rogue: Mobile Research Applications and the
Right to Privacy, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4) (on file with
author).
7.
See Nicolas P. Terry & Tracy D. Gunter, Regulating Mobile Mental
Health Apps, 36 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 136, 137 (2018) (providing background information
regarding mobile health apps).
8.
See Valerie Gay & Peter Leijdekkers, Bringing Health and Fitness Data
Together for Connected Health Care: Mobile Apps as Enablers of Interoperability, J. MED.
INTERNET RES., Nov. 2015, at 37, 37–38 (2015) (discussing fitness and health uses of mobile
apps as well as the aggregation of such uses); Deborah Lupton & Annemarie Jutel, “It’s Like
Having a Physician in Your Pocket!” A Critical Analysis of Self-Diagnosis Smartphone Apps,
133 SOC. SCI. & MED. 128, 128–30 (2015) (analyzing diagnostic uses of mobile apps,
including the effects such apps have on the physician-patient relationship and medical
authority in relation to diagnosis); Elaine O. Nsoesie et al., New Digital Technologies for the
Surveillance of Infectious Diseases at Mass Gathering Events, 21 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY &
INFECTION 134, 134–35 (2015) (focusing on disease surveillance uses of mobile apps and
other digital technologies); Ben Underwood et al., The Use of a Mobile App to Motivate
Evidence-Based Oral Hygiene Behaviour, 219 BRIT. DENTAL J. 166, 166 (2015) (reporting the
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This Article focuses on independent scientists, citizen scientists, and
patient researchers who use mobile apps to conduct or participate in health
research. 9 As background, an independent scientist—also known as a rogue
or lone scientist—is an individual who engages in scientific research without
university, pharmaceutical company, research institute, government agency,
or other third-party affiliation. 10 A citizen scientist—also known as a
community scientist, crowd scientist, or amateur scientist—is a member of
the general public who engages in scientific work, often in collaboration with
or under the direction of a professional, affiliated scientist and the scientist’s
academic or other institution. 11 Citizen scientists also include nonprofessionally trained scientists who independently conduct their own
experiments, frequently with the assistance of mobile apps, online
crowdsourcing, computational analytics, and other technologies made
possible by big data. 12 A patient researcher is a current or former patient
who initiates or assists research at any stage of the research process,
including establishing the research agenda, designing the research protocol,
collecting data, and disseminating research results. 13 Mobile apps have been
tremendously helpful to independent scientists, citizen scientists, and patient
researchers, as well as conventional scientists who fall outside traditional
results of a study assessing user perceptions of an oral health app that provides oral health
education and oral health behavioral support); Sharon Parmet, App Developed at UIC to Track
Mood, Predict Bipolar Disorder Episodes, UIC TODAY (Jan. 15, 2019, 2:32 PM),
http://www.today.uic.edu/app-developed-at-uic-to-track-mood-predict-bipolar-disorderepisodes (explaining that the mobile app BiAffect “unobtrusively monitors keyboard
dynamics metadata, such as typing speed and rhythm, mistakes in texts, and the use of
backspace and auto-correct” and that such data is then “analyzed using an artificial
intelligence-based machine learning approach to identify digital biomarkers of manic and
depressive episodes in people with bipolar disorder”); Sarah Peddicord, FDA in Brief: FDA
Launches New Digital Tool to Help Capture Real World Data from Patients to Help Inform
Regulatory
Decision-Making,
FDA
(Nov.
6,
2018),
http://www.fda.gov/newsEvents/newsroom/FDAInBrief/ucm625228.htm (“announcing the
MyStudies app, . . . a new mobile technology designed to foster the collection of real world
evidence via patients’ mobile devices” for health research and other purposes).
9.
See discussion infra Parts II–IX.
10.
See James Lovelock, James Lovelock: We Need Lone Scientists,
INDEPENDENT: INDY/LIFE (Mar. 26, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.independant.co.uk/lifestyle/health-and-families/features/james-lovelock-we-need-lone-scientists-9215280.html
(comparing affiliated scientists, who work in large corporations or for the government, with
lone, or independent, scientists who work alone in their own laboratories).
11.
See Rothstein et al., supra note 3, at 897; Citizen Science, OXFORD
DICTIONARY, http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/citizen_science (last visited May
1, 2019) (defining citizen scientist).
12.
Rothstein et al., supra note 3, at 897 (explaining the development of the
term citizen scientist).
13.
See Leese et al., supra note 4, at 3 (discussing patient engagement in
research).
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regulation—collectively, independent scientists—in the conduct of a wide
range of health research projects.14
As explained in the Author’s other work, independent scientists who
use mobile apps to conduct health research collect a wide variety of data
regarding their research participants’ health including, but not limited to,
data regarding sexual health, 15 occupational health, 16 neurological health, 17
and cardiovascular health. 18 As one might imagine, this voluminous and
diverse health data may be at risk of privacy and security breaches, leading
to dignitary, psychological, and economic harms for which the mobile
research participants have few legally enforceable rights or remedies due to a
lack of regulation and applicable standards. 19
In a forthcoming publication, the Author analyzes existing federal
statutes and regulations designed to protect the privacy and/or security of
health data, including data generated in the research context.20 In that article,
the Author shows that a variety of federal authorities, including the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Administrative
Simplification Rules, 21 the Common Rule, 22 and the Federal Trade
14.
See Elizabeth Klemick, Mobile Apps for Citizen Science, SMITHSONIAN
SCI. EDUC. CTR. (July 15, 2018), http://www.ssec.si.edu/stemvisions-blog/mobile-appscitizen-science. “An abundance of mobile apps makes participation in citizen science projects
easier than ever and allows data entry in the field.” Id.
15.
See Tovino, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing Kinsey Reporter, a mobile
research app that collects sexual health data from research participants).
16.
See id. at 10–11 (discussing Active Day and Fall Safety Pro, two mobile
apps that collect fall data from workers, such as painters and roofers, who experience falls
from height).
17.
See id. at 11–12 (discussing Patients Like Me, a mobile app that collects
all types of health data, including Parkinson’s symptoms and other neurological health data,
and discloses that data for research purposes).
18.
See id. at 13 (discussing MyFitnessPal, a mobile app that collects health
and fitness data and discloses that data for research purposes).
19.
See Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(explaining that the mobile app Yelp exceeded the scope of its users’ consent when it
uploaded its users’ contacts data without explicit permission); Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical
Issues in Big Data Health Research, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 426–27 (2015) (discussing
physical and dignitary harms associated with the loss of privacy in the context of big data
health research); Zeynep Tufekci, The Latest Data Privacy Debacle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/opinion/strava-privacy.html (reporting the mobile
exercise app Strava, which inadvertently revealed the secret locations of American military
bases and service members).
20.
See Tovino, supra note 6, at 16–17 (analyzing existing federal statutes and
regulations designed to protect the privacy and/or security of health data).
21.
See id. at 2–3, 16–17; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
201 (2012)); Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 226, 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
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Commission Act, 23 either: (1) do not apply to mobile app mediated health
research conducted by independent scientists; or (2) fail to establish
comprehensive data privacy and security standards that will drive the
implementation of privacy and security best practices by independent
scientists. 24
In response to these lapses in federal regulation, many academics
and practitioners have suggested new federal laws or amendments to existing
federal laws in an attempt to create comprehensive privacy and security
standards that, once implemented, may help protect otherwise unprotected
data. 25 It is not clear, however, whether the federal government has the
42 U.S.C.). HHS’s privacy regulations, which implement section 264(c) of HIPAA, are
codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–.534 (2018). 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–.534 (2018). HHS’s
security regulations, which implement section 262(a) of HIPAA [42 U.S.C. § 1320d–2(d)(1)],
are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318. Id. §§ 164.302–.318. HHS’s breach notification
regulations, which implement section 13402 of HITECH [42 U.S.C. § 17932], are codified at
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414. Id. §§ 164.400–.414. Collectively, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the
HIPAA Security Rule, and the HIPAA Breach Notification Rules are known as the HIPAA
Administrative Simplification Rules. See id. §§ 164.302–.534.
22.
See 45 C.F.R. 46.101–409 (2018); Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,497, 28,518 (June 19, 2018) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
11) (showing changes to HHS’s Common Rule with which compliance is required by July 21,
2019); Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: Research Privacy Under HIPAA
and the Common Rule, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 154, 155 (2005) (explaining the application of
the Common Rule).
23.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). “Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful.” Id.
The FTC has brought legal actions against organizations that have
violated consumers’ privacy rights, or misled them by failing to maintain security
for sensitive consumer information . . . [i]n many of these cases, the FTC has
charged the defendants with violating Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bars unfair
and deceptive acts and practices in or affecting commerce.

Privacy and Security Enforcement, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement (last visited May 1,
2019).
24.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b) (2018); Sharona Hoffman, Citizen
Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to Medical Big Data, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1741, 1746 (2015); Tovino, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing the application of these federal
authorities in detail and noting which apply and which contain privacy and security
standards).
25.
See David W. Bates et al., Health Apps and Health Policy: What Is
Needed?, 320 JAMA 1975, 1975 (2018). “The FDA also needs to review apps specifically
with respect to safety, protection of privacy, and false claims.” Id. “[I am] sure there will be
some major breaches that just might push the drive for national legislation over the top.”
James Swann, That Apple Watch May Show Hackers Your Heart’s Health, BLOOMBERG L.:
HEALTH L. & BUS. (Oct. 18, 2018, 6:15 AM), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-andbusiness/that-apple-watch-may-show-hackers-your-hearts-health [hereinafter Apple Watch]
(quoting a prominent health care attorney); James Swann, Video: Your Fitbit Steps May Not
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desire or capacity to enforce expanded or new laws in this area.26 In an
earlier publication, the Author found that a consumer complaint involving a
violation of the HIPAA Administrative Simplification Rules has a 0.1%
chance of triggering a government-imposed settlement or civil money
penalty. 27 In that same article, the Author showed that in those few cases
that go to settlement or penalty, the federal government takes a significant
amount of time—more than seven years in some cases—to execute the
settlement agreement or to impose the civil money penalty. 28 The Author
concluded that the federal desire and/or capacity to enforce the HIPAA
Administrative Simplification Rules is low, resulting in a lack of timely
attention to the privacy and security rights of individuals. 29
This Article furthers the line of research by investigating whether
state law contains comprehensive privacy, security, and breach notification
standards that could apply to independent scientists who conduct mobile app
mediated health research. 30 Focusing only on Florida law, this Article
assesses potentially relevant and applicable sources of privacy, security, and
breach notification standards for health data of the type obtained during
mobile app mediated health research studies. 31 This Article concludes that,
with one exception, Florida law tends to fall into one of two categories: (1)
the law contains at least one data privacy, security, or breach notification
standard, but the standard is limited in application to certain actors, certain
professions, or certain institutions and the law does not apply to independent
scientists, 32 or (2) the law is not necessarily limited in application, but the
law fails to establish comprehensive privacy, security, and breach

Be Protected by Federal Law, BLOOMBERG L.: NEWS (May 30, 2018), www.bna.com/videofitbit-steps-n57982093031/ [hereinafter Fitbit]. “[It is] almost certain that the federal
government will look to regulate health information [that is] not subject to HIPAA . . . .”
Fitbit, supra.
26.
See Sarah Fellay, Changing the Rules of Health Care: Mobile Health and
Challenges for Regulation, AM. ENTERPRISE INST.: TECH & INNOVATION (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.aei.org/publication/changing-the-rules-of-health-care-mobile-health-andchallenges-for-regulation/.
27.
Stacey A. Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, 104 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
28.
Id.
29.
See id.
30.
See discussion infra Part X.
31.
See discussion infra Part X; Tovino, supra note 6, at 9–10, 12–13
(providing several examples of health data collected by mobile research apps).
32.
FLA. STAT. §§ 282.318, 381.026, 395.001, 408.051, 456.003 (2018); see
also FLA. CONST. art I, § 23.
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notification standards that will drive the implementation of privacy and
security best practices by independent scientists. 33
As discussed in more detail below, Florida laws that fall into the first
category include the Florida Constitution, 34 Florida’s health institution
licensing laws, 35 Florida’s health professional licensing laws, 36 the Florida
Electronic Health Records Exchange Act (“Health Records Act”), 37 the
Florida Information Technology Security Act (“Florida ITS Act”), 38 and the
Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities (“Patient Bill of
Rights”). 39 Florida laws that fall into the second category include the Florida
Information Protection Act (“FIPA”) 40 and Florida common law. 41 This
Article concludes that FIPA, which contains data security and breach
notification standards that will apply to some—but not all—independent
scientists who conduct mobile app mediated research, is the best option for
protecting mobile app mediated research data going forward. 42 This Article
proposes amendments to FIPA that are designed to protect the privacy and
security of all big data subjects, including mobile app mediated health
research participants.43
II.

THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution provides: “Every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided
herein.” 44 Although the Florida Supreme Court has stated that the phrase
natural person includes all Floridians, even minors and individuals who are
incompetent, the phrase governmental intrusion makes clear that the Florida
Constitution only protects individuals against governmental—not private—
intrusions. 45 Although mobile app mediated research certainly can be
33.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171; Florida Common Law, WITHOUT MY CONSENT,
http://www.withoutmyconsent.org/50state/state-guides/florida/common-law# (last visited May
1, 2019).
34.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
35.
See FLA. STAT. § 395.001.
36.
See id. § 456.003.
37.
See id. § 408.051.
38.
See id. § 282.318.
39.
See id. § 381.026.
40.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
41.
See Florida Common Law, supra note 33.
42.
Discussion infra Part X; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
43.
Discussion infra Part X; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
44.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
45.
Id.; In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990) (in the
context of a request for the discontinuation of medical treatment with respect to individuals
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conducted by an agent of the Florida—or any other—government, 46 this
Article focuses on private health research conducted or facilitated by mobile
apps such as: Kinsey Reporter; 47 Active Day; 48 Patients Like Me; 49 and My
Fitness Pal. 50 Described in detail in the Author’s prior work, 51 these apps are
neither sponsored, supported, nor affiliated with any governmental agency or
agent thereof. 52 As a result, the Florida Constitution is inapplicable to the
issue on which this Article focuses. 53
Assuming for the moment that the Florida Constitution did apply to
mobile app mediated research conducted by private, independent scientists,
Floridians do have a constitutionally protected interest in their health-related
data. 54 However, neither the Florida Constitution nor its interpretive case
law sets forth particular privacy, security, and breach notification standards
that could help protect that data, or that could minimize the risk of an
who are incompetent); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (in the context of
abortion with respect to minors); Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of
Privacy in Florida in the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for
Protection from Private and Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 26 (1997).
“[I]t is critical to recognize that this [constitutional] provision protects only against intrusions
by the government. It does nothing to protect citizens from intrusions by private or
commercial entities. . . . [T]he provision provides no protection from private or commercial
intrusion because the present provision is limited to governmental intrusions.” Overton &
Giddings, supra at 26, 41.
46.
See Peddicord, supra note 8 (“announcing the MyStudies app, a new
mobile technology [designed] to foster the collection of real-world evidence via patients’
mobile devices” for health research and other purposes).
47.
See Clayton A. Davis et al., Kinsey Reporter: Citizen Science for Sex
Research, ARXIV, http://arxiv/org/pdf/1602.04878.pdf (last visited May 1, 2019) (using
Kinsey Reporter, “[c]itizen sex scientists submit reports, each consisting of one or more
surveys, after participating in or observing sexual activity. Surveys cover topics such as
flirting, sexual activity, unwanted experience, consumption of pornography, and hormonal
STORE,
birth
control
side
effects”);
Kinsey
Reporter,
APP
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/kinsey-reporter/id533205458?mt=8 (last visited May 1, 2019)
[hereinafter Kinsey Reporter: Apple Store]; Kinsey Reporter, GOOGLE PLAY,
http://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kinsey.android&hl=en_us (last visited May
1, 2019) [hereinafter Kinsey Reporter: Google Play].
STORE,
48.
ActiveDay
—
Activity
Study,
APP
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/activeday-activity-study/id1183046259?mt=8 (last visited May
1, 2019).
STORE,
49.
PatientsLikeMe,
APP
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/patientslikeme/id955272281?mt=8 (last visited May 1, 2019).
STORE,
50.
MyFitnessPal,
APP
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/myfitnesspal/id341232718?mt=8 (last visited May 1, 2019).
51.
Tovino, supra note 6, at 9–14.
52.
See id. at 9–14.
53.
See id.; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
54.
See State v. Tamulonis, 39 So. 3d 524, 528 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
“An individual has a privacy interest in his or her prescription records.” Id.
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unconstitutional intrusion. 55 Florida case law simply makes clear that, in
assessing a claim for an unconstitutional privacy intrusion, a court shall:
[D]etermine whether the individual possesses a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the information or subject at issue . . . [i]f
so, the burden shifts to the State to show that . . . there is a
compelling state interest warranting the intrusion into the
individual’s privacy, and . . . that the intrusion is accomplished by
the least intrusive means. 56

The keys to a constitutional inquiry, thus, are a legitimate
expectation of privacy, a compelling state interest, and the means of the
intrusion—not adherence to particular privacy, security, and breach
notification standards. 57
III.

FLORIDA HEALTH INSTITUTION LICENSING LAWS

Although the Florida Constitution does not contain particular
privacy, security, or breach notification standards, a number of other Florida
laws do contain privacy standards applicable to physical and mental health
data of the type collected by mobile health apps and mobile research apps. 58
That said, many of these additional laws only apply to licensed health care
institutions, not independent scientists who, by definition, do not work for or
within any type of institution. 59 For example, Florida’s hospital licensing
law, codified at Chapter 395 of the Florida Statutes, contains privacy
standards applicable to patient records. 60 In particular, Chapter 395 defines a
patient record as a system that includes the following elements: “[B]asic
client data collection; a listing of the patient’s problems; the initial plan with
diagnostic and therapeutic orders as appropriate for each problem identified;
and progress notes, including a discharge summary.” 61 Chapter 395 then
establishes individual rights requirements as well as use and disclosure
requirements—similar to those set forth in the HIPAA Privacy Rule—
55.
See id.; compare FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23, with Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)) (setting forth particular privacy, security, and
breach notification standards).
56.
Tamulonis, 39 So. 3d at 528.
57.
See id.
58.
FLA. STAT. §§ 395.3015, .3025(4)–(11) (2018); see also FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 23.
59.
FLA. STAT. §§ 395.3015, 395.3025(1).
60.
Id. §§ 395.3015, 395.3025(1).
61.
Id. § 395.3015.
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relating to these records. 62 For example, Chapter 395 gives Florida hospital
patients the right to obtain a copy of their patient records. 63 By further
example, Chapter 395 establishes that hospital patients’ records are
confidential and may not be disclosed without the prior consent of the
patient. 64 However, Chapter 395 also establishes several exceptions to this
prior consent requirement, including when the patient records are needed for
treatment, risk management and quality assurance activities, trauma registry
purposes, organ procurement activities, and epidemiological investigations. 65
Although the data collected and maintained by Florida hospitals in patient
records are similar in type and kind to the data obtained by some independent
scientists through some mobile health and mobile research apps, hospitals are
heavily regulated by the privacy standards referenced in this paragraph but
independent scientists—who, by definition, work independent of an
institution—are not. 66
By further illustrative example, Florida’s nursing home licensing
law, codified within Chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes, establishes certain
nursing home patient rights, including the right of nursing home patients to
privacy in treatment and to confidentiality of personal and medical records. 67
Although the information collected by nursing homes about their residents is
similar in type and kind to that obtained by some independent scientists
using some mobile health research apps,68 nursing homes are required to
comply with a variety of privacy standards set forth in the Florida nursing
62.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 395.3015, and FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(1), with 45
C.F.R. § 164.520 (2018) (establishing the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s individual rights
requirements), and 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2018) (establishing the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s use
and disclosure requirements).
63.
FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(1).
64.
Id. § 395.3025(4).
65.
Id. § 395.3025(4)(a), (4)(b), (4)(f), (4)(i), (5).
66.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 395.3015 (defining the content of a patient record
for purposes of the Florida hospital licensing law), with PatientsLikeMe, supra note 49
(collecting information regarding app users’ diagnoses, symptoms, and treatments; charting
users’ daily and monthly symptom progress; disclosing such information to partners of
PatientsLikeMe for research purposes).
67.
FLA. STAT. §§ 400.011, 400.022(1)(m), 400.20.
68.
See Elderly Hip Fracture: Prevention and Treatment, PLACE FOR MOM,
http://www.aplaceformom.com/planning-and-advice/articles/hip-fractures-in-the-elderly (last
visited May 1, 2019) (noting that individuals who are elderly may fall, sustain a hip fracture,
and receive care for that fracture in a nursing home); ActiveDay — Activity Study, supra note
48 (a mobile research app that collects, among other information, information regarding
whether an app user has fallen); FallSafety Pro — Safety Alerts, APP STORE,
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/fallsafety-pro-safety-alerts/id870864283?mt=8 (last visited
May 1, 2019) (a mobile occupational safety and health app that collects information regarding
whether a user has fallen, the number of time the user has fallen, and whether a first responder
was called to assist the fallen user).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss3/1

144

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 3

2019]

FLORIDA LAW, MOBILE RESEARCH APPLICATIONS

363

home licensing law, whereas independent scientists do not have the same
obligations. 69
As a final illustrative example, Florida’s hospice licensing law, also
codified within Chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes, defines and establishes
uses and disclosure requirements relating to interdisciplinary records of
hospice patients. 70 In particular, the hospice licensing law requires hospices
to maintain an “up-to-date, interdisciplinary record of care being given and
patient and family status. Records shall contain pertinent past and current
medical, nursing, social, and other therapeutic information and such other
information that is necessary for the safe and adequate care of the patient.”71
The hospice licensing law further provides that the interdisciplinary record as
well as related billing records are confidential and may not be disclosed,
although exceptions exist for certain situations, including those involving an
authorization executed by the patient or an order by a court of competent
jurisdiction ordering the release of the interdisciplinary record.72 Although
the information collected by hospices about their terminally ill patients is
similar in type and kind to that obtained by some independent scientists
through some mobile health research apps, hospices are required to comply
with the privacy requirements set forth in Florida’s hospice licensing law,
whereas independent scientists are not. 73
IV.

FLORIDA HEALTH PROFESSIONAL LICENSING LAWS

In addition to health institution licensing laws, a number of
additional Florida laws contain privacy standards applicable to physical and
mental health data of the type collected by mobile health apps and mobile
research apps. 74 However, many of these laws only apply to certain licensed
health care professionals, not non-provider independent scientists whose
69.
See Rothstein et al., supra note 3, at 897, 899; Nursing Home Regulations
—
State
Laws
and
Nursing
Homes,
NURSING HOME ABUSE GUIDE,
http://nursinghomeabuseguide.com/legal-action/nursing-home-regulations/ (last visited May
1, 2019).
70.
FLA. STAT. § 400.611.
71.
Id. § 400.611(1).
72.
Id. § 400.611(3)–(4).
73.
See id. § 400.611(1) (requiring hospice records to “contain pertinent past
and current medical, nursing, social, and other therapeutic information . . . necessary for the
safe and adequate care of [hospice] patient[s],” who, by definition, have a terminal illness);
PLAY,
ALS
Mobilizer
Analyzer,
GOOGLE
http://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.prizeforlife.healthcare&hl=en_US
(last
visited May 1, 2019) (a mobile research app used to investigate disease progression in ALS, a
progressive and terminal disease); Nursing Home Regulations — State Laws and Nursing
Homes, supra note 69.
74.
FLA. STAT. §§ 395.3015, 395.3025, 400.011, 400.611, 456.013, 456.059.
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training is in software engineering, information systems, marketing, and
communications. 75 For example, Chapter 456 of the Florida Statutes
establishes general licensing requirements for physicians and other health
care practitioners who practice a health profession in Florida. 76 With respect
to practitioners who are psychiatrists, Chapter 456 specifically states that
“[c]ommunications between a patient and a psychiatrist . . . shall be held
confidential and shall not be disclosed except upon the request of the patient
or the patient’s legal representative.” 77 Chapter 456 further explains,
however, that a psychiatrist may disclose patient communications to the
extent necessary to warn a potential victim or to communicate a threat to a
law enforcement agency when:
(1) A patient is engaged in a treatment relationship with a
psychiatrist; (2) [the] patient has made an actual threat to
physically harm an identifiable victim or victims; and (3) [t]he
treating psychiatrist makes a clinical judgment that the patient has
the apparent capability to commit such an act and that it is more
likely than not that in the near future the patient will carry out that
threat. 78

The general rule requiring psychiatrist confidentiality is designed to
encourage patients with mental health conditions to fully disclose their past
diagnoses and treatments as well as their current “[m]ood, level of anxiety,
thought content, . . . and perception and cognition” to enable the psychiatrist
to accurately diagnose and treat the patient. 79 The general rule, combined
with the three exceptions, is also designed to remind the psychiatrist that
each patient’s history, physical, and other information must be maintained in
confidence and is not to be disclosed except in discrete situations in which

75.
See About Us, FALLSAFETY, http://www.fallsafetyapp.com/about-us (last
visited May 1, 2019) (noting that the FallSafety employees responsible for developing several
occupational safety and health mobile apps, including the FallSafety Pro, Lone Worker Pro,
and Worker Safety Pro apps, include “safety-oriented engineers, keen-eyed designers,
disciplined quality assurance people, passionate marketers and business development
professionals, advanced researchers and technology innovators,” but not licensed health care
professionals).
76.
FLA. STAT. § 456.013.
77.
Id. § 456.059.
78.
Id.
79.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR THE PSYCHIATRIC
EVALUATION OF ADULTS 6, 9 (3d ed. 2015) (stating as a guideline that a psychiatrist should
obtain this information during an initial psychiatric evaluation of a patient; further stating,
“[t]he goal of this guideline is to improve the quality of the doctor-patient relationship, the
accuracy of psychiatric diagnoses, and the appropriateness of treatment selection.”).
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the public interest outweighs the patient’s right to confidentiality. 80
Interestingly, the information obtained by psychiatrists—including
information regarding past diagnoses and treatments as well as current mood,
level of anxiety, and thought content—is very similar to the information
obtained by a number of mobile health apps and mobile research apps.81
Although Florida psychiatrists are heavily regulated by privacy standards set
forth in Chapter 456 of the Florida Statutes, non-provider independent
scientists who conduct mobile app mediated research are not. 82
By further illustrative example, Chapter 490 of the Florida Statutes
establishes licensure requirements for clinical psychologists who practice in
Florida. 83 In the legislative intent section of Chapter 490, the Florida
Legislature explains that:
[A]s society becomes increasingly complex, emotional survival is
equal in importance to physical survival. Therefore, in order to
preserve the health, safety, and welfare of the public, the
Legislature must provide privileged communication for members
of the public or those acting on their behalf to encourage needed or
desired psychological services to be sought out. 84

To this end, Chapter 490 establishes a general rule that, “[a]ny
communication[s] between [a psychologist] and her or his patient or client
80.
See FLA. STAT. § 456.059.
81.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 79, at 5, 6; compare Parmet,
supra note 8 (explaining that the mobile research app BiAffect “unobtrusively monitors
keyboard dynamics metadata, such as typing speed and rhythm, mistakes in texts, and the use
of backspace and auto-correct [and that such data is then] analyzed using an artificial
intelligence-based machine learning approach to identify digital biomarkers of manic and
depressive episodes in people with bipolar disorder”), with Olwen Glynn Owen, Bipolar
Disorder: Psychiatrists Are Taking a New Approach that Aims to Treat Not Just Symptoms
NEWS
TODAY
(July
18,
2007),
but
the
Whole
Person,
MED.
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/77227.php (discussing the traditional treatment of
patients with bipolar disorder by psychiatrists); compare Featured Conditions at
PatientsLikeMe, PATIENTSLIKEME: CONDITIONS, http://www.patientslikeme.com/conditions
(last visited May 1, 2019) (noting that the PatientsLikeMe mobile app collects symptom data
from patients who have a number of mental and behavioral health conditions, including drug
addiction and alcohol addiction), with PSYCHOL. TODAY: YAHYA SAEED (Feb. 15, 2019),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/us/psychiatrists/yahya-saeed-houstontx/391190?sid=1545765952.5073_17507&city=San+Antonio&state=TX&spec=248&ref=1&t
r=ResultsName (profiling a traditional psychiatrist who treats patients and collects
information regarding patients with alcohol and drug addiction).
82.
See FLA. STAT. § 456.059; Who Regulates All These Health-Related
Apps?, HEALTHLINE, http://www.healthline.com/health-news/who-regulates-all-these-healthrelated-apps#1 (last visited May 1, 2019).
83.
FLA. STAT. §§ 490.005–.006.
84.
Id. § 490.002.
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shall be confidential.” 85 Chapter 490 allows the privilege to be waived in
only three situations:
(1) When the [psychologist] is a . . . defendant [in a legal] action
arising from a complaint filed by the patient, . . . in which case the
waiver [is] limited to that [legal] action; (2) [w]hen the patient . . .
agrees to the waiver, in writing, or when more than one person in a
family is receiving therapy, when each family member agrees to
the waiver, in writing; [or] (3) [w]hen there is a clear and
immediate probability of physical harm to the patient or client, to
other individuals, or to society and the [psychologist]
communicates the information only to the potential victim,
appropriate family member, or law enforcement or other
appropriate authorities. 86

Although psychologists may obtain information that is similar in
type and kind to that obtained by non-psychologist independent scientists
through a mobile health or health research app, psychologists are heavily
regulated by the privacy standards referenced in this section whereas
independent scientists are not. 87
Similarly, Chapter 490 and 491 of the Florida Statutes establishes
licensure requirements for psychotherapists, clinical social workers, marriage
and family therapists, and mental health counselors. 88 In the legislative
intent section of Chapter 491, the Florida Legislature explains that:
[A]s society becomes increasingly complex, emotional survival is
equal in importance to physical survival. Therefore, in order to
preserve the health, safety, and welfare of the public, the
Legislature must provide privileged communication for members
of the public or those acting on their behalf to encourage needed
or desired counseling, clinical and psychotherapy services, or
certain other services of a psychological nature to be sought out. 89

85.
Id. § 490.0147.
86.
Id.
87.
See id.; compare Parmet, supra note 8 (explaining that the mobile research
app BiAffect “unobtrusively monitors keyboard dynamics metadata, such as typing speed and
rhythm, mistakes in texts, and the use of backspace and auto-correct [and that such data is
then] analyzed using an artificial intelligence-based machine learning approach to identify
digital biomarkers of manic and depressive episodes in people with bipolar disorder”), with
Culbertson v. Culbertson, 455 S.W.3d 107, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing a child
custody case involving a father with bipolar disorder and legal questions relating to waiver of
the psychologist-patient privilege).
88.
FLA. STAT. §§ 490.0051, 491.0046.
89.
Id. § 491.002.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss3/1

148

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 3

2019]

FLORIDA LAW, MOBILE RESEARCH APPLICATIONS

367

To this end, Chapter 491 provides that, “[a]ny communication
between [a mental health counselor] and her or his patient or client shall be
confidential.” 90 Chapter 491 permits waiver of this secrecy only:
(1) When the [mental health counselor] is a party defendant to a
[legal] action arising from a complaint filed by the patient . . . in
which case the waiver [is] limited to that [legal] action; (2) [w]hen
the patient . . . agrees to the waiver in writing; or . . . (3) [w]hen, in
the clinical judgment of the [mental health counselor], there is a
clear and immediate probability of physical harm to the patient or
client, to other individuals, or to society and the [mental health
counselor] communicates the information only to the potential
victim, appropriate family member, or law enforcement or other
appropriate authorities. 91

Although Florida’s mental health counselors may obtain information
that is similar in type and kind to that obtained by non-counselor independent
scientists through a mobile health or mobile research app, mental health
counselors are heavily regulated by the privacy standards set forth in this
section whereas independent scientists are not. 92
The examples above involve psychiatrists, psychologists, and mental
health counselors. 93 As background for this initial focus, many mobile
health apps are specifically designed to help individuals with their mental
health. 94 However, non-mental health practitioners also are required to
adhere to privacy standards set forth in Florida law. 95 Again, however, these
standards apply only to health care practitioners, not non-practitioner
independent scientists. 96 For example, one provision within Chapter 456 of
the Florida Statutes regulates a records owner, defined as:

90.
Id. § 491.0147.
91.
Id.
92.
See id. §§ 491.0147, 491.002; Independent Scientists: Young Researchers
Producing
Remarkable
Research,
MANA,
http://www.nims.go.Jp/mana/about/independent.html (last visited May 1, 2019); compare
Pooja Chandrashekar, Do Mental Health Mobile Apps Work: Evidence and Recommendations
for Designing High-Efficacy Mental Health Mobile Apps, MHEALTH, Mar. 23, 2018, at 1, 3
(noting that mobile mental health apps “enable users to self-monitor their mood by
periodically reporting their thoughts, behaviors, and actions”), with Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So.
2d 348, 357 (Fla. 2002) (noting that the defendant psychotherapist obtained—and then shared
without consent—confidential mental health information).
93.
FLA. STAT. §§ 456.059, 490.0051, 490.0147, 491.0046.
94.
Terry & Gunter, supra note 7, at 136 (discussing mobile mental health
apps).
95.
FLA. STAT. § 456.057.
96.
Id. § 456.057(1).
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[A]ny health care practitioner who generates a medical record after
making a physical or mental examination of, or administering
treatment or dispensing legend drugs to, any person; any health
care practitioner to whom records are transferred by a previous
records owner; [and] any health care practitioner’s employer,
including, but not limited to, group practices and staff-model
health maintenance organizations, provided the employment
contract or agreement between the employer and the health care
practitioner designates the employer as the records owner. 97

This provision then requires health care practitioners and records
owners to give “copies of all reports and records relating to [their]
examination [and] treatment” to patients upon request. 98 This provision also
prohibits the furnishing of such records, or the discussion of a patient’s
medical condition, with any person other than the patient, without patient
authorization, unless an exception applies. 99 To the extent an individual
conducting mobile app mediated health research is a non-practitioner
scientist, software engineer, or other businessperson, the provisions
discussed in this paragraph will not apply. 100 Again, these privacy standards
are limited in application to health care practitioners. 101
V.

THE HEALTH RECORDS ACT

In addition to Florida laws that impose privacy requirements on
health care institutions and health care professionals as a condition of
licensure, additional Florida laws seek to regulate the electronic exchange of
health records. 102 However, these laws also only apply to licensed health
care professionals, not to non-provider independent scientists. 103 For
example, the Health Records Act, codified in Chapter 408 of the Florida
Statutes, required the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration to
develop, by the year 2010, a universal patient authorization form that “may
be used by a health care provider to document patient authorization for the
use or [disclosure] of an identifiable health record.” 104 As background, the
Health Records Act defines health record as “any information, recorded in
any form or medium, which relates to the past, present, or future health of an
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. § 456.057(6).
Id. § 456.057(7)(a).
See FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a).
Id.
See id. § 408.051.
Id.
Id. § 408.051(4)(a).
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individual for the primary purpose of providing health care and healthrelated services.” 105 The Health Records Act further defines identifiable
health record as “any health record that identifies the patient or with respect
to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to
identify the patient.” 106
Pursuant to the terms of the Health Records Act, “[a] health care
provider receiving [a universal] authorization form containing a request for
the release of an identifiable health record [is required to] accept the form as
a valid authorization to release an identifiable health record.” 107 In addition,
“[t]he exchange by a health care provider of an identifiable health record
upon receipt of an authorization form completed and submitted in
accordance with [the Health Records Act] creates a rebuttable presumption
that the release of the identifiable health record was appropriate.” 108
Moreover, “[a] health care provider that exchanges an identifiable health
record upon receipt of an authorization form [is] deemed to have [not]
violated or waived any privilege protected under [Florida law].” 109 Finally,
the Health Records Act specifies that the release of an identifiable health
record of a patient without the patient’s authorization is permitted for “the
treatment of the patient for an emergency medical condition.”110
Although the health data collected by a mobile research app could
easily fit within the definition of a health record, the privacy standards set
forth within the Health Records Act only apply to health care providers, not
non-provider scientists. 111 Stated another way, the Health Records Act’s
universal authorization form provisions have no application to the context of
mobile app mediated health research conducted by independent scientists.112
VI.

FLORIDA ITS ACT

Although many of the laws discussed above are limited in
application to health industry participants, Florida has a number of additional
laws that establish security standards that, in theory, could help protect
physical and mental health data of the type collected by independent
scientists who use mobile health apps and mobile research apps. 113 For
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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See id. § 408.051(2)(d), (4).
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example, the Florida ITS Act requires the Florida Agency for State
Technology (“Agency”) to establish “standards and processes consistent with
generally accepted best practices for information technology security, to
include cybersecurity, and [to] adopt[] rules that safeguard an agency’s data,
information, and information technology resources to ensure availability,
confidentiality, and integrity and to mitigate risks.” 114
In particular, the Florida ITS Act requires the Agency to:
(a) Develop, and annually update . . . a statewide
information technology security strategic plan that includes
security goals and objectives for the strategic issues of information
technology security policy, risk management, training, incident
management, and disaster recovery planning.
(b) Develop, and publish for use . . . an information
technology security framework that, at a minimum, includes
guidelines and processes for:
(1) Establishing asset management procedures to ensure
that an agency’s information technology resources are identified
and managed consistent with their relative importance to the
agency’s business objectives.
(2) Using a standard risk assessment methodology that
includes the identification of an agency’s priorities, constraints,
risk tolerances, and assumptions necessary to support operational
risk decisions.
(3) Completing comprehensive risk assessments and
information technology security audits . . . .
(4) Identifying protection procedures to manage the
protection of an agency’s information, data, and information
technology resources.
(5) Establishing procedures for accessing information and
data to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of such
information and data.
(6) Detecting threats through proactive monitoring of
events, continuous security monitoring, and defined detection
processes.
(7) Establishing agency computer security incident
response teams and describing their responsibilities for responding
to information technology security incidents, including breaches of
personal information containing confidential or exempt data.
(8) Recovering information and data in response to an
information technology security incident . . . .
(9) Establishing an information technology security
incident reporting process . . . .
114.

Id. § 282.318(1), (3).
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(10) Incorporating information obtained through detection
and response activities into the agency’s information technology
security incident response plans.
(11) Developing agency strategic and operational
information technology security plans . . . .
(12) Establishing the managerial, operational, and
technical safeguards for protecting state government data and
information technology resources . . . . 115

The Florida ITS Act thus establishes comprehensive security
standards similar to those set forth in the HIPAA Security Rule.116 The catch
is that only state agencies, defined as any “official, officer, commission,
board, authority, council, committee, or department of the executive branch
of [Florida] state government; the Justice Administrative Commission; and
the Public Service Commission” are required to comply with these security
standards. 117 By definition, independent scientists do not work for a state
agency. 118 As a result, the Florida ITS Act has no application to the instant
issue. 119
VII.

FIPA

Florida still has other laws that contain security standards, as well as
breach notification standards that could, in theory, help protect physical and
mental health data of the type collected by mobile health apps and mobile
research apps. 120 For example, FIPA—codified within Chapter 501 of the
Florida Statutes—applies to a covered entity, defined to include “a sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative,
association, . . . commercial entity, [or governmental entity] that acquires,
maintains, stores, or uses personal information;” as well as a third-party
agent, defined as “an entity that has been contracted to maintain, store, or
process personal information on behalf of a covered entity or governmental
entity.” 121 Because an independent scientist could be a sole proprietor, or an
independent scientist could form a commercial entity with other business,
marketing, and communication professionals, FIPA has potential application

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.308 (2018).
FLA. STAT. § 282.0041(23).
See Lovelock, supra note 10.
See FLA. STAT. § 282.318(2)–(3).
See id. § 501.171.
Id. § 501.171(1)(b), (h).
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to independent scientists, and/or their commercial entities, that develop
and/or use mobile apps to conduct health research. 122
The application of FIPA hinges, however, on whether the covered
entity “acquires, maintains, stores, or uses personal information.” 123 FIPA
defines personal information as:
(1) An individual’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following data elements
for that individual: [a] social security number; [b] . . . driver[’s]
license or identification card number, passport number, military
identification number, or other similar number issued on a
government document used to verify identity; [c] . . . financial
account number or credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that is
necessary to permit access to an individual’s financial account; [d]
. . . information regarding an individual’s medical history, mental
or physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a
health care professional; or [e] [a]n individual’s health insurance
policy number or subscriber identification number and any unique
identifier used by a health insurer to identify the individual; or (2)
[a] user name or e-mail address, in combination with a password
or security question and answer that would permit access to an
online account. 124

Some mobile research apps require the user to enter: (1) the user’s
first and last name; and (2) a user name or email address combined with a
password or security question. 125 To the extent the user also provides the
app with “information regarding [the] individual’s medical history, mental or
physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a health care
professional,” FIPA’s security and breach notification standards, discussed
below, would apply. 126 However, other mobile research apps allow research
participants to supply health information without providing: (1) a first and
last name; or (2) a user name or email address combined with a password or
122.
See id.; Tovino, supra note 6, at 40; About Us, supra note 75 (referencing
the commercial entity Fall Safety, which employs software engineers as well as marketing and
communications professionals to develop occupational safety and health apps as well as
occupational safety and health research apps).
123.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b).
124.
Id. § 501.171(1)(g)(1).
125.
See
Privacy
Policy,
PATIENTSLIKEME,
http://www.patientslikeme.com/about/privacy (last visited May 1, 2019). PatientsLikeMe is a
mobile health app that requires the user to enter an email address, a user name, and a password
before the user may enter health information. Id.; PatientsLikeMe, supra note 49.
126.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(IV); What Is PII?, U. MASS. MED. SCH.,
http://www.umassmed.edu/it/security/compliance/what-is-pii/ (last visited May 1, 2019).
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security question. 127 In the case of these latter mobile research apps, FIPA’s
security and breach notification standards would not apply. 128
To the extent FIPA applies, the law requires “[e]ach covered entity,
governmental entity, or third-party agent [to] take reasonable measures to
protect and secure data in electronic form containing personal
information.” 129 This provision may be referred to as a modest reasonable
security standard. 130 FIPA also requires “[e]ach covered entity [and] thirdparty agent [to] take all reasonable measures to dispose, or arrange for the
disposal, of customer records containing personal information within [their]
custody or control when the records are no longer to be retained.” 131 “Such
disposal shall involve shredding, erasing, or otherwise modifying the
personal information in the records to make it unreadable or undecipherable
through any means.” 132 These latter two provisions may be referred to as
modest secure disposal standards. 133 These provisions are modest because
they pale in comparison to the comprehensive security standards set forth in
the HIPAA Security Rule, 134 as well as other state laws, including the Florida
ITS Act. 135

127.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(1); see also Frequently Asked Questions,
KINSEY REP., http://www.kinseyreporter.org/#/faq (last updated May 1, 2019). Kinsey
Reporter is a mobile sexual health research app that allows users to donate sexual health data,
such as female hormonal birth control effects, for research purposes without the users
identifying themselves or providing a user name or email address. Frequently Asked
Questions, supra.
128.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
129.
Id. § 501.171 (2).
130.
Id.; Kevin L. Miller, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Reasonable Cybersecurity: A Proactive and Adaptive Approach, FLA. B.J., Sept./Oct. 2016, at
23, 26.
131.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(8). Florida Statute § 501.171(1)(c) defines a
customer record as:
[A]ny material, regardless of the physical form, on which personal information is
recorded or preserved by any means, including, but not limited to, written or spoken
words, graphically depicted, printed, or electromagnetically transmitted that are
provided by an individual in [Florida] to a covered entity for the purpose of
purchasing or leasing a product or obtaining a service.

Id. § 501.171(1)(c).
132.
Id. § 501.171(8).
133.
See Charles H. Kennedy, Secure Records Disposal: Is Not Shedding Ever
MOUNTAIN,
a
Good
Idea?,
IRON
http://www.ironmountain.com/resources/whitepapers/s/secure-records-disposal-is-notshredding-ever-a-good-idea (last visited May 1, 2019).
134.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191 § 201, 110 Stat. 1936, 1992 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2012));
FLA. STAT. §§ 282.318(3), 501.171(2), (4), (8).
135.
See FLA. STAT. § 282.318.
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In addition to these modest security standards, FIPA contains
comprehensive breach notification provisions. 136 In particular, FIPA
requires a covered entity to give notice to each individual in the state of
Florida whose personal information was, or the covered entity reasonably
believes to have been, accessed as a result of a breach of security, defined as
“unauthorized access of data in electronic form containing personal
information.” 137 FIPA requires the notice to be made “as expeditiously as
practicable and without unreasonable delay, taking into account the time
necessary to allow the covered entity to determine the scope of the breach of
security, to identify individuals affected by the breach, and to restore the
reasonable integrity of the data system that was breached;” however, the
notice may not be made later than thirty days after the determination of a
breach or reason to believe a breach occurred. 138 When required, notice to an
individual shall include, at a minimum:
(1) [t]he date, estimated date, or estimated date range of the breach
of security; (2) [a] description of the personal information that was
accessed or reasonably believed to have been accessed as a part of
the breach of security; (3) [i]nformation that the individual can use
to contact the covered entity to inquire about the breach of security
and the personal information that the covered entity maintained
about the individual. 139

In addition to notifying the individual who was the subject of the
information breach, FIPA also requires the covered entity to provide notice
to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs (“Department”) of any breach of
security affecting five hundred or more individuals in the state of Florida. 140
The covered entity must provide this notice to the Department as
expeditiously as practicable, but not later than thirty days after the
determination of the breach or reason to believe a breach has occurred.141 A
covered entity may, however, receive fifteen additional days if the covered
entity provides the Department, in writing, good cause for delay within thirty
days after determination of the breach or reason to believe a breach has
occurred. 142 FIPA requires written notice to the Department to include:

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. § 501.171(4).
Id. § 501.171(1)(a), (4)(a).
Id. § 501.171(4)(a).
Id. § 501.171(4)(e).
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(3)(a).
Id. § 501.171(3)(a).
Id.
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(1) [a] synopsis of the events surrounding the breach at the time
notice is provided; (2) [t]he number of individuals in [Florida] who
were, or potentially have been affected by the breach; (3) [a]ny
services related to the breach being offered or scheduled to be
offered, without charge, by the covered entity to individuals, and
instructions as to how to use such services; (4) [a] copy of the
notice . . . ; (5) [t]he name, address, telephone number, and e-mail
address of the employee or agent of the covered entity from whom
additional information may be obtained about the breach. 143

“If a covered entity discovers circumstances requiring notice . . . of
more than [one thousand] individuals at a single time,” FIPA also requires
the covered entity to “notify, without unreasonable delay, all consumer
reporting agencies that compile and maintain files on consumers on a
nationwide basis, . . . of the timing, distribution, and content of the
notices.” 144
Interestingly, FIPA provides that:
Notice provided pursuant to rules, regulations,
procedures, or guidelines established by the covered entity’s
primary or functional federal regulator is deemed to be in
compliance with [FIPA’s] notice requirement . . . if the covered
entity notifies affected individuals in accordance with the rules,
regulations, procedures, or guidelines established by the primary
or functional federal regulator in the event of a breach of
security. 145

As discussed in the Author’s prior work and above in this Article,
most independent scientists do not have a primary or functional federal
regulator. 146 Thus, FIPA, to the extent applicable, may be the primary—or
actually only—form of regulation. 147
FIPA provides that a violation of its reasonable security, secure
disposal, or breach notification provisions “shall be treated as an unfair or
deceptive trade practice” for which the Department may bring a legal
action. 148 A covered entity that fails to notify affected individuals and the
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. § 501.171(3)(b).
Id. § 501.171(5).
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(4)(g).
Stacey A. Tovino, Incidental Findings: A Common Law Approach, 15
ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 242, 242 (2008); see also discussion supra Parts I–VI (discussing the
lack of application of many Florida laws to independent scientists who conduct mobile app
mediated research).
147.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
148.
Id. § 501.171(9)(a).
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Department in accordance with FIPA’s breach notification requirements
shall also be liable for: (1) during the first thirty days following the
violation, a civil penalty of $1,000 per day; (2) for each subsequent thirtyday period or portion thereof through the 180th day following the violation, a
civil penalty of $50,000; and (3) after the 180th day following the violation,
a civil penalty up to $500,000. 149 FIPA clarifies that these civil penalties
apply per breach, not “per individual affected by the breach.” 150 Notably,
FIPA “does not establish a private cause of action.” 151
VIII.

PATIENT BILL OF RIGHTS

None of the Florida laws discussed above have specific or express
application to researchers. 152 However, the Patient Bill of Rights, codified in
Chapter 381 of the Florida Statutes, provides that “a patient has the right to
know if medical treatment is for purposes of experimental research and to
consent prior to participation in such experimental research.” 153 The Patient
Bill of Rights further provides that, “[f]or any patient, regardless of ability to
pay or source of payment for his or her care, participation must be a
voluntary matter; and a patient has the right to refuse to participate. The
patient’s consent or refusal must be documented in the patient’s care
record.” 154 If applicable to mobile app mediated research, these provisions
create some privacy protections for research participants; that is, they
prohibit the collection of an individual’s information by an app for research
purposes without the individual’s prior consent. 155 Nothing in the quoted
language set forth in this paragraph limits the application of this privacy
prohibition to just health care providers or health care facilities. 156 That said,
the stated intent of the Patient Bill of Rights is to protect “patients of health
care providers and health care facilities.” 157 In addition, the prefatory
statement in the beginning of the Patient Bill of Rights suggests that the
enumerated obligations only apply to health care providers and health care

149.
Id. § 501.171(9)(b).
150.
Id. § 501.171(9)(b)(2).
151.
Id. § 501.171(10).
152.
See discussion supra Parts I–VII.
153.
FLA. STAT. § 381.026(4)(e).
154.
Id.
155.
See id.
156.
See id.
157.
Id. at § 381.026(3). “It is the purpose of this section to promote the
interests and well-being of the patients of health care providers and health care facilities and to
promote better communication between the patient and the health care provider.” FLA. STAT.
§ 381.026(3).
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facilities. 158 As such, these privacy protections probably would not apply to
a non-provider independent scientist, who does not work within or for a
Florida-licensed health care facility. 159
IX.

FLORIDA COMMON LAW

Florida recognizes a number of common law causes of action that
involve duties relevant to confidentiality and privacy. 160 For example,
Florida recognizes a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when a
fiduciary impermissibly discloses a confidence. 161 Under Florida law, the
elements of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty include: (1) the
existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) a breach of such duty; (3) proximate
causation; and (4) damages. 162 The first element, which is the crucial
element for the issue at hand, requires an actor to have a fiduciary
relationship with the person who is claiming damages. 163 Fiduciary duties
have been recognized in cases involving an attorney/client, executor/heir,
guardian/ward,
agent/principal,
trustee/beneficiary,
corporate
officer/shareholder, psychiatrist/patient, psychotherapist/patient, mental
health counselor/patient, and other similar relationships where great trust is
imposed on one person for the benefit of another. 164 Some courts, however,
have imposed fiduciary duties on other, less-classic actors, including lenders,
clerics, and wives. 165 The question in the instant case is whether a court
would impose a fiduciary duty on an independent scientist who conducts
mobile app mediated research and, to a lesser extent, whether that scientist
could breach that duty in a case involving a privacy or security breach of
confidential research data. 166

158.
Id. § 381.026(4). “Each health care facility or provider shall . . . .” Id.
159.
See id.
160.
See Florida Common Law, supra note 33.
161.
Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002).
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
John F. Mariani et al., Understanding Fiduciary Duty, FLA. B.J., March
2010, at 21, 21; see also Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 353; DeVaughn v. DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d
1128, 1132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Barnett Bank of Marion Cty. v. Shirey, 655 So. 2d
1156, 1158 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Cohen v. Hattaway, 595 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986); Eckhardt v.
Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque, Inc., 953 P.2d 722, 727–28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
165.
Mariani et al., supra note 164, at 21 (providing an outstanding overview
of Florida law governing the fiduciary relationship and fiduciary duties).
166.
See Suthers v. Amgen Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072 (S.D.
Fla. 2003); Tovino, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing the application of fiduciary duties in the
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As the Author explained in a prior work, “fiduciary relationships
may be expressly or impliedly created.” 167 Because it is unlikely that an
independent scientist who conducts mobile app mediated research would
expressly identify as a fiduciary in any electronic or other policies related to
the mobile app, the concept of an implied fiduciary relationship is
discussed. 168 “Implied fiduciary relationships are premised on the specific
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and the relationship of
the parties. These relationships have been found when confidence is reposed
by one individual, the principal, and trust is accepted by the other individual,
the fiduciary.” 169 Although research participants have sought to impose
fiduciary duties on researchers, these attempts are usually unsuccessful. 170
As the Author explained elsewhere:
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 171 a patient,
Moore, who underwent treatment for hairy-cell leukemia, and
whose treating physician used the patient’s cells to establish and
patent a new cell line without his permission, sued the physician,
Dr. Golde, the Regents of the University of California (“Regents”),
a researcher employed by the Regents, Quan, and other parties for
breach of fiduciary duty and twelve additional causes of action . . .
The California Supreme Court applied the fiduciary duty to Dr.
Golde, but summarily dismissed the breach of fiduciary cause of
action with respect to the other defendants: “The Regents, Quan
[and others] are not physicians. In contrast to [Dr.] Golde, none of
these defendants stood in a fiduciary relationship with Moore or
had the duty to obtain Moore’s informed consent to medical
procedures.”
Other courts have dismissed breach-of-fiduciary-duty
causes of action when the research participant failed to present
sufficient evidence of the formation of the fiduciary relationship.
In Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, 172
the plaintiffs sued a researcher, hospital, and research institute for
breach of fiduciary duty based on the defendants’ alleged failure to
disclose material information relating to their disease research.
When the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege any
context of researchers who conduct neuroimaging studies and who may discover incidental
neurological findings).
167.
Tovino, supra note 146, at 250; see also Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1071.
168.
See Suthers, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 429; Tovino, supra note 146, at 250.
169.
Tovino, supra note 146, at 250; see also Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1071.
170.
Tovino, supra note 146, at 251.
171.
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
172.
264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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facts showing that the defendants had recognized or accepted the
trust, as required to form the fiduciary relationship, the plaintiffs
responded by alleging that the defendants impliedly accepted the
trust by undertaking research that they represented as being for the
benefit of the plaintiffs. The court disagreed, reasoning that the
plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged the second element of a
fiduciary relationship—acceptance of trust by the researchers—
and that this element cannot be assumed from the subjects’
research participation:
“There is no automatic fiduciary
relationship that attaches when a researcher accepts medical
donations and the acceptance of trust, the second constitutive
element of finding a fiduciary duty, cannot be assumed once a
donation is given.”
Other courts also have considered, at least in dicta, the
question of whether researchers owe their participants fiduciary
duties. Suthers v. [Amgen Inc.], 173 involved an investigation of an
experimental Parkinson’s treatment—glial-derived neurotrophic
factor (“GDNF”)—at several sites, including New York University
(“NYU”). Amgen, the trial sponsor, discontinued the trials after
data indicated that GDNF was neither safe nor effective. Two of
the research participants who received GDNF in an extended
version of the study conducted at NYU sued Amgen to compel the
provision of GDNF, which the participants believed relieved their
Parkinson’s symptoms. One of their causes of action was breach
of fiduciary duty, which the court refused to impose on Amgen:
“[T]here is no basis in fact or law to impose a fiduciary duty
running from the sponsor of an independent study to participants
who it does not select, has not met, and about whom it may not
know the details of their medical conditions.” Because the
participants did not name NYU or its researchers as defendants,
the court did not address the applicability of the fiduciary duty to
the research team, although the court noted in dicta one
bioethicist’s criticism of the application of fiduciary duties to
researchers.
Notwithstanding these cases, the nature of the relationship
between researchers and participants continues to be debated.
Some plaintiffs’ lawyers argue that researchers are fiduciaries visà-vis their participants. Attorney Alan Milstein, who successfully
represented University of Pennsylvania gene therapy participant,
and decedent, Jesse Gelsinger, recently stated [that once a research
participant] signs . . . [an] informed consent [to research document,
the fiduciary relationship has been established].
....

173.
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Other attorneys and scholars take a middle ground and
admit that there are important distinctions between the researcher–
participant relationship and the types of relationships traditionally
governed by fiduciary principles, although they use the concept of
the fiduciary relationship as a framework for thinking about the
researcher–participant relationship. Finally, some attorneys and
scholars expressly oppose the application of fiduciary duties to
researchers, reasoning that the relationship between researcher and
participant differs fundamentally from that between physician and
patient, that clinical research should not be conflated with medical
care, and that the purpose of research is not to benefit
individuals. 174

In summary, it is certainly possible for a mobile app mediated
research participant to claim that an independent scientist has a fiduciary
duty that favorably runs towards the research participant. 175 However, it is
unlikely that a court would agree absent an express assumption of trust by
the independent scientist or other facts not contemplated by this Article. 176
Even if an independent scientist were found by a court to have a fiduciary
relationship with the scientist’s research participants, the case law discussed
above does not establish privacy, security, or breach notification standards
compliance with which would establish proper fiduciary behavior. 177
In addition to breach of fiduciary duty based on breach of trust or
confidence, Florida also recognizes four invasion of privacy torts, including:
(1) appropriation, [which is] the unauthorized use of a person’s
name or likeness to obtain some benefit; (2) intrusion, [which is
the] physical[] or electronic[] intru[sion] into one’s private
quarters; (3) public disclosure of private facts, [which] is the
dissemination of truthful private information [that] a reasonable
person would find objectionable; and (4) false light in the public
eye, [which is the] publication of facts [that] place a person in a
false light even though the facts themselves may not be
defamatory. 178

174.
Tovino, supra note 146, at 251–53 (citations omitted) (first quoting
Moore, 793 P.2d at 486; then quoting Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072; then quoting
Suthers, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 429).
175.
See id.
176.
Id. at 254.
177.
Id.; see Suthers, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 429; Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1072.
178.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003) (listing the
four invasion of privacy torts recognized in Florida).
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“All of these actions are tied together by the common thread of
privacy, but otherwise they have little in common.” 179 Absent extraordinary
facts not contemplated by this Article, the first and the last torts—
appropriation and false light—have little application to the issue at hand. 180
Appropriation would require, for example, the independent scientist—or,
perhaps, a person who received personal data from the independent
scientist—to use the research participant’s name, image, or other comparable
research data for commercial or other advantage without the research
participant’s prior authorization. 181
False light would require the
independent scientist—or, perhaps, a person who received personal data
from the independent scientist—to publish in a widespread manner facts that
place the research participant in a highly offensive, false light. 182 Although
one could certainly create a fact pattern involving an independent scientist
and mobile research participant that satisfies the elements of one or both
torts, such a fact pattern is unlikely. 183
The second tort—intrusion—has still unlikely but potential
application to the issue at hand. 184 “Intrusion involves ‘the unreasonable and
highly offensive intrusion upon the seclusion of another.’” 185 Examples of
intrusion found to be actionable include “the illegal diversion or interception
and opening of one’s mail, peeping into one’s home, the viewing of a
department store’s changing room by someone of the opposite sex where no
adequate notice has been provided, persistent and unwanted telephone calls,
wiretapping, or prying into a plaintiff’s bank account.” 186 An independent
scientist who obtains personal data from a research participant’s mobile
phone and uses that data for research purposes without providing prior notice
to, and without obtaining the authorization of, the research participant could
arguably be a proper defendant in an intrusion case. 187 On the other hand, an
independent scientist whose mobile app—through an electronic privacy
policy or otherwise—notifies the potential research participant of the types
of data that will be collected for research purposes and who obtains the
individual’s prior and express electronic authorization to such research
participation should be able to defeat an intrusion claim. 188
179.
Overton & Giddings, supra note 45, at 41.
180.
See id. at 41–43.
181.
See id. at 41 (explaining the appropriation tort under Florida law).
182.
See id. at 43 (explaining the false light tort under Florida law).
183.
See id. at 41–43.
184.
Overton & Giddings, supra note 45, at 42.
185.
Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 117, at 854 (5th ed. 1984)) (explaining the intrusion tort under Florida law).
186.
Id.
187.
See id.
188.
See id.; Moore et al., supra note 1, 3–4.
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The third tort—public disclosure of private facts—also has unlikely
but potential application to the issue at hand. 189 In a case based on public
disclosure of private facts, “[t]he plaintiff must allege that facts were made
public that would normally [be] kept hidden from the public eye. Moreover,
the facts disclosed must be facts that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.” 190 One can imagine that an independent scientist who
made public highly offensive facts collected during research—perhaps
sexual behavior or sexual disease information 191—might be named as a
defendant in a public disclosure of private facts case if the scientist had
promised the research participant confidentiality. 192
The case law
interpreting both the second and third torts does not contain particular
privacy, security, or breach notification standards, compliance with which
would defeat the torts. 193 That said, the privacy concepts of prior notification
and prior authorization are referenced in the case law and, if adequately pled
by the independent scientist, should be sufficient to defeat a claim. 194
X.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS

This Article has carefully examined a variety of provisions within
Florida law to determine whether Florida law contains comprehensive
privacy, security, and breach notification standards that could apply to
independent scientists who conduct mobile app mediated health research. 195
This Article has concluded that Florida law tends to fall into one of two
categories—that is: (1) the law contains at least one data privacy, security,
and/or breach notification right or standard, but the right or standard is
limited in application to certain actors, certain professions, or certain
institutions and does not apply to independent scientists; or (2) the law is not
necessarily limited in application but the law fails to establish comprehensive
privacy, security, and breach notification standards that will drive the
implementation of privacy and security best practices by independent
scientists. 196 Florida laws that fall into the first category include the Florida

law).

189.
190.

Overton & Giddings, supra note 45, at 42.
Id. (discussing the public disclosure of private facts tort under Florida

191.
See id.; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 127.
192.
See Overton & Giddings, supra note 45, at 40–42.
193.
Id. at 42; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 160–62 (Fla.
2003); Doe v. Univision Television Grp., Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
194.
See Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d at 160–62; Doe, 717 So. 2d at 64.
195.
See discussion supra Parts II–IX.
196.
Discussion supra Parts II–IX; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; FLA. STAT.
§§ 282.318, 381.026, 395.0197, 408.051, 464.0095, 501.171 (2018); Florida Common Law,
supra note 33.
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Constitution (privacy), Florida’s health institution licensing laws (privacy),
Florida’s health professional licensing laws (privacy), the Health Records
Act (privacy), Florida ITS Act (security), and the Patient Bill of Rights
(privacy). 197 Florida laws that fall into the second category include FIPA
(security and breach notification) and Florida common law (privacy). 198
FIPA, which contains security and breach notification standards that
will apply to some, but not all, independent scientists who conduct mobile
app mediated research studies may be the best option for protecting mobile
app mediated research data going forward. 199 Several amendments to FIPA
would be necessary, however, to make the law apply to all independent
scientists who conduct mobile app mediated research. 200 First, as currently
written, FIPA applies to a covered entity, defined to include “a sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association
. . . commercial entity [or governmental entity] that acquires, maintains,
stores, or uses personal information.” 201 Because many independent
scientists are simply natural persons, an amendment to FIPA’s definition of
covered entity to include natural person would be helpful to ensuring
coverage of all independent scientists.202
Second, the application of FIPA hinges on whether the covered
entity acquires, maintains, stores, or uses personal information. 203 Recall that
FIPA defines personal information as:
“a. [a]n individual’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following data elements
for that individual: (I) [a] social security number; (II) [a]
driver[’s] license or identification card number, passport number,
military identification number, or other similar number issued on a
government document used to verify identity; (III) [a] financial
account number or credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that is
necessary to permit access to an individual’s financial account;
(IV) [a]ny information regarding an individual’s medical history,
mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by
a health care professional; or (V) [a]n individual’s health insurance
197.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; FLA. STAT. §§ 282.318, 381.026, 395.0197,
408.051; 464.0095.
198.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171; Florida Common Law, supra note 33.
199.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b).
200.
See id. § 501.171; Independent Scientists: Young Researchers Producing
Removeable Research, supra note 92.
201.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b).
202.
See id.; Independent Scientists:
Young Researchers Producing
Removeable Research, supra note 92.
203.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b).
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policy number or subscriber identification number and any unique
identifier used by a health insurer to identify the individual;
[(V)(b)] a user name or e-mail address, in combination with a
password or security question and answer that would permit access
to an online account.” 204

Some mobile apps, including PatientsLikeMe, require the user to
enter: (1) the user’s first and last name; and/or (2) a user name or email
address combined with a password or security question. 205 To the extent the
user also provides the app with information regarding the individual’s
“medical history, mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or
diagnosis by a health care professional,” FIPA would apply. 206 Other mobile
research apps, such as Kinsey Reporter, allow research participants to supply
health information without providing: (1) a first and last name; or (2) a user
name or email address combined with a password or security question.207 In
the case of these latter mobile research apps, FIPA would not apply. 208 In
order to cover all mobile research apps, FIPA’s definition of personal
information should be amended such that a first and last name, or a user
name or email address combined with a password or security question, are
not required for FIPA to apply. 209 One might think that these are the only
identifiers that could be used to identify a research participant; however,
electronically—and publicly—accessible property records, for example,
make it such that other identifiers, such as street number or address, could be
used to identify a research participant or a research participant’s family. 210

126.

204.
205.
206.

Id. § 501.171(g).
See PatientsLikeMe, supra note 49.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(a)(IV); see also What Is PII?, supra note

207.
See Kinsey Reporter: Apple Store, supra note 47; Kinsey Reporter:
Google Play, supra note 47.
208.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(a).
209.
See id.
210.
See Guidance Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected
Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/specialtopics/de-identification/index.html#rationale (last visited May 1, 2019); Cameron F. Kerry,
Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today — And How to Change the Game,
BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), http://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-alosing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/.
To most people, personal information means information like social security
numbers, account numbers, and other information that is unique to them. [United
States] privacy laws reflect this conception by aiming at personally identifiable
information, but data scientists have repeatedly demonstrated that this focus can be
too narrow. The aggregation and correlation of data from various sources make it
increasingly possible to link supposedly anonymous information to specific
individuals and to infer characteristics and information about them. The result is
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In summary, “[t]he aggregation and correlation of data from various sources
make it increasingly possible to link supposedly anonymous information to
specific individuals and to infer characteristics and information about
them.” 211
Once FIPA applies, the law contains a modest reasonable security
standard, a modest secure disposal standard, and a comprehensive breach
notification standard. 212 One option is to elevate FIPA’s modest security
provisions to the level of comprehensive security standards. 213 Other states
that have established comprehensive security standards in this context that
could serve as a guide include Oregon and Massachusetts. 214 Florida’s own
ITS Act, which also establishes comprehensive security standards, could be
used as a guide. 215 Because FIPA contains no privacy standards, including
individual rights provisions or use and disclosure requirements, the Author
further recommends that FIPA be amended to include such standards. 216 The
privacy standards set forth within the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule as well as
California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 may be used as a guide. 217
This Article has demonstrated that many Florida laws contain some
type of privacy, security, or breach notification standard applicable to health
data of the type collected by mobile research applications. 218 However, these
laws tend to be traditional, intra-industry laws that are limited in application
to certain individuals—usually licensed health care professionals—and
certain institutions—usually licensed health care facilities. 219 Today,
that today, a widening range of data has the potential to be personal information,
i.e. to identify us uniquely. Few laws or regulations address this new reality.

Kerry, supra.
211.
Id.
212.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2), (4), (8) (reviewing FIPA in detail; noting
that FIPA’s security provisions are modest because they pale in comparison to the
comprehensive security standards set forth in the HIPAA Security Rule as well as other state
laws, including the Florida ITS Act); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 201, 110 Stat. 1936, 1992 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
201 (2012)); FLA. STAT. § 282.318(3).
213.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 201,
110 Stat. 1936 at 1992; FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2), (4), (8).
214.
Tovino, supra note 6, at 54 (discussing the comprehensive data security
provisions of Oregon and Massachusetts); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 2 (2018);
OR. REV. STAT. § 182.122 (2018).
215.
See FLA. STAT. § 282.318.
216.
See id. § 501.171(2).
217.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 201,
110 Stat. 1936 at 1992; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (West 2018) (this law will be effective on
Jan. 1, 2020); Tovino, supra note 6, at 52 (discussing the comprehensive privacy standards set
forth within the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018).
218.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 282.318(3), 395.3025(4), 456.057(4), 501.171(2).
219.
See id. §§ 395.3025, 456.057.
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however, health data is generated not only by individual and institutional
members of the health care industry, but also by independent scientists who
conduct mobile app mediated research studies as well as a range of other
individuals and institutions that are based outside the health care industry. 220
The significant economic, dignitary, and psychological harms associated
with health data breaches and the lack of generally applicable federal and
state regulations suggests a need for reform in this area. 221 It is the Author’s
hope that the changes recommended to FIPA will better protect the privacy
and security of mobile research participant data as well as other forms of
health-related big data.*

220.
221.

See Klemick, supra note 14; Rothstein, supra note 19, at 425.
See Rothstein, supra note 19, at 425–26.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 22, 2018, eighteen-year-old Deanna Recktenwald stared
death square in the face and did not even know it, at least not until her
robotic sidekick—her Apple Watch—notified her to seek immediate medical
attention. 1 As Deanna quietly and calmly sat in church, her smart watch
pinged her out of nowhere, alerting her that her resting heart rate had
skyrocketed from a normal rate of sixty to one hundred beats per minute to a
rate of one hundred ninety beats per minute. 2 Her watch immediately
instructed her to reach the nearest hospital and, upon arrival, emergency
room physicians performed a series of tests confirming that Deanna’s smart
watch was correct—her heart rate was abnormally high. 3 Within hours,
medical professionals told Deanna that her Apple Watch “helped catch a
serious condition from which she was unaware she was suffering,” a genetic
condition known as Alport system. 4 The condition was causing Deanna’s
kidneys to function at twenty percent and fail. 5 Doctors warned her that she
was lucky to be alive and told her that if the smart watch had not alerted her
to the symptoms, she would have required an emergency kidney transplant. 6
Deanna’s story is not unique, but is one of the many stories
considered at the start of a technological revolution in the healthcare world—
an Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) revolution.7 The words AI and revolution in
one sentence may evoke futuristic images of robotic machines who become
more innovative and advanced than their creators, ultimately deciding to
annihilate civilization. 8 But, in reality, imagining a dystopian future with an
1.
Teen’s Life Saved by Apple Watch That Alerted Her Heart Condition,
INSIDE EDITION: NEWS (May 4, 2018, 8:23 AM), http://www.insideedition.com/teens-lifesaved-apple-watch-alerted-her-heart-condition-43024.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Christina Capatides, Teen's Apple Watch May Have Saved Her Life, CBS
NEWS (May 2, 2018, 6:18 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/teens-apple-watch-may-havesaved-her-life/.
6.
Id.
7.
See id.; Carrie Marshall, The Doctor on Your Wrist: How Wearables Are
Revolutionizing
Healthcare,
TECHRADAR:
NEWS
(July
7,
2018),
http://www.techradar.com/news/the-doctor-on-your-wrist-how-wearables-are-revolutionizinghealthcare; Michael Reilly, With a Little AI, Apple Watch May Be Able to Spot a Heart
TECH.
REV.:
CONNECTIVITY
(May
12,
2017),
Problem,
MIT
http://www.technologyreview.com/s/607867/with-a-little-ai-apple-watch-may-be-able-to-aspot-heart-problem/. In fact, the Apple Watch is credited with saving over three lives by
alerting its wearers to seek immediate medical help. Marshall, supra.
8.
Scott Bennett & Leeann Habte, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care:
Welcome to the Machine, AHLA CONNECTIONS, June 2018, at 16, 17.
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impending doom is not necessary to see just how AI can change the way we
live our lives. 9 Wearables such as the Apple Watch or Fitbit are no longer
engineered to just monitor how many steps a user takes in one day or a user’s
resting heart rate; they employ a form of AI technology that mimics the
human brain to detect irregular heartbeats and spot health issues such as high
blood pressure, sleeping issues, and even atrial fibrillation. 10 AI has turned
these flashy devices from fashion into robotic doctors on your wrist and that
is only a sliver of how healthcare is beginning to incorporate data-driven
intelligence to save lives. 11
The very first glimpse of AI occurred in the late 1950s. 12 One of the
brightest minds of Dartmouth, professor John McCarthy, brought together a
group of computer scientists in a workshop, known today as the Dartmouth
Workshop, to create his vision of getting computers to learn language just as
humans do. 13 McCarthy’s ideas on computer learning led the creation of the
field of AI. 14 From the 1950s on, the field developed and never stopped. 15
From computers that played checkers to the first computer world chess
champion, milestone after milestone was reached as computers completed
tasks, just like humans. 16
AI has come a long way since, but as innovation continues to move
at the speed of light, complex issues begin to present themselves. 17 While AI
is taking humankind into the future—left, right, and center—AI is being
applied to various industries, but laws and regulations are struggling to keep

9.
Id.
10.
Megan Molteni, With AI, Your Apple Watch Could Flag Signs of
Diabetes, WIRED: SCI. (Feb. 7, 2018, 10:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/story/with-ai-yourapple-watch-could-flag-signs-of-diabetes/; see also This Artificial Intelligence Model Mimics
TIMES
(July
24,
2018,
12:22
PM),
Human
Brain,
ECON.
http://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/this-artificial-intelligence-modelmimics-human-brain/articleshow/65115249.cms.
11.
See Jane R. Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 388
(2017); Marshall, supra note 7.
12.
Tom Simonite, The Wired Guide to Artificial Intelligence, WIRED: BUS.
(Feb. 1, 2018, 9:22 AM), http://www.wired.com/story/guide-artificial-intelligence/.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
See id.
16.
Id.; see also Pavel Hamet & Johanne Tremblay, Artificial Intelligence in
Medicine, 69 METABOLISM CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL, S36, S37 (2017).
17.
See Michael Guihot et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to
Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 394 (2017); Richard A.
Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV.
1753, 1753–54 (1996).
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tempo with the growth and change of such technological advancement. 18
One of the biggest and most worrisome issues facing regulatory agencies is
AI as applied to the healthcare world, its medical devices, and its drugs. 19
The daunting task of determining what is the best route to regulate AI
medicine so it is safe and effective falls to the purview of the United States
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). 20 While the FDA’s traditional
reaction to change in the healthcare world is to wait out innovation until a
public health crisis forces regulatory amendment, history will not repeat
itself this time. 21 The FDA has issued guidance and attempted to get ahead
of innovation, promoting AI in healthcare—but that begs the question, is
caution warranted? 22
This Comment will first provide an introduction to AI, going indepth on its history and how it has rapidly developed in the medical
culture. 23 More specifically, the Comment will discuss the types of AI,
breaking down the difference between machine-learning (“ML”) and deeplearning (“DL”) intelligence. 24 Part III of this Comment will then discuss the
FDA in great detail, providing a historical overview of how the FDA has
developed since its establishment and how it has reacted to previous
healthcare advancements. 25 Additionally, it will discuss how the FDA
currently regulates medical devices and drug discoveries. 26 Part IV of this
Comment will explain the FDA’s newest proposed regulatory guidelines for
how to regulate AI’s incorporation into healthcare devices and the risks of
regulating AI so quickly. 27 Finally, Part V will offer a conclusion. 28
II.

AN INTRODUCTION TO AI

“The development of full [AI] could spell the end of the human race
. . . . [AI] would take off on its own, and re-design itself at an ever-increasing
18.
Asokan Ashok, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare,
MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.medium.com/@Unfoldlabs/the-impact-of-artificialintelligence-in-healthcare-4bc657f129f5.
19.
Id.
20.
See Bambauer, supra note 11, at 385; Ashok, supra note 18.
21.
See Merrill, supra note 17, at 1761–62; Ashok, supra note 18.
22.
See Ashok, supra note 18; Aaron Gin & Bryan Helwig, FDA Signals
Fast-Track Approval for AI-Based Medical Devices, BLOOMBERG L. (May 9, 2018, 2:26 PM),
http://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/fda-signals-fast-track-approval-for-aibased-medical-devices-1/.
23.
See infra Section II.A.
24.
See infra Section II.A.2–3.
25.
See infra Section III.A.
26.
See infra Section III.B.
27.
See infra Part IV.
28.
See infra Part V.
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rate. Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, [could not]
compete, and would be superseded.” 29
A.

History of AI

Modern society is no stranger to the term AI. 30 The reality is that AI
is not a novel concept; since the 1950s, AI has been embedded in our culture
as an idea of science fiction, with everything from onscreen entertainment to
education. 31 The common perception of AI is derived from box-office hits
such as Star Wars, I, Robot, Blade Runner, and Interstellar, where “AI
beings who . . . challenge[] what it means to be human” have been brought to
the screen of modern society. 32 But what is AI? 33 Where did this
unorthodox and critically important scientific idea that is going to affect so
many industries come from? 34 Before embarking on AI’s origin story—and
how it became a field in need of its own regulation—it is important to define
what intelligence is first.35 In terms of mankind, intelligence has been
defined as characteristics comprised of “consciousness, self-awareness,
language use, the ability to learn, the ability to abstract, the ability to adapt,
and the ability to reason.” 36 Calculations or approximations of such
characteristics shape the benchmark of attempts to recreate or mimic such
intelligence, also known as AI. 37 Understanding what the threshold criteria
should be for a simulation possessing such intellectual qualities to be deemed
an AI is precisely what Dartmouth professor, John McCarthy, attempted to
define in 1956 when he coined the term AI. 38
29.
Bernard Marr, 28 Best Quotes About Artificial Intelligence, FORBES (July
25, 2017, 12:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/07/25/28-best-quotesabout-artificial-intelligence/#50783d374a6f.
30.
See Michael Hogan & Greg Whitmore, The Top 20 Artificial Intelligence
(Jan.
8,
2015,
7:29
PM),
Films
—
in
Pictures,
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/gallery/2015/jan/08/the-top-20-artificial-intelligencefilms-in-pictures; Simonite, supra note 12.
31.
See Ashok, supra note 18; Hogan & Whitmore, supra note 30; Simonite,
supra note 12.
32.
Hogan & Whitmore, supra note 30.
33.
See Guihot et al., supra note 17, at 393–96; Simonite, supra note 12.
34.
See Simonite, supra note 12.
35.
Guihot et al., supra note 17, at 393.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 393–94.
38.
Id.; Simonite, supra note 12. The pioneers of AI date back to names such
as Alan Turing and John von Neumann who focused on strong AI. M. Tim Jones, A
Beginner’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Cognitive Computing,
IBM DEVELOPER (June 1, 2017), http://developer.ibm.com/articles/cc-beginner-guidemachine-learning-ai-cognitive/.
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McCarthy “defined AI as ‘the science and engineering of making
intelligent machines, especially intelligent computer programs.’” 39 He was
careful not to confine intelligence in AI to an exact replication of human
intelligence; instead, McCarthy contended that machines had the ability to
exhibit other intelligences that required “much more computing than people
can do.” 40 McCarthy created and coined the field of AI by approaching a
small group of colleagues and asking them to study the possible idea of
making “machines do things [such as] use language.” 41 The study has been
referred to as the Dartmouth Workshop, recognized for “[giving] birth to
what developed into a new interdisciplinary research area.” 42 The work
accomplished at the Dartmouth Workshop “focused on solving fairly abstract
problems in math and logic” that resulted in the algorithms that we know and
see in AI today. 43
Early AI research, such as the Dartmouth Workshop, created a hype
in the development of the AI field that resulted in computers starting “to
solve . . . complex mathematical problems.” 44 Computer scientists began to
develop “[i]nstruments with increasing computational power. 45 These
discoveries paved the way for technological achievements such as IBM’s
Deep Blue winning the title of World Chess Champion in 1997, when it
defeated its human opponent, Gary Kasparov. 46 Today, AI is treated as a
subset of the engineering field that implements innovative concepts and
“solutions to []solve complex challenges.” 47
1.

What is AI?

In today’s day and age, AI plays a role by “powering . . . technology
that impacts people’s daily lives.” 48 AI is the substructure of nearly every
39.
Guihot et al., supra note 17, at 394 (quoting John McCarthy, What Is
Artificial
Intelligence?,
STAN.
U.
2
(Nov.
12,
2007,
2:05
AM),
http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/whatisai/whatisai.pdf).
40.
Id.; McCarthy, supra note 39, at 3.
41.
Simonite, supra note 12.
42.
Hamet & Tremblay, supra note 16, at S37; Simonite, supra note 12.
43.
Simonite, supra note 12. An algorithm is a program that evaluates data
and executes given instructions. See Jeff Goodell, Inside the Artificial Intelligence
Revolution: A Special Report, Pt. 1, ROLLING STONE: CULTURE (Feb. 29, 2016, 2:05 PM),
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/inside-the-artificial-intelligence-revolutiona-special-report-pt-1-118333/.
44.
Hamet & Tremblay, supra note 16, at S37.
45.
Id.
46.
Simonite, supra note 12.
47.
Hamet & Tremblay, supra note 16, at S37.
48.
Understanding the Black Box of Artificial Intelligence, SENTIENT: BLOG
(Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.sentient.ai/blog/understanding-black-box-artificial-intelligence/.
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website, cellphone, and tool that we use today—without it, iPhones would
not ring, iPads would not turn on, and Twitter would not tweet. 49 So what
exactly is AI? 50 Well, simply put, it is a complex “mathematical equation
that [instructs] a computer [on] what [task] to perform.” 51 The guide to
breaking down AI algorithms can be complex and dense because these
mathematical equations have many different parts to them. 52 In its earliest
stages, the main focus on the development of AI was to get a machine to
“perform any intellectual task that a human could [do].” 53
This
developmental focus became known as strong AI or Artificial General
Intelligence (“AGI”), which does not exist yet in today’s society. 54 AGI is
defined or referred to as machine sentience or the “possess[ion] [of] a
reasonable degree of self-understanding, . . . the ability to solve a variety of
complex problems in a variety of contexts, and [the ability to] learn to solve
new problems that [it] didn’t know about at the time of [its] creations.” 55
Due to a lack of progress in the field of AI for many years, an area in the
field of AI was created on its own—one which is prevalent in our everyday
lives—known as weak or narrow AI. 56 This type of AI is exactly what it
sounds like: AI that is not real and “focused on [carrying out] a single
task.” 57 Narrow AI is what “is used to recommend what films you watch on
Netflix or what songs you listen to on Spotify,” or even to recommend a
course of medical treatment; it essentially powers unexceptional machinery
with exceptional algorithms. 58
2.

ML

However, achieving such technological advancement in making
machines smart did not occur without digression from the original goal of

49.
See id.; Goodell, supra note 43.
50.
Jason Chung & Amanda Zink, Hey Watson — Can I Sue You for
Malpractice? Examining the Liability of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, ASIA PAC. J.
HEALTH L. & ETHICS, Mar. 2018, at 51, 53.
51.
Goodell, supra note 43.
52.
See Jones, supra note 38. The definitions, or lack thereof, is a discussion
beyond the scope of this Comment.*
53.
Id.
54.
Guihot et al., supra note 17, at 396.
55.
ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE vi (Ben Goertzel & Cassio Pennachin
eds., 2007); Chung & Zink, supra note 50, at 53.
56.
Chung & Zink, supra note 50, at 53; Jones, supra note 38.
57.
Chung & Zink, supra note 50, at 53.
58.
Understanding the Black Box of Artificial Intelligence, supra note 48;
Chung & Zink, supra note 50, at 54.
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AI. 59 During the early years of AI development and research, scientists and
engineers found themselves torn between AI and AGI, ultimately stumbling
upon a new type of algorithm known as ML. 60 ML, originally developed in
the 1980s, quickly became a leading subset of AI research. 61 The goal
behind ML is to give machines, especially computers, “the ability to learn
and build models so . . . they [are able to] perform activities [such as]
prediction within specific domains.” 62 But, what is ML? 63 Is it a technology
or a separate type of intelligence? 64 Google defines ML as:
A program or system that builds—[or] trains—a
predictive model from input data. The system uses the learned
model to make useful predictions from new—[or] never-beforeseen—data drawn from the same distribution as the one used to
train the model. [ML] also refers to the field of study concerned
with these programs or systems. 65

ML can be thought of as types of AI math equations that tell a
computer what to do. 66 These math equations are based off of algorithms
that “have been around for thousands of years and [used for basic] modern
computer[s].” 67 Put simply, these equations put data in the computer and the
“algorithm spits out a result.” 68 What is different about ML algorithms is
that the computers write their own algorithms. 69 How does this work? 70 If
you wanted to teach a computer how to perform an MRI of a brain, first you
would write an algorithm that teaches the computer the controls of the MRI
machine and input the data. 71 Next, you would tell the computer how and
what parts of the brain you want scanned—known as the result. 72 Finally,
the computer will give its own algorithm that tells the MRI machine how to
59.
See Hamet & Tremblay, supra note 16, at S37; Goodell, supra note 43;
Jones, supra note 38.
60.
See Jones, supra note 38.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
See id.; Goodell, supra note 43.
64.
See Jones, supra note 38.
DEVELOPER,
65.
Machine
Learning
Glossary,
GOOGLE
http://developers.google.com/machine-learning/glossary/?utm_source=googleai&utm_medium=card-image&utm_campaign=training-hub&utm_content=ml-glossary#m
(last visited May 1, 2019).
66.
Goodell, supra note 43.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
See id.
71.
See Goodell, supra note 43.
72.
See id.
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perform a scan of a brain. 73 This ML approach is called supervised ML,
which allows computer software to learn by example, either by a photograph
or specific data. 74 This type of learning means the data is classified. 75
On the other hand, an unsupervised ML approach is defined as
“[l]earning without annotated examples, just from experience of data or the
world—trivial for humans but not generally practical for machines.” 76
Unsupervised learning means there are no classified data sets. 77 Using the
example above, in an unsupervised learning approach the algorithm would
not tell the computer how to use MRI controls or even what result it
wanted. 78 Instead, the computer itself would realize there are different
machine controls to be used and different ways to perform an MRI scan and
would try to perform the task on its own. 79 In modern society, the
application of ML is around us every day. 80 The phone app Google Maps
uses supervised ML algorithms to find the quickest route and “calculate
traffic delays based on real-time data.” 81
3.

DL

ML has a lot of mathematical and statistical areas to it. 82 One of
those areas is called DL. 83 DL is defined as a “[ML] technique in which data
is filtered through self-adjusting networks of math loosely inspired by
neurons in the brain.” 84 Those self-adjusting networks are known as
Artificial Neural Networks (“ANNs”) and were originally discovered in 1958
but lost their popularity quickly due to a lack of belief that they would be
very powerful. 85 In 2012, scientists proved that ANNs would be extremely
effective and would fuel large piles of data, thereby giving computers the
ability to perceive new intelligence capabilities. 86 Today, DL is able to
revolutionize the way AI is used by employing neural networks. 87 With the
73.
See id.
74.
See id.; Simonite, supra note 12.
75.
See Goodell, supra note 43; Jones, supra note 38.
76.
Simonite, supra note 12.
77.
See id.; Jones, supra note 38.
78.
See Goodell, supra note 43; Simonite, supra note 12.
79.
See Goodell, supra note 43; Simonite, supra note 12.
80.
Goodell, supra note 43.
81.
Id.
82.
See Simonite, supra note 12.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Ariel Bleicher, Demystifying the Black Box That Is AI, SCI. AM. (Aug. 9,
2017), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/demystifying-the-black-box-that-is-ai/.
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use of ANNs, DL is able to put “large data sets through networks set up to
mimic the human brain’s neural network in order to teach computers to solve
specific problems on their own, such as recognizing patterns or identifying . .
. object[s] in a photo[].” 88 The process begins by a neural network first
receiving an input of data—so, for example, pixels of a photograph of a
dog—and scoring this data “according to simple mathematical rules, and
then pass[ing] the [results] to the next layer of [neurons].” 89 A DL network
has “anywhere from three to hundreds of layers.” 90 The last layer in a DL
network outputs a singular prediction—so, for example, it would predict:
This is a photo of a dog. 91 If the last layer makes the incorrect prediction—
for example, this is a photo of a bear—then the algorithm will correct itself
because the neural net has “create[d] a structured set of relationships [during
the process] . . . that can classify new images or perform actions under
conditions it has never encountered before.” 92 The neural networks make it
possible for AI systems to adapt to—and learn with accuracy—patterns that
are too complex and that would take too long for humans to be able to
accomplish on their own. 93 Additionally, these networks reflect the trial and
error process of the human brain, and they do so at a speed that is not
humanly possible. 94
So, what is the difference between regular ML, which involves
supervised and unsupervised learning, and DL? 95 ML forces computers to
perform tasks through the use of repeated drills written in the algorithm; the
computer is constantly being corrected and given instruction by the
programmer—the process is similar to the way a child learns a new word: A
teacher will have the child repeat the word again and again, or perhaps give a
spelling test until that child has learned that new skill. 96 During the process
of ML, the computer does not learn from its mistakes until the programmer
points them out and, until the computer reaches a certain level of accuracy,
88.
Larry Greenemeier, AI Is Not Out to Get Us, SCI. AM. (Oct. 24, 2016),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ai-is-not-out-to-get-us/.
89.
Bleicher, supra note 87.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
See id.
94.
Understanding the Black Box of Artificial Intelligence, supra note 48.
95.
Bernard Marr, What Is the Difference Between Deep Learning, Machine
(Dec.
8,
2016,
2:14
AM),
Learning
and
AI?,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/08/what-is-the-difference-between-deeplearning-machine-learning-and-ai/#6f4e537226cf.
96.
Abhi Arunachalam, How Deep Is Your Learning?, FORBES (Mar. 29,
2016, 1:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/valleyvoices/2016/03/29/how-deep-is-yourlearning/.
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the process continues. 97 On the other hand, DL eliminates the need for a
programmer—or teacher—and instead the computer can “self-improve [via]
the [analysis of] large data sets.” 98 With DL, the algorithm is basically
teaching the computer to learn like a human all on its own. 99 Various
companies have already applied the technologies of DL algorithms to their
products. 100 Products that serve as digital assistants, such as Apple’s Siri or
Amazon’s Alexa, are able to recognize speech and translate perfectly
because of neural networks. 101 Machines and computers are able to
recognize images, predict disease, and beat humans at video games because
of deep neural networks. 102 Now, the application of DL to the healthcare
world is making its debut. 103
B.

AI in Medicine

AI is constantly being applied to countless industries—from finance
to transportation—and these algorithms are changing the way we live life. 104
One of the most exciting and hopeful applications of AI to modern industries
is in the context of healthcare. 105 For years, specialists in the field of
healthcare have struggled with balancing the exorbitant amount of patient
information with diagnosing disease accurately, and with an overall shortage
of clinical support. 106 According to the World Health Organization, there is
no indication that there will be a decline in disease, death, or medicine in
general in the future:
[B]y 2020, the prevalence of chronic disease is expected to rise
[fifty-seven percent]. However, advancements in detecting and
diagnosing diseases will help to minimize the cost of treating
chronic diseases. Some of these new technologies include
genomics, proteomics, cell biology, stem cell and organ therapy,
and minimally invasive and robotic surgery. 107

97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.; Goodell, supra note 43.
101.
Bleicher, supra note 87.
102.
Id.
103.
See id.
104.
Ashok, supra note 18.
105.
See id.
106.
See id.; Jennifer Bresnick, Can Healthcare Avoid Black Box Artificial
Intelligence Tools?, HEALTHITANALYTICS.COM: TOOLS & STRATEGIES (Feb. 2, 2018),
http://healthitanalytics.com/news/can-healthcare-avoid-black-box-artificial-intelligence-tools.
107.
Ashok, supra note 18.
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Thankfully, with the implementation of AI in the medical industry,
the way physicians and healthcare professionals handle diagnosing and
treating disease will be approached from an entirely new platform. 108 In
modern society, AI technologies in healthcare are already present in various
medical products such as: Virtual medical devices that can readily diagnose
and track a patient’s health without a doctor present, DL algorithms that can
accelerate and assist in drug development, and the use of robots in
biologicals, genomics, and surgical care. 109 The exponential and doubling
growth of these technologies is why regulatory bodies need to keep a
watchful eye on their outdated polices and the shifting change of how the
medical world is incorporating these devices. 110 Many of the medical
products and devices using AI algorithms today, such as Mobile Health
(“mHealth”) or Deep Patient, are breaching the topic of black-box
medicine—the concern about transparency behind a machine’s thoughts,
such as how and why a machine generates the prediction or diagnosis that it
does. 111
C.

Black-Box Medicine

To put it simply, “black-box medicine [is] the use of opaque
computational models to make decisions related to health care.” 112 The user
or programmer understands what goes in to the computer and the result that
comes out of the computer, but what about the process in between that the
computer performs? 113 That remains a mystery. 114 One of the biggest issues
in applying AI to medicine is trying to figure out why a neural network
makes the decision it does—trying to get to the core behind what happens
between DL layer one and three hundred. 115 The concept of black-box
medicine is not new—for years users have been trusting the results of
technology, apps, and computers without knowing how A gets translated into

108.
Id. Early studies conducted found that nearly $630 million was spent in
the healthcare industry in 2014 on AI technology. Bennett & Habte, supra note 8, at 17. That
number is expected to grow more than nine-fold by the year 2021. Id.
109.
Id.
110.
See id. at 17–18.
111.
W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 421, 429–31 (2017); Bleicher, supra note 87.
112.
W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419,
421 (2015).
113.
Understanding the Black Box of Artificial Intelligence, supra note 48.
114.
See id.
115.
Id.; Bleicher, supra note 87.
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B. 116 The prevalence of black-box medicine is most often seen in clinical
decision making, whether diagnostic or therapeutic, because the computer or
system is most likely providing a particular recommendation to a patient and
will need to be trustworthy—an issue if the software is unable to give its
reasoning as to how it arrived at its recommendation. 117
1.

The Diagnosing Devices of AI

In 2010, IBM built one of the most influential machines in AI
history: Watson. 118 The company’s AI masterpiece shocked the country
with its television debut on Jeopardy!, taking home the grand prize and
defeating two all-time champions. 119 Watson’s “ability to synthesize [large]
quantities of data and produce evidence-based hypotheses” was a unique
characteristic that had never been seen before. 120 By 2012, Watson was
using its data processing abilities to help medical students diagnose and treat
patients. 121 By 2014, Watson had been developed to be used by doctors “to
connect genomic and medical data to help drive more personalized
treatments.” 122 Today, Watson has worked with over twenty cancer
institutes, the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”), and is now the
frontrunner to work with the country’s top oncologists to analyze samples of
tumors “look[ing] for mutations in the cancer’s genome.” 123
Watson has worked with over twenty-seven hundred veterans and
will continue to do so through 2019. 124 But how exactly does Watson
work? 125 “Watson [is] powered by DeepQA software,” meaning it is using
116.
Bresnick, supra note 106. The foundation of why a ML or DL computer
does what it does is usually not necessary for the average consumer. See id. This issue and
transparency of black-box medicine is beyond the scope of this Comment.*
117.
Id.
118.
Chung & Zink, supra note 50, at 54. Watson “can read [eight hundred]
million pages a second and can digest the entire corpus of Wikipedia, [and can even read]
decades of law and medical journals.” Goodell, supra note 43.
119.
Chung & Zink, supra note 50, at 54.
120.
See id. at 54–55.
121.
Id. at 54.
122.
Id.
123.
Sarah Wells, IBM Watson Health and the VA Extends Partnership in
(July
19,
2018),
Cancer
Research,
TECHCRUNCH
http://www.techcrunch.com/2018/07/19/ibm-watson-health-and-the-va-extends-partnershipin-cancer-research/.
124.
Id. “[T]he National Cancer Institute . . . estimate[s] [that about] 1,735,350
new cases of cancer will be diagnosed in 2018” and “that the veteran population [is] 3.5
[percent] of the nation’s cancer patients.” Id.
125.
Alison E. Berman, A Look at IBM’s Watson 5 Years After Its Breathtaking
HUB
(Aug.
10,
2016),
Jeopardy
Debut,
SINGULARITY
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an AI software used to analyze, reason, and answer content that is fed into
it. 126 Oncologists use Watson by “[u]pload[ing] the DNA fingerprint of a
patient’s tumor, which indicates which genes are mutated . . . and Watson . . .
sift[s] through thousands of mutations [to] try to identify which [one] is
driving the tumor and therefore what a drug must target.” 127 Unfortunately,
researchers still have kinks to figure out as the United States health system
and its flaws create flaws in the way Watson’s algorithm functions and
processes data—the medical records and information Watson sorts through is
not error free and was “initially digitized for . . . hospital administrators, not
for . . . disease treatment.” 128
But IBM and Watson are not the only dynamic duo making waves in
the world of medical AI; in 2018, Google released a new type of algorithm
that could help predict a patient’s risk of death.129 In May, “[a] woman with
late-stage breast cancer came to a city hospital, fluids already flooding her
lungs. She saw two doctors and [received] a radiology scan. The hospital’s
computers read her vital signs and estimated a 9.3 percent chance she would
die during her stay.” 130 Google applied its new algorithm to Jane Doe to
asses her death risk, something unheard of in healthcare. 131 The result? 132 A
19.9 percent chance, and within just a matter of days, Jane Doe had
passed. 133 Google used Jane Doe’s data to publish research regarding the use
of ANNs and DLs to create a system that would be able to “forecast . . .
patient outcomes, including how long people may stay in hospitals, their
odds of re-admission and chances they will soon die.” 134 The AI system
used everything from a random scribbled nurse’s note hidden deep in Jane’s
file to large CT scans to make its prognosis—and it did so in twice the speed
of a doctor, with almost none of the mistakes. 135 The system amazed
researchers and physicians as it “gobbled up all [the] unruly information

http://www.singularityhub.com/2016/08/10/a-look-at-ibms-watson-5-years-after-itsbreathtaking-jeopardy-debut/.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Mark Bergen, Google Is Training Machines to Predict When a Patient
(June
18,
2018,
5:00
AM),
Will
Die,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-18/google-is-training-machines-to-predictwhen-a-patient-will-die.
130.
Id.
131.
See id.
132.
See id.
133.
Id.
134.
Bergen, supra note 129.
135.
Id.
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[and] then spat out predictions . . . even show[ing] which records led it to
[what] conclusions.” 136
Innovation does not stop there; in 2018, more than three new
medical devices that focused on different types of diagnoses received
attention from the FDA. 137 First, Viz.ai engineered a large vessel occlusion
(“LVO”) Proactive Stroke Pathway (“PSP”). 138 Using DL technology, the
software helps automatically detect and alert on-call physicians that a patient
is having signs of a stroke. 139 Additionally, IDx LLC released its new device
IDx-DR which is engineered to detect a condition known as diabetic
retinopathy, exclusively found in adults with diabetes. 140 Moreover, AI
developers have started to utilize algorithms similar to Watson’s, that allow
software to make a diagnosis by reviewing images stored in a database. 141
The impact of software such as IBM’s Watson, and Google’s
Medical Brain on regulatory bodies are countless. 142 Such black-box
applications of ML and DL algorithms to provide for “medication assistance
. . . and communicat[ion] with doctors” create access to data and the ability
136.
137.

Id.
Rabiya S. Tuma, Caution Needed with Artificial Intelligence in Medicine,
(May
29,
2018),
Experts
Warn,
MEDSCAPE
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/897350#vp_1; see also Gin & Helwig, supra note 22.
In 2016, an “experimental neural net . . . called Deep Patient” was created to review over
“[twelve] years’ worth of electronic health records—including [everything from] test results
[to] hospital visits—from 700,000 patients.” Bleicher, supra note 87. The system was
successful and able to predict accurate diagnosis on its own without the help or input from a
doctor. Id. This system is a traditional black-box medical AI, as researchers know what goes
in and understand the result that comes out, but do not receive an analysis or reasoning behind
the diagnosis given. Id.
138.
Gin & Helwig, supra note 22; Tuma, supra note 137; Viz.ai, VIZ. AI,
http://www.viz.ai[http://www.web.archive.org/web/20181109145100/https://www.viz.ai/]
(last visited May 1, 2019).
139.
Gin & Helwig, supra note 22; Viz. ai, supra note 138.
140.
Gin & Helwig, supra note 22; see also Tuma, supra note 137.
141.
See Kif Leswing, Apple CEO Tim Cook Gave a Shout-Out to a $100-PerYear App for Doctors — Here’s What It Does, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 19, 2017, 8:30 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/visualdx-machine-learning-app-for-skin-diagnosis-ceointerview-2017-11.
142.
See Drew Simshaw et al., Regulating Healthcare Robots: Maximizing
Opportunities While Minimizing Risks, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 15. Predicting
medical events before they occur is also a very big benefit of AI’s application to health. See
Abby Norman, Your Future Doctor May Not Be Human. This Is the Rise of AI in Medicine.,
FUTURISM: SCI-FI VISIONS (Jan. 31, 2018), http://futurism.com/ai-medicine-doctor/. Recent
studies indicate that with “data from 378,256 patients, a self-taught AI [was able to predict]
7.6 percent more cardiovascular events in patients than the [previous] standard of care.” Id.
To put it in layman’s terms, the AI “had 1.6 percent [less] . . . cases in which [a] risk was
overestimated, possibly leading to patients having unnecessary, [risky] procedures or
treatments [done].” Id.
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to share such data on a global scale. 143 These applications and data
collections are very distinguishable from what is already being utilized in the
healthcare world, such as websites like WebMD and the like, creating a
regulatory loophole in classification categories that fall under the jurisdiction
of regulatory bodies such as the FDA. 144
2.

Surgical Robots

For nearly a decade, the idea of going [u]nder the [r]obotic [k]nife
has been making headlines. 145 Infamous AI robot systems, like the daVinci
Surgical System, provide doctors with a robotic arm of a sort, turning
surgery into a robotic video game. 146 The daVinci system allows surgeons to
change how operations are performed by allowing them to make a few small
incisions. 147 While surgical robots “present a number of . . . legal issues
[such as] . . . product and practice liability,” they also apply ML and DL AI
in traditional medical devices providing for unique regulation challenges. 148
The daVinci is not the only robodoc; in 2010, Canadian surgeons used
daVinci in-tandem with the world’s first robot anesthesiologist, McSleepy,
to perform surgery successfully. 149 The evolution of robotic surgeons does
not necessarily mean a green light for the AI application to the medical
device world; the FDA needs to be on the look-out. 150 A study conducted in
2015 by MIT staff using FDA data of robotic surgery statistics discovered
that “144 patient[s] [had died] and 1,391 patient injuries [had been] reported
[due to] technical difficulties or device malfunctions.” 151 The study showed
that the more complex the surgery, the higher the number of events
occurred. 152 The question to consider becomes: As AI begins to be applied
to accountable areas of life such as medicine and surgery, who begins to
regulate it and how? 153

143.
See Simshaw et al., supra note 142, at 11.
144.
See id. at 15, 17–20.
145.
Norman, supra note 142.
146.
See id.; Simshaw et al., supra note 142, at 9.
147.
Hamet & Tremblay, supra note 16, at S37; Anthea Gerrie, The da Vinci
Code: Why a Robotic System Replaces Chopstick Surgery, MEDTECH ENGINE: INNOVATION &
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.medtechengine.com/article/da-vinci-surgicalsystem/.
148.
Simshaw et al., supra note 142, at 9.
149.
Norman, supra note 142.
150.
See id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
See Simshaw et al., supra note 142, at 7, 15, 17–20.
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Precision Medicine and Drug Discovery

As the role of AI continues to be applied to various areas of the
medical world, one of the biggest applications is in the one-size-fits-all
treatment mentality that has plagued the healthcare industry. 154 Thanks to
these technologies, we are now aware that everyone has a different genetic
code and when it comes to disease treatment and prevention, may react
differently to medications. 155 Precision medicine is the emerging approach
for drug treatment, taking into account the varying genetic codes and
disregarding the one-size-fits-all approach. 156 The National Institute of
Health defines precision medicine as “an emerging approach for disease
treatment and prevention that takes into account individual variability in
genes, environment, and lifestyle.” 157 This type of treatment would break the
barriers of illness, allowing people to recover faster and stay healthy
longer. 158 How do we accomplish the wonders of precision medicine? 159
Well, due to the length of time it takes to develop a drug and the extremely
high cost, not to mention the amount of data, AI, ML, and DL algorithms can
help to resolve many of the issues that are present when it comes to treating
diseases such as Ebola and cancer. 160 In 2015, a company called Atomwise
released its software—a database that runs off of DL and AI—to help reengineer existing medications that could help treat the Ebola virus. 161 The
DL black-box system was successful in identifying two medications that
would help reduce the pain and suffering that people with the virus
experience—a process that usually takes ten months to ten years to
uncover. 162 But the drug innovation does not stop there; in May of 2018,
researchers at the University of Washington School of Medicine developed a
154.
Hema Chamraj, Powering Precision Medicine With Artificial Intelligence,
INTEL AI (Mar. 6, 2018), http://ai.intel.com/powering-precision-medicine-artificialintelligence/; see also There Is No Precision Medicine Without Artificial Intelligence, MED.
FUTURIST (Oct. 19, 2017), http://medicalfuturist.com/no-precision-medicine-without-artificialintelligence/.
155.
See Chamraj, supra note 154; There Is No Precision Medicine Without
Artificial Intelligence, supra note 154.
156.
Chamraj, supra note 154.
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
See id.; There Is No Precision Medicine Without Artificial Intelligence,
supra note 154.
160.
See Ashok, supra note 18; Chamraj, supra note 154; There Is No
Precision Medicine Without Artificial Intelligence, supra note 154.
161.
There Is No Precision Medicine Without Artificial Intelligence, supra note
154; see also Marr, supra note 95.
162.
There Is No Precision Medicine Without Artificial Intelligence, supra note
154.
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way to use mini robots to fight kidney disease. 163 Through the use of liquidhandling robots researchers have changed the growth of stem cells to
produce more complex three-dimensional structures that are able to mimic
“mutations that cause polycystic kidney disease.” 164 Researchers and
innovators in the drug development world call this and other applications of
AI a “secret weapon in our fight against disease.” 165
4.

mHealth

mHealth is commonly known as a type of AI medicine that uses
“mobile communications devices [such as] smartphones [or tablets] for
health or medical purposes, usually for diagnosis, treatment, or . . . wellbeing and maintenance.” 166 When it comes to mHealth apps that provide
maintenance or guidance on how to stay healthy, think of the FitBit, the
Apple Watch, and other devices that track steps and monitor heart rates. 167
Such devices have already been given regulatory review by the FDA and, as
such, this Comment is focused on mHealth apps that are focused on
predicting diagnosis and providing diagnosis, treatment, or other important
information that would usually be administered by a physician. 168 An
example of such an app is VisualDx. 169 A mobile app “targeted at trained
and credentialed doctors who . . . use it to help diagnose skin conditions and
disorders.” 170 Dr. James Shoemaker, a doctor with Elkhart Emergency
Physicians in Elkhart, Indiana, is an avid user of VisualDx and often uses it
with his patients. 171 Shoemaker was able to even diagnose a young child
with a very rare disorder called Stevens-Johnson syndrome, remarking that
he “had an idea it [was] that” and that “[t]he program reinforced [his]
diagnosis and helped [him] figure out the next step.” 172 The app uses an AI
program called CoreML, which allows it to use an ML algorithm on a phone
and—this is the exciting part—instead of having to process photos on a
163.
Robots Grow Mini-Organs from Human Stem Cells, SCIENCEDAILY (May
17, 2018), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/05/180517123300.htm.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Price II, supra note 111, at 428 (quoting Nathan Cortez, The Mobile
Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173, 1176 (2014)).
167.
See id. at 428–29.
168.
Id.; see also infra Part I–V.
169.
Leswing, supra note 141.
170.
Id.
171.
Arlene Weintraub, Hospitals Utilize Artificial Intelligence to Treat
Patients, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: CIVIC (Oct. 31, 2017, 11:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/healthcare-of-tomorrow/articles/2017-10-31/hospitals-utilizeartificial-intelligence-to-treat-patients.
172.
Id.
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server, the algorithm can readily process it on a handheld device. 173 What
exactly does this mean? 174 It means that VisualDx allows physicians to scan
a portion of a patient’s body, rather than taking a photo that is saved and
uploaded, and the neural network is trained by a “library of professional
medical images” to provide doctors with a search of “symptoms, signs, and
other patient factors” and then “confirm and validate [a] diagnos[i]s.” 175
III.

THE FDA: AN OVERVIEW

“[T]he upheavals [of AI] can escalate quickly and become scarier
and even cataclysmic. Imagine how a medical robot, originally programmed
to rid cancer, could conclude that the best way to obliterate cancer is to
exterminate humans who are genetically prone to the disease.”176
Established in 1906, the FDA is the regulatory authority over the
majority of food, drugs, and medical products that the public consumes on a
daily basis. 177 As such, the FDA is charged with the responsibility of
regulating all drugs and medical devices that implement AI technologies. 178
Since its establishment, the FDA has had to respond to numerous changes in
the field of healthcare and it is vital to briefly review such changes within the
FDA’s regulatory framework before discussing the FDA’s current AI
framework. 179
A.

Historical Overview of the FDA’s Regulatory Framework

In 1906, the Federal Food and Drugs Act was signed into law,
creating what is known today as the FDA. 180 Upon the initial passage of the
Act, the FDA’s regulatory powers were limited to regulating drugs that were
unsanitary or unsafe. 181 The FDA’s effectiveness in regulating therapeutic
drugs before they hit the mass markets was a problem for Congress, as well

at E2.

173.
174.
175.
176.

Leswing, supra note 141.
See id.
Id.
Nick Bilton, Artificial Intelligence as a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2014,

177.
RONALD HAMOWY, MEDICAL DISASTERS AND THE GROWTH OF THE FDA 3
(2010), http://www.independent.org/pdf/policy_reports/2010-02-10-fda.pdf; Merrill, supra
note 17, at 1758.
178.
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1753, 1753.
179.
See HAMOWY, supra note 177, at 5.
180.
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1758; see also Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915,
34 Stat. 768. Before 1927, the FDA was known as the Division of Chemistry and did not get
the name FDA until June 1940. John P. Swann, FDA’s Origin, FDA (Feb. 1, 2018),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/FOrgsHistory/EvolvingPowers/ucm124403.htm.
181.
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1802.
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as the consumer, because the FDA did not have the regulatory scope to
premarket review every drug or medical device. 182 Instead, the regulatory
process that the FDA did have placed all the standards of review on the
product, food, or device instead of on the manufacturers themselves; this
created large loopholes for the FDA. 183
In 1937, the FDA’s lack of regulatory authority became a public
health crisis after an administration of elixir sulfanilamide led to the death of
over one hundred people, many of them children. 184 The public health crisis
prompted Congress to pass the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”), enabling the requirement of premarket approval. 185 The process
for a manufacturer to market a drug changed drastically with the FDCA as it
required manufacturers to contact the FDA within a span of one hundred
eighty days before placing a drug out on the market; if no challenge or
question was raised with regard to safety concerns by the FDA, then the
manufacturer would be allowed to sell its drug to the public. 186 When
drafting the FDCA, Congress made sure to consider all “exotic mechanical
and electrical devices” that would fall under the scope of the definition of
drug. 187 Such considerations took evidence when Congress “expanded the
definition of drug to include devices,” making an effort to expand the FDA’s
regulatory scope to device-like products—subjecting them to premarket
approval—without having to create a secondary regulatory category. 188 At
the time, standard devices such as wheelchairs, leg braces, and surgical nails
posed no danger to patients. 189 However, it was shortly after the passing of
the FDCA that a new wave of technologies, with much more sophisticated
designs, began to advance the medical world. 190
The new wave of technological innovation following the FDCA
created a severe lack of regulatory authority for the FDA. 191 The FDA was
unable to premarket approve medical devices that were not considered nor
provided for under the FDCA’s original or expanded definition of a drug. 192
182.
Id. at 1761, 1802.
183.
Id. at 1761–62.
184.
Id. at 1761; HAMOWY, supra note 177, at 6.
185.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717 § 505, 52 Stat.
1040, 1052 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); Merrill, supra note 17, at 1764–65.
186.
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87–781, § 104, 76 Stat. 780 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); Merrill, supra note 17, at 1764–65.
187.
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1765, 1801–02; HAMOWY, supra note 177, at 9;
see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 201(g), at 1041.
188.
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1802.
189.
Id. at 1803.
190.
Id.; see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 1, at 1040.
191.
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1803–04; see also Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, § 1, at 1040.
192.
See Merrill, supra note 17, at 1804.
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Over time, larger and larger loopholes formed in the FDA’s regulatory
process, as medical devices and drugs that the FDA attempted to declare new
drugs, fell out of regulatory reach and hit the market before the FDA
approved them as safe and effective. 193
In 1960, Congress was faced with another mass health crisis when
numerous infants were born with severe birth defects due to the ingestion of
thalidomide, a drug given to pregnant woman for nausea. 194 Congress and
the FDA realized it was time to amend the FDCA when costly and disruptive
recalls of medical devices, such as intrauterine devices (“IUDs”) and
antibiotics, plagued the country due to an outdated regulatory scheme being
applied to the growing technological advances in the medical field. 195 The
Medical Device Amendments (“the Amendments”) of 1976 expanded the
scope of the FDA and transformed the regulatory scheme of the FDA’s
authority into one of the most complicated and conservative drug regulation
systems in the world. 196 The FDA had now been given the ability to issue
guidance on manufacturing standards for medical devices, to ban dangerous
products that had already been on the market, and to require premarket
notification of such defective products. 197 The Amendments also established
the fundamental frameworks of the regulatory process that the FDA uses
today: Classification, levels of control, and premarket notification. 198 While
the FDCA gave the FDA the authority to regulate medical devices for the
first time, the Amendments established the FDA’s authority to require
manufacturers of any medical device to prove its safety and effectiveness
before selling it to the public. 199
B.

Regulating Drugs and Devices

The FDA is arranged into multiple centers that focus on regulating
specific areas of products: the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
(“CFSAN”); the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”); the
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (“CBER”); and the Center for

193.
See id. at 1805–06.
194.
HAMOWY, supra note 177, at 11; Merrill, supra note 17, at 1764 & n.35.
195.
See Merrill, supra note 17, at 1805–06.
196.
See id. at 1808; Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94295, 90 Stat. 539.
197.
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1808.
198.
Id. at 1809–10; Medical Device Amendments of 1976, §§ 85 1-2.
199.
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52
Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 (2012)); Merrill, supra note 17, at 1765,
1776, 1800.
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Devices and Radiological Health (“CDRH”).200 The centers primarily
responsible for regulating drugs, medical devices and biopharma are CDER,
CBER, and CDRH. 201
1.

CDER

CDER is charged with regulating “over-the-counter and prescription
drugs, including biological therapeutics and generic drugs.” 202 If a
pharmaceutical company or drug manufacturer wants to market a new drug,
it must abide by the regulations set out by CDER. 203 The multi-step process
for manufacturing and selling a new drug is exhaustive and costly. 204 First,
the manufacturer has to file an Investigational New Drug (“IND”)
application—which is based on test results from initial experiments
conducted on animals—to get approval for research to experiment the drug
on human subjects. 205 If the applicant is approved, then he or she can begin
human clinical trials and attempt to test the safety and efficacy of the drug. 206
The purpose of this step is to gather evidence that the new drug meets the
FDA’s requirements for marketing approval. 207 The process of clinical
human trials is lengthy, consisting of three phases. 208 Phase I studies focus
on gathering test data regarding the safety of the drug and typically involve
twenty to eighty human subjects; Phase II focuses on the effectiveness of the
drug and involves several dozen to three hundred people; and Phase III

200.
John Miller, Beyond Biotechnology: FDA Regulation of Nanomedicine,
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV., 2003, at 1, 13; see also About CBER, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/u
cm123340.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2018); How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprov
ed/default.htm (last visited May 1, 2019); Overview of CDRH Transparency, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/
CDRHTransparency/ucm199624.htm (last updated Sept. 14, 2018).
201.
Miller, supra note 200, at 13; see also About CBER, supra note 200; How
Drugs Are Developed and Approved, supra note 200; Overview of CDRH Transparency,
supra note 200.
202.
About the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder/
(last
updated Feb. 27, 2019).
203.
See How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, supra note 200.
204.
See The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and
Effective, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last
updated Nov. 24, 2017).
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
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focuses on specific treatment variables and involves anywhere from a few
hundred to three thousand people. 209
“The goal [of these phases] is to determine what the drug’s most
frequent side effects are and, often, how the drug is metabolized and
excreted.” 210 The length of each phase can vary greatly; for example, Phase
II trials can vary anywhere from “[s]everal months to [two] years.” 211 At this
stage, “[a]pproximately [thirty-three percent] of drugs [are approved to]
move to the next phase.” 212 If there is evidence of effectiveness, Phase III
studies begin with the purpose of “demonstrat[ing] whether or not a product
offers a treatment benefit to a specific population . . . [and] these studies
involve [three hundred] to [three thousand] participants.” 213 The length of
Phase III trials can vary anywhere from one to four years.214 According to
the FDA: “Phase [III] studies provide most of the safety data. In [Phase I
and II] studies, it is possible that less common side effects might have gone
undetected. Because [the Phase III] studies are larger and longer in duration,
the results are more likely to show long-term or rare side effects.” 215
Once the IND clinical trials are completed, CDER requires that postmarket studies be completed; these are at times referred to as Phase IV
trials. 216 Phase IV trials involve several thousand volunteers and involve the
gathering of data on the drug “after the FDA has approved [the] product for
marketing.” 217 After the IND phase is complete, the drug manufacturer
applies for a New Drug Application (“NDA”) and submits along with it all
the animal and human experimental data, proposed labeling, and chemical
makeup of the drug. 218 At this stage, CDER reviews all the data and, after
evaluating the data from the clinical trials, weighs whether the product’s
benefits outweigh its risks to decipher whether to approve or deny the
drug. 219 CDER’s surveillance is never quite finished when it comes to a

209.
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and
Effective, supra note 204.
210.
Id.
211.
Step
3:
Clinical
Research,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 211.
217.
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and
Effective, supra note 204; Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 211.
218.
How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, supra note 200; The FDA’s
Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra note 204.
219.
See How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, supra note 200.
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drug’s development of efficacy and safety. 220 “[I]t is impossible to have [all
the] information about the safety of a drug at the time of approval.” 221 Thus,
CDER and the FDA are constantly reviewing drugs post-market for safety. 222
2.

CDRH

The FDA center responsible for regulating medical devices is the
CDRH. 223 The process for classifying a medical device is significantly
easier and less restrictive than the drug approval process. 224 A medical
device is defined as:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article,
including [any] component part, or accessory which is . . . intended
for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or
other animals, or intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its
primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on
the body of man or other animals. 225

Medical devices are regulated using a risk-based classification
system. 226 Using this approach, all devices could fall under FDA regulation,
which would entail “registration, listing, and . . . reporting requirements.” 227
The higher the risk, the higher the class: Class I—simple low-risk devices;
220.
See id.; About the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, supra note
202;
Step
5:
FDA
Post-Market
Drug
Safety
Monitoring,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405579.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
221.
Step 5: FDA Post-Market Drug Safety Monitoring, supra note 220.
222.
See The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and
Effective, supra note 204. With regard to right-to-try laws, this falls beyond the scope of this
Comment and will not be discussed. See Jacqueline Howard, What You Need to Know About
HEALTH
(May
29,
2018,
1:50
PM),
Right-to-Try
Legislation,
CNN:
http://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-explainer/index.html.
223.
Overview
of
Device
Regulation,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/overview/default.htm (last
updated Aug. 31, 2018).
224.
See
Is
the
Product
a
Medical
Device?,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYour
Device/ucm051512.htm (last updated Mar. 22, 2018); The FDA’s Drug Review Process:
Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra note 204.
225.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012); Is the Product a Medical Device?, supra note
224.
226.
Price II, supra note 111, at 438.
227.
Id.
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Class II—medium risk devices; or Class III—high risk devices. 228 These
categories are determined based upon the risks such devices may pose and
the regulatory controls that will need to be provided to assure safety and
effectiveness. 229 “Class I devices . . . pose the lowest risk to [a] patient . . .
Class III devices pose the highest risk.” 230 The controls that a class is subject
to is based upon the regulatory measures necessary to ensure safety and
efficacy. 231 In addition to a three-tiered classification system, the CDRH
employs varying levels of review that must be met before allowing a device
to enter the market. 232 A new device may be subject to either a total
exemption or a 510(k) premarket notification process if the device is subject
to a Class I or II classification or, if the device falls under Class III, a
premarket approval process (“PMA”). 233 Generally, the largest area of
regulation for medical devices rests with the category of Class III medical
devices. 234 Any device manufactured after 1976 is defaulted into Class III
228.
Id.
229.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2012).
230.
Overview of Medical Device Classification and Reclassification, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cdrh/cdrhtran
sparency/ucm378714.htm (last visited May 1, 2019). Class I devices are subject to general
controls, Class II are subject to special controls, and only Class III devices are subject to
complete review for safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1); Premarket Approval
(PMA),
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevic
e/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm (last visited May 1, 2019); see
also
Regulatory
Controls,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/overview/generalandspecial
controls/default.htm (last updated Mar. 27, 2018).
231.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a). An example of a Class I product is an elastic
bandage. What’s My FDA Medical Device Classification, CORTEX DESIGN INC.: IDEAS (June
25, 2018), http://www.cortex-design.com/blog/whats-my-fda-medical-device-classification/.
An example of a Class II product is an infusion pump. Id. An example of a Class III product
is a cochlear implant. Id.
232.
Spenser F. Powell, Changing Our Minds: Reforming the FDA Medical
Device Reclassification Process, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 177, 184 (2018).
233.
Id. at 184–85; Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 230.
234.
See Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 230. In 1997, the FDA
Modernization Act was passed and it allowed for the exemption of the majority of Class I
devices from 510(k) premarket notification on the condition that “the device is not ‘intended
for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health’ and
does not ‘present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.’” Powell, supra note 232,
at 185 (quoting Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105115, § 206(a), 111 Stat. 2296, 2339 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012))). In
2012, the FDA Safety and Innovation Act further expedited the process of medical device
approval, giving the FDA “the authority to alter device classification [via] administrative
order rather than regulation.” Powell, supra note 232, at 185 (quoting Jeffrey K. Shapiro,
Substantial Equivalence Premarket Review: The Right Approach for Most Medical Devices,
69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 367 n.3677 (2014)); see also Food and Drug Administration Safety

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

193

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 1

412

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

and subject to a PMA, unless the CDRH finds that, either there is a
substantially equivalent device on the market classified as I or II and grants
510(k) approval—this acts as a loophole to having a Class III device being
regulated as such—or that based upon a de novo determination by the FDA
the statutory definition of Class I or II is met. 235
3.

CBER

CBER regulates a broad area of concern in public health. 236 This is
the regulation of biological related products called biologics, including
anything from blood, vaccines, tissues, and gene therapies—many of which
are created using biotechnology. 237 The FDA opines that “[t]hese products
often represent cutting-edge biomedical research and, in time, may offer the
most effective means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and conditions
that presently have few or no other treatment options.” 238 The process for a
manufacturer to obtain approval for either clinical testing or license to
market a new biological product is similar to the process under CDER’s
purview. 239 CBER is responsible for determining that a product is “safe,
pure, potent, and manufactured accordingly.” 240
C.

The 21st Century Cures Act

In 2016, the 21st Century Cures Act (“the Cures Act”) was enacted
by Congress. 241 The Cures Act was enacted with various purposes in mind,
but one of the key factors was the clarification of “the FDA’s regulatory
authority over digital health and medical devices.” 242 More specifically, one
aspect of the Act titled Clarifying Medical Software Regulation clarified
what medical software does and does not fall under the purview of the
and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 101, 126 Stat. 993, 996 (2012) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)).
235.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)-(3); Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note
230.
236.
See About CBER, supra note 200.
237.
Id.
238.
Id.
239.
Miller, supra note 200, at 15.
240.
Id. (quoting 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, HISTORY LEADING TO THE BIOLOGICS
PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2009 § 13:156, Westlaw (database updated June
2018).
241.
Bennett & Habte, supra note 8, at 18; see also 21st Century Cures Act,
Pub. L. No 114-255, § 1, 130 Stat. 1033, 1033 (2016).
242.
Bennett & Habte, supra note 8, at 18; see also 21st Century Cures Act, §
1, 130 Stat. at 1033.
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FDA. 243 Pursuant to the Act, digital health—under purview of the FDA and
subject to regulatory authority—includes machines or devices that use AI
algorithms such as ML or DL “to provide diagnostic information for
patients.” 244 The Cures Act completely changed the way the FDA regulated
medical devices, including the way mobile devices are incorporated into the
definition of both digital devices and medical devices. 245 Most importantly,
the Cures Act allowed for the provision that Class III devices be regulated or
excluded from regulation as Class I or Class II devices, given they are lowrisk medical software that “serve as electronic patient records, assist in
displaying or storing data, or provide limited clinical decision support.” 246
To put it simply, if the algorithm does not provide a diagnosis or predict a
course of treatment, then the FDA does not regulate it. 247 Until modern
society began utilizing Fitbits, Apple Watches, and other mobile devices to
track steps taken, monitor their hearts, and for other health reasons, a medical
device was traditionally thought of and used only to provide measurements
or give treatments. 248 Given the increasing amount of entities using and
implementing the amount of AI software or support, and the imperfect fit
between AI and healthcare, the FDA provided a pilot program to pre-certify
eligible digital health developers who could market their devices without
additional FDA review. 249
IV.

REGULATING DR. ROBOT

The pace of progress in [AI]—I’m not referring to narrow AI—is
incredibly fast. Unless you have direct exposure to groups like
Deepmind, you have no idea how fast—it is growing at a pace

243.
Price II, supra note 111, at 439–40 (citing to 21st Century Cures Act §
3060, 130 Stat. at 1130).
244.
Bennett & Habte, supra note 8, at 18; see also 21st Century Cures Act, §
3051, 130 Stat. at 1121.
245.
See Price II, supra note 111, at 439–40; see also 21st Century Cures Act,
§ 515c, 130 Stat. at 1121. The Cures Act attempts to streamline and address some of the
issues the FDA has already faced in seeking to clarify software device and non-software
device involved in diagnosing and treating diseases. Price II, supra note 111, at 439–40.
However, the Cures Act does not specifically address all AI technology. See 21st Century
Cures Act, § 515c, 130 Stat. at 1121–24.
246.
Bennett & Habte, supra note 8, at 18; see also Price II, supra note 111, at
438.
247.
Bennett & Habte, supra note 8, at 18; see also 21st Century Cures Act, §
515c, 130 Stat. at 1121–24.
248.
See Bambauer, supra note 11, at 386.
249.
Bennett & Habte, supra note 8, at 18.
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close to exponential. The risk of something seriously dangerous
happening is in the five-year time frame. [Ten] years at most. 250

A.

The FDA’s Digital Health Innovation Action Plan

In 2018, the FDA released a potential remedy to the AI loophole in
its regulatory policies. 251 The Digital Health Software Precertification
Program (“Pre-Cert”) was created by the FDA to potentially regulate certain
software that abides by FDA medical device standards to “qualify for either
an exemption from premarket review for lower risk . . . products, or [for] a
faster review of higher risk products.” 252 The main difference between PreCert and the Cures Act? 253 “Pre-Cert focuse[s] on free-standing software . . .
apps designed to diagnose or treat disease.” 254 The program is designed to
speed up regulatory review for companies that have exhibited quality
medical devices and drugs, as well as in software development. 255 Pre-Cert
works by using five working models based on principles that will be used to
evaluate devices that manufacturers submit for Pre-Cert. 256 The principles
are: “(i) product quality, (ii) patient safety, (iii) clinical responsibility, (iv)
cybersecurity protection, and (v) proactive culture.” 257 The FDA uses these
principles to evaluate and monitor the AI algorithm which a medical device
uses. 258 The main goal of this program is to look at the developer of the
software instead of targeting the product itself, as the FDA has done in years
prior. 259 It is important to note that the Pre-Cert program is not law, and
FDA guidance still creates a loophole for manufacturers that are creating
250.
Marr, supra note 29.
251.
FDA Releases Software Precertification Working Model, JONES DAY
(May 30, 2018), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fda-releases-software-precertification65942/.
252.
Id.; see also Theodore T. Lee & Aaron S. Kesselheim, U.S. Food and
Drug Administration Precertification Pilot Program for Digital Health Software: Weighing
the Benefits and Risks, 168 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 730, 730–31 (2018).
253.
Compare Lee & Kesselheim, supra note 252, at 731, with 21st Century
Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1, 130 Stat. 1033, 1033 (2016).
254.
Experts Express Concerns About FDA Precertification Program for
Health Apps, HEALIO (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.healio.com/internal-medicine/practicemanagement/news/online/%7B30f0ee35-f2e2-408f-a35a-723df18a9217%7D/experts-expressconcerns-about-fda-precertification-program-for-health-apps.
255.
Lee & Kesselheim, supra note 253, at 730; FDA Releases Software
Precertification Working Model, supra note 251.
256.
FDA Releases Software Precertification Working Model, supra note 251.
257.
Id.
258.
See id.; Gin & Helwig, supra note 22.
259.
See FDA Releases Software Precertification Working Model, supra note
251.
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helpful medical devices and drugs for the time being. 260 For now, until such
guidance is adopted as law by Congress, developers can still seek
classification of their medical device through the FDA’s 510(k) process or
wait it out if their device is a Class III device. 261
Nine companies were selected by the FDA to participate in a pilot
program of the Pre-Cert process. 262 The companies—Apple, Samsung,
Verily, Johnson & Johnson, Roche, and Fitbit, among them—were all named
companies selected to participate and, as such, are now required to share
information such as quality management and post-market data, and to allow
FDA visitation to corporate sites. 263 The Pre-Cert program may be “an
encouraging move on the FDA’s part, [but there are] some . . . raising
concerns that it will pose more risks to consumers by allowing them to
purchase products before there are evidence-based results”—one of the few
risks of regulating Dr. Robot. 264
B.

The Risks of Regulating Dr. Robot

Apple Watches are telling us our heart rates, Fitbits are telling us
how many steps we walk, and mobile apps are telling us to drink more
water. 265 All of these technologies are possible because of AI algorithms—
algorithms that are even making medication smarter. 266 But “innovation
moves fast—much faster than” regulation—and patients look to regulators to
protect them from the dangers that devices and drugs can potentially pose. 267
The biggest risk of regulating robots in health comes with the speed in which

731.
731.

260.

See Gin & Helwig, supra note 22; Lee & Kesselheim, supra note 253, at

261.

See Gin & Helwig, supra note 22; Lee & Kesselheim, supra note 253, at

262.
FDA Selects Participants for New Digital Health Software
Precertification Pilot Program, FDA: NEWS RELEASE (Sept. 26, 2017)
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm577480.htm.
263.
Id.
264.
Shireen Yates, A Digital Health Revolution Is Happening Now, but the
(Mar.
8,
2018,
9:19
AM),
FDA
Can’t
Keep
Up,
OBSERVER
http://www.observer.com/2018/03/digital-health-revolution-happening-now-fda-cant-keepup/.
265.
Marshall, supra note 7; Molteni, supra note 10; Hint Water, 10 of the Best
Water Apps to Use for Free, QUENCH (June 21, 2016), http://www.thequench.com/water/8-ofthe-best-water-apps-to-use-for-free/.
266.
Chamraj, supra note 154; see also Bambauer, supra note 11, at 391–92.
267.
Yates, supra note 264; see also Tuma, supra note 137.

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

197

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 1

416

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

the FDA either wants to or cannot regulate these devices and drugs such as,
for example, the home genomics kit 23andMe. 268
Initially, the home genomics kit, utilizing AI, escaped regulation
because it was not considered a medical device by definition.269 The FDA
began to give attention to the kit when it “began to provide customized
health reports” to its users. 270 What was concerning about this was the risk
to users regarding the AI learning and knowledge component. 271 23andMe is
a prime example of why AI in healthcare offers a scare to regulatory
authority; all the knowledge provided by AI is based on models and
algorithms—models that are based on code. 272
Another risk that comes with the regulation of AI in healthcare “is
that the[se] models are based on such . . . large volume[s] of data and are so
complex that no one really knows what is driving [the] outcomes, why one
patient falls into one group or another according to the model.” 273 The
algorithms that drive ML and DL are written by humans and, while the
systems learn on their own from there, if a bad code is written—or bad data
is fed into the system—we have yet to learn how long it will take before that
self-learning system will harm itself or the patients that are using it. 274
Consistency and accuracy is a key function in not only technology, but also
in medication treatment and diagnosis. 275 If data sets are trained or coded to
encounter a limited number of or certain types of illnesses in the medical
world, it is very likely that in a clinical setting they will come across
scenarios they have never learned or been coded for. 276 The FDA will have
to reach out to other regulatory bodies to help it understand and consider all
the aspects of AI technologies, including everything from “ethics [and]
computing [to] clinical care.” 277
V.

CONCLUSION

“With such a controversial technology such as [AI], it is imperative
that policymakers make decisions while the technology is still young, before
268.
Bambauer, supra note 11, at 388; Lee & Kesselheim, supra note 253, at
730; Yates, supra note 264.
269.
Bambauer, supra note 11, at 388.
270.
Id.
271.
Id.
272.
See id.; Jones, supra note 38; Tuma, supra note 137.
273.
Tuma, supra note 137.
274.
See id.; Jones, supra note 38.
275.
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they are forced to make policy reactively.” 278 The application of AI
technologies such as ML and DL to healthcare devices and drugs has been
rampant in the last ten years—ranging from telemedicine to cancer detection
to algorithms to help neurovascular brain deterioration. 279 With over $1.7
billion spent in 2016 alone on AI technologies in the healthcare industry, it is
no longer just a choice for the FDA to start developing a framework on how
to regulate ML and DL products in the context of medicine. 280 However, the
FDA should not approach these regulations alone, as the speed at which AI
continues to grow proves to be too fast for one regulatory body to handle. 281
Instead, multiple regulatory bodies should review the potential harms of
regulatory flexibility pertaining to AI technologies being applied to medical
devices and drugs and err on the side of caution. 282
Looking back at the history of the FDA, it is easy to identify a
pattern of how the agency approaches the regulation of new technologies and
drug developments. 283 Instead of having foresight and getting ahead of
innovation, the FDA allows itself to fall behind—warranting catastrophe to
stockpile up into public health events—ultimately triggering overly tight
regulations. 284 But this time, there is a technological revolution in front of
its eyes—the FDA’s way of handling changes in how drugs and medical
devices are regulated will not be able to keep up if the agency continues to
let itself fall behind. 285 The age of AI has arrived. 286
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